Incentive-Compatible Grants-in-Aid Mechanisms for Federations with Local Tax Competition and Asymmetric Information
Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher, T. Kuhn
Proceedings. 98th Annual Conference on Taxation, Miami, Florida, November 17-19, 2005 and Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the National Tax Association,
2006
Abstract
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The (never) ending story of the truck toll system – a contract theory view
Niels Krap
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 11,
2005
Abstract
After long-lasting negotiations, representatives of the Federal Government and the consortium Toll Collect signed a 17,000 pages contract on 20 September, 2002. It was fixed that Toll Collect had to develop and afterwards operate a system for the automatic collection of a satellite-supported distance-based truck toll until the end of August 2003. However, technical difficulties in the development of the new system led to delays to an unexpected extent. In this article, it is examined whether the results of the renegotiations that followed were consistent to the economics of contract theory. It can be shown that both contracting parties were bound to the contractual relation, so that the preliminary termination of the contract by the Federal Minister of Transport on 17 February, 2004 became void by an agreement only few days later. Additionally, it could be identified that the contract set correct incentives for both parties, Federal Government and Toll Collect, and covered the possibility of efficient renegotiation.
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The Impact of Institutions on the Employment Performance in European Labour Markets
Herbert S. Buscher, Christian Dreger, Raúl Ramos, Jordi Surinach
Discussion Paper No. 1732,
2005
Abstract
The paper investigates the role of institutions for labor market performance across European countries. As participation rates have been rather stable over the past, the unemployment problem is mainly caused by shortages in labor demand. Labor demand is expressed by its structural parameters, such as the elasticities of employment to output and factor prices. Institutional variables include employment protection legislation, the structure of wage bargaining, measures describing the tax and transfer system and active labor market policies. As cointegration between employment, output and factor prices is detected, labor demand equations are fitted in levels by efficient estimation techniques. Then, labor demand elasticities are explained by institutions using panel fixed effects regressions. The results suggest that higher flexibility and incentives of households to work appear to be appropriate strategies to improve the employment record. The employment response to economic conditions is stronger in a more deregulated environment, and the absorption of shocks can be relieved.
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Non-market Allocation in Transport: A Reassessment of its Justification and the Challenge of Institutional Transition
Ulrich Blum
50 Years of Transport Research: Experiences Gained and Major Challenges Ahead,
2005
Abstract
Economic theory knows two systems of coordination: through public choice or through the market principle. If the market is chosen, then it may either be regulated, or it may be fully competitive (or be in between these two extremes). This paper first inquires into the reasons for regulation, it analyses the reasons for the important role of government in the transportation sector, especially in the procurement of infrastructure. Historical reasons are seen as important reasons for bureaucratic objections to deregulation. Fundamental economic concepts are forwarded that suggest market failure and justify a regulatory environment. The reasons for regulation cited above, however, may be challenged; we forward theoretical concepts from industrial organization theory and from institutional economics which suggest that competition is even possible on the level of infrastructure. The transition from a strongly regulated to a competitive environment poses problems that have given lieu to numerous failures in privatization and deregulation. Structural inertia plays an important role, and the incentive-compatible management of infrastructure is seen as the key element of any liberal transportation policy. It requires that the setting of rules on the meta level satisfies both local and global efficiency ends. We conclude that, in market economies, competition and regulation should not be substitutes but complements. General rules, an "ethic of competition" have to be set that guarantee a level playing field to agents; it is complimented by institutions that provide arbitration in case of misconduct.
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Quality of Service, Efficiency, and Scale in Network Industries: An Analysis of European Electricity Distribution
Christian Growitsch, Tooraj Jamasb, Michael Pollitt
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 3,
2005
Abstract
Quality of service is of major economic significance in natural monopoly infrastructure industries and is increasingly addressed in regulatory schemes. However, this important aspect is generally not reflected in efficiency analysis of these industries. In this paper we present an efficiency analysis of electricity distribution networks using a sample of about 500 electricity distribution utilities from seven European countries. We apply the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) method on multi-output translog input distance function models to estimate cost and scale efficiency with and without incorporating quality of service. We show that introducing the quality dimension into the analysis affects estimated efficiency significantly. In contrast to previous research, smaller utilities seem to indicate lower technical efficiency when incorporating quality. We also show that incorporating quality of service does not alter scale economy measures. Our results emphasise that quality of service should be an integrated part of efficiency analysis and incentive regulation regimes, as well as in the economic review of market concentration in regulated natural monopolies.
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Kooperation, Vernetzung und Erfolg von Unternehmen - die Biotechnologiebranche
Walter Komar
List Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik,
No. 2,
2005
Abstract
According to theoretical implications the succes of enterprises benefits from co-operation and integration into networks. Enterprises of the biotechnology sector in particular have a high propensity to build up co-operations. Estimations of the growth of firms using co-operation-based and non-co-operation-based factors as independent variables reveal a significantly positive influence of the propensity of co-operation as well as networking. In this regard scientific institutions and universities located in geographical proximity of firms play an important role. From this analysis it can be generalized and concluded, concerning other industries too, that networks emerge automatically under certain conditions. Nevertheless their creation and development should be encouraged, e.g. by efficiency incentives for public research and education of universities as well as an intensification of co-operation and networking between the scientific and the corporate sector. This can promote the technology and human capital transfer.
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Monetary Policy and Bank Lending in Japan: An Agency-based Approach
Diemo Dietrich
Incentives and Economic Behaviour,
2005
Abstract
This paper studies the incentive effects on Japanese banks of a low interest rate policy by the Bank of Japan. It utilizes a simplified version of an overlapping principal-agent-style model of corporate finance originally developed in Dietrich (2003). This model is dedicated to study the monetary policy transmission mechanism by combining arguments of the broad credit channel and the bank lending channel taking into account that banks need to be provided with incentives to monitor entrepreneurs. We argue that stipulating banks to possess some amount of own capital generate these incentives. We denote this capital requirement to be market based and show that this requirement depends crucially on interest rates. After revealing some shortcomings of the credit crunch hypothesis, we apply this approach to the Japanese economy. As a result, a policy of very low interest rates may not only be inefficient but counterproductive to reactivate a stumbled economy via the usual credit channel.
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Hartz IV: 1-Euro-Jobs setzen falsche Anreize
Herbert Buscher
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 11,
2004
Abstract
The paper analyzes the different incentives due to different possibilities of additional earnings to the receipt of unemployment benefits. Long term unemployed people may earn additional income due to a regular occupation in the first labor market or due to social work. In the latter case people receive a expense allowance which they are allowed to hold for the full amount. Contrary to this income earned in a regular job is partly reduced (by 85 % for the first 400 Euro, e.g.) which might make working in the social or common sector more attractive than working in the first labor market. Secondly, given the unemployment benefits and the additional amount of earnings it might be more attractive with respect to total income than the income earned in the low wage sector of the economy. This might imply a negative incentive for those who are working in a low wage sector.
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Auctioning Public Financial Support Incentives
Ulrich Blum, F. Kalus
International Journal of Technology Management Vol. 26,
2003
Abstract
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Incentive effects of social welfare payments on the supply of low-paid labor
Hilmar Schneider, Cornelia Lang, Wolfram Kempe, Jürgen Kolb, Martin T. W. Rosenfeld
Schriften des IWH,
No. 12,
2002
Abstract
Im September 2000 hat das Bundesministerium der Finanzen dem IWH den Auftrag erteilt, eine Studie unter dem Titel "Zu den Anreizwirkungen der Sozialhilfe - Das Angebotsverhalten arbeitsfähiger Sozialhilfeempfänger" zu erstellen. Die Ausgangshypothese bestand darin, dass das gegenwärtige Transfersystem Fehlanreize im Hinblick auf die Erwerbsbereitschaft von arbeitsfähigen Sozialhilfeempfängern setzt. Für Personen, deren am Markt erzielbarer Lohn nicht hinreichend weit über dem Sozialhilfeanspruch liegt, ist die Aufnahme einer Erwerbstätigkeit relativ unattraktiv. Für diesen Personenkreis steigt das verfügbare Einkommen durch Aufnahme einer Erwerbstätigkeit nur unwesentlich an, da das Erwerbseinkommen fast vollständig auf die Sozialhilfe angerechnet wird. Davon betroffen sind vor allem gering Qualifizierte, aber auch Ältere. Daraus resultiert zum einen ein starker Anreiz zur Schwarzarbeit. Zum anderen dürfte in den angesprochenen Fehlanreizen eine der Hauptursachen der Langzeitarbeitslosigkeit zu suchen sein. Wer keine anderen Jobangebote erhält als solche, die gemessen an der Alternative des Transferbezugs unattraktiv erscheinen, und wer diese deshalb ausschlägt, gerät in einen schleichenden Prozess der Entwöhnung von Erwerbsarbeit. Früher oder später stellen sich die bekannten negativen Begleiterscheinungen ein: psychische Verletzungen, Verlust von Selbstwertgefühl und der Fähigkeit zur Selbstorganisation, Alkoholkonsum und dergleichen. Was an Arbeitsfähigkeit am Beginn eines solchen Prozesses noch vorhanden war, schwindet mit zunehmender Dauer der Arbeitslosigkeit.
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