The unemployment-growth relationship in transition countries
Hubert Gabrisch, Herbert Buscher
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 5,
2005
Abstract
Does the disappointingly high unemployment in Central and East European countries reflect non-completed adjustment to institutional shocks from transition to a market economy, or is it the result of high labour market rigidities, or rather a syndrome of too weak aggregate demand and output? In the case of transitional causes, unemployment is expected to decline over time. Otherwise, it would pose a challenge to the European Union, particular in case of accession countries, for it jeopardizes the ambitious integration plans of, and may trigger excessive migration to the Union. In order to find out which hypothesis holds 15 years after transition has started, we analyze the unemploymentgrowth dynamics in the eight new member countries from Central-Eastern Europe. The study is based on country and panel regressions with instrument variables (TSLS). The results suggest to declare the transition of labour markets as completed; unemployment responds to output and not to a changing institutional environment for job creation. The regression coefficients report a high trend rate of productivity and a high unemployment intensity of output growth since 1998. The conclusion is that labour market rigidities do not to play an important role in explaining high unemployment rates. Rather, GDP growth is dominated by productivity progress, while the employment relevant component of aggregate demand is too low to reduce substantially the high level of unemployment.
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The Impact of Institutions on the Employment Performance in European Labour Markets
Herbert S. Buscher, Christian Dreger, Raúl Ramos, Jordi Surinach
Discussion Paper No. 1732,
2005
Abstract
The paper investigates the role of institutions for labor market performance across European countries. As participation rates have been rather stable over the past, the unemployment problem is mainly caused by shortages in labor demand. Labor demand is expressed by its structural parameters, such as the elasticities of employment to output and factor prices. Institutional variables include employment protection legislation, the structure of wage bargaining, measures describing the tax and transfer system and active labor market policies. As cointegration between employment, output and factor prices is detected, labor demand equations are fitted in levels by efficient estimation techniques. Then, labor demand elasticities are explained by institutions using panel fixed effects regressions. The results suggest that higher flexibility and incentives of households to work appear to be appropriate strategies to improve the employment record. The employment response to economic conditions is stronger in a more deregulated environment, and the absorption of shocks can be relieved.
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Panel Seasonal Unit Root Test: Further Simulation Results and An Application to Unemployment Data
Christian Dreger, Hans-Eggert Reimers
AStA - Advances in Statistical Analysis,
No. 3,
2005
Abstract
In this paper the seasonal unit root test of Hylleberg et al. (1990) is generalized to cover a heterogenous panel. The procedure follows the work of Im, Pesaran and Shin (2002). Test statistics are proposed and critical values are obtained by simulations. Moreover, the properties of the tests are analyzed for different deterministic and dynamic specifications. Evidence is presented that for a small time dimension the power is slow even for increasing cross section dimension. Therefore, it seems necessary to have a higher time dimension than cross section dimension. The new test is applied for unemployment behaviour in industrialized countries. In some cases seasonal unit roots are detected. However, the null hypotheses of panel seasonal unit roots are rejected. The null hypothesis of a unit root at the zero frequency is not rejected, thereby supporting the presence of hysteresis effects.
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Non-market Allocation in Transport: A Reassessment of its Justification and the Challenge of Institutional Transition
Ulrich Blum
50 Years of Transport Research: Experiences Gained and Major Challenges Ahead,
2005
Abstract
Economic theory knows two systems of coordination: through public choice or through the market principle. If the market is chosen, then it may either be regulated, or it may be fully competitive (or be in between these two extremes). This paper first inquires into the reasons for regulation, it analyses the reasons for the important role of government in the transportation sector, especially in the procurement of infrastructure. Historical reasons are seen as important reasons for bureaucratic objections to deregulation. Fundamental economic concepts are forwarded that suggest market failure and justify a regulatory environment. The reasons for regulation cited above, however, may be challenged; we forward theoretical concepts from industrial organization theory and from institutional economics which suggest that competition is even possible on the level of infrastructure. The transition from a strongly regulated to a competitive environment poses problems that have given lieu to numerous failures in privatization and deregulation. Structural inertia plays an important role, and the incentive-compatible management of infrastructure is seen as the key element of any liberal transportation policy. It requires that the setting of rules on the meta level satisfies both local and global efficiency ends. We conclude that, in market economies, competition and regulation should not be substitutes but complements. General rules, an "ethic of competition" have to be set that guarantee a level playing field to agents; it is complimented by institutions that provide arbitration in case of misconduct.
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Negotiated Third Party Access - an Industrial Organisation Perspective
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
European Journal of Law and Economics,
2005
Abstract
In the course of the liberalization of European energy markets, the German government opted – diverging from all other European countries – for Negotiated Third-Party Access. In this article we analyze if, theoretically, this institutional regime can be superior to regulation. We review empirically whether certain aspects of the actual implementation, in particular publication of the network access charges for each network supplier, facilitated or inhibited competition. In the first place we reconsider previous research, showing that NTPA can – under certain conditions – be economically effective. Our empirical analysis shows that the duty of publishing access charges supported market transparency and imposed a regulatory threat, particularly to suppliers with significantly above-average charges. On the other hand observable price adjustments over time serve as an indicator of tacit collusion. Although the expensive suppliers cut their prices, the cheaper ones raised theirs.
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An analysis of household electricity price developments in Germany since liberalization
Christian Growitsch, Felix Müsgens
External Publications,
2005
Abstract
Despite the liberalization of energy markets in 1998, household electricity prices in 2004 are nearly the same as 1998, indicating a failure of market restructuring. However, such a general consideration is misleading for two main reasons. Firstly, the price development shows significant differences among the stages of the value chain. Secondly, the underlying cost structure might have changed from 1998 to 2004. While such effects can be expected to level out over time, they can distort the comparison of a small period of observation. For these reasons, we analyzed the different price components at a detailed level, finding a considerable price reduction of about 32% in generation and a much lower reduction of 13% in transmission and distribution tariffs. These decreases have been mostly compensated by a significant increase in taxes and subsidies (+56%).
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Monetary Policy and Bank Lending in Japan: An Agency-based Approach
Diemo Dietrich
Incentives and Economic Behaviour,
2005
Abstract
This paper studies the incentive effects on Japanese banks of a low interest rate policy by the Bank of Japan. It utilizes a simplified version of an overlapping principal-agent-style model of corporate finance originally developed in Dietrich (2003). This model is dedicated to study the monetary policy transmission mechanism by combining arguments of the broad credit channel and the bank lending channel taking into account that banks need to be provided with incentives to monitor entrepreneurs. We argue that stipulating banks to possess some amount of own capital generate these incentives. We denote this capital requirement to be market based and show that this requirement depends crucially on interest rates. After revealing some shortcomings of the credit crunch hypothesis, we apply this approach to the Japanese economy. As a result, a policy of very low interest rates may not only be inefficient but counterproductive to reactivate a stumbled economy via the usual credit channel.
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Network Access Charges, Vertical Integration, and Property Rights Structure
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Energy Economics,
No. 2,
2005
Abstract
After the deregulation of the German electricity markets in 1998, the German government opted for a regulatory regime called negotiated third party access, which would be subject to ex post control by the federal cartel office. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers. As the electricity networks are incontestable natural monopolies, the local and regional network operators are able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, limited only by their concerns over possible interference by the federal cartel office (Bundeskartellamt). In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for varying charging behaviour depending on a supplier`s economic independence (structure of property rights) or its level of vertical integration. For this purpose we hypothesise that incorporated and vertically integrated suppliers set different charges than independent utility companies. Multivariate estimations show a relation between network access charges and the network operator’s economic independence as well as level of vertical integration. On the low voltage level, for an estimated annual consumption of 1700 kW/h, vertically integrated firms set – as predicted by our hypothesis - significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers. There is insufficient evidence available to confirm these results for other consumptions or voltage levels.
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East German economy: Catching up in tiny steps
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 6,
2005
Abstract
Trotz der allgemein schwachen Inlandsnachfrage in ganz Deutschland ist die gesamtwirtschaftliche Produktion im Ostteil der Republik 2004 das dritte Jahr in Folge gestiegen. Kräftig erhöht hat sich die Nachfrage des Auslands nach Gütern aus Ostdeutschland. Die Warenausfuhren sind überdurchschnittlich in die alten EU-Länder gestiegen, Impulse aus dem Vollzug der Osterweiterung lassen sich dagegen für die neuen Bundesländer kaum nachweisen. Nach dem Fall der letzten Handelsschranken hat es auch keinen Importboom aus den neuen Mitgliedsländern gegeben. Der Anstoß aus dem Ausland hat zwar die Exportindustrien und ihre Zulieferzweige erreicht, aber infolge des geringen Gewichts dieses Sektors war die Wirkung auf die Gesamtwirtschaft gering....
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Employment restraints in public service - considering scientific assistants in research establishments
Herbert Buscher
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 6,
2005
Abstract
Spätestens mit den so genannten Hartz-Reformen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt verstärkt sich das Interesse der Öffentlichkeit an der Arbeitsvermittlung und ihrer Wirksamkeit. Eine effiziente Arbeitsvermittlung ist nicht nur wünschenswert, sondern auch notwendige Voraussetzung für einen spürbaren Abbau von Arbeitslosigkeit. Aber die Vermittlung allein ist nur eine notwendige, keine hinreichende Bedingung dafür, dass die Arbeitsuchenden auch entsprechende Beschäftigungsverhältnisse abschließen können. Gesetzliche und tarifvertragliche Regelungen können trotz aller Vermittlungsbemühungen dazu führen, dass potenzielle Arbeitsplätze nicht besetzt werden....
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