Asset Allocation in Bankruptcy
Shai B. Bernstein, Emanuele Colonnelli, Benjamin Iverson
Journal of Finance,
No. 1,
2019
Abstract
This paper investigates the consequences of liquidation and reorganization on the allocation and subsequent utilization of assets in bankruptcy. Using the random assignment of judges to bankruptcy cases as a natural experiment that forces some firms into liquidation, we find that the long-run utilization of assets of liquidated firms is lower relative to assets of reorganized firms. These effects are concentrated in thin markets with few potential users and in areas with low access to finance. These findings suggest that when search frictions are large, liquidation can lead to inefficient allocation of assets in bankruptcy.
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Payment Defaults and Interfirm Liquidity Provision
F. Boissay, Reint E. Gropp
Review of Finance,
No. 6,
2013
Abstract
Using a unique data set on French firms, we show that credit constrained firms that face liquidity shocks are more likely to default on their payments to suppliers. Credit constrained firms pass on a sizeable fraction of such shocks to their suppliers. This is consistent with the idea that firms provide liquidity insurance to each other and that this mechanism is able to alleviate credit constraints. We show that the chain of defaults stops when it reaches unconstrained firms. Liquidity appears to be allocated from firms with access to outside finance to credit constrained firms along supply chains.
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Stages of the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis: Is there a Wandering Asset-Price Bubble?
Lucjan T. Orlowski
One-off Publications,
No. 3,
2008
Abstract
This study argues that the severity of the current global financial crisis is strongly influenced by changeable allocations of the global savings. This process is named a “wandering asset bubble”. Since its original outbreak induced by the demise of the subprime mortgage market and the mortgage-backed securities in the U.S., this crisis has reverberated across other credit areas, structured financial products and global financial institutions. Four distinctive stages of the crisis are identified: the meltdown of the subprime mortgage market, spillovers into broader credit market, the liquidity crisis epitomized by the fallout of Bear Sterns with some contagion effects on other financial institutions, and the commodity price bubble. Monetary policy responses aimed at stabilizing financial markets are proposed.
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International Banking and Liquidity Allocation: Cross-border Financial Services versus Multinational Banking
Diemo Dietrich, Uwe Vollmer
Journal of Financial Services Research,
2010
Abstract
This paper explores the comparative advantage of multinational banking over cross-border financial services in terms of capitalizing on a global access to funding sources. We argue that this advantage depends on the benefit and the cost of multinational banks' intimacy with local markets. The benefit is that it allows multinational banks to create more liquidity. The cost is that it causes inefficiencies in internal capital markets, on which a bank relies to allocate liquidity across countries. We analyze the conditions under which multinational banking is then likely to arise and show that capital requirements have an effect as they influence the degree of inefficiency in internal capital markets for alternative organization structures differently.
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Stages of the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis: Is there a Wandering Asset Price Bubble?
Lucjan T. Orlowski
Economics E-Journal 43. Munich Personal RePEc Archive 2008,
2009
Abstract
This study identifies five distinctive stages of the current global financial crisis: the meltdown of the subprime mortgage market; spillovers into broader credit market; the liquidity crisis epitomized by the fallout of Northern Rock, Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers with counterparty risk effects on other financial institutions; the commodity price bubble, and the ultimate demise of investment banking in the U.S. The study argues that the severity of the crisis is influenced strongly by changeable allocations of global savings coupled with excessive credit creation, which lead to over-pricing of varied types of assets. The study calls such process a “wandering asset-price bubble“. Unstable allocations elevate market, credit, and liquidity risks. Monetary policy responses aimed at stabilizing financial markets are proposed.
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Stages of the Ongoing Global Financial Crisis: Is There a Wandering Asset Bubble?
Lucjan T. Orlowski
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 11,
2008
Abstract
This study argues that the severity of the current global financial crisis is strongly influenced by changeable allocations of the global savings. This process is named a “wandering asset bubble”. Since its original outbreak induced by the demise of the subprime mortgage market and the mortgage-backed securities in the U.S., this crisis has reverberated across other credit areas, structured financial products and global financial institutions. Four distinctive stages of the crisis are identified: the meltdown of the subprime mortgage market, spillovers into broader credit market, the liquidity crisis epitomized by the fallout of Bear Sterns with some contagion effects on other financial institutions, and the commodity price bubble. Monetary policy responses aimed at stabilizing financial markets are proposed.
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Stages of the Global Financial Crisis: Is There a Wandering Asset Bubble?
Lucjan T. Orlowski
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 9,
2008
Abstract
This study argues that the severity of the current global financial crisis is strongly influenced by changeable allocations of the global excess liquidity. This process is named a “wandering asset bubble”. Since its original outbreak induced by the demise of the subprime mortgage market and the mortgage-backed securities in the U.S., this crisis has reverberated across other credit areas, structured financial products and global financial institutions. Four distinctive stages of the crisis are distinguished: the meltdown of the subprime mortgage market, spillovers into broader credit market, the fallout of Bear Sterns with some contagion effects on other financial institutions, and the commodity price bubble. Monetary policy responses aimed at stabilizing financial markets are proposed.
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Asset Tangibility and Capital Allocation
Diemo Dietrich
Journal of Corporate Finance,
No. 13,
2007
Abstract
Firms comprise divisions that often differ with respect to the degree of asset tangibility. As the strength of borrowing constraints depends on the liquidation value of assets, these firms influence their debt capacity by allocating funds across divisions. We argue that a company whose capital allocation is not verifiable suffers from a dynamic inconsistency problem, as it tends to allocate resources in favor of divisions with fewer tangible assets, leading to a tight borrowing constraint. When capital allocation is verifiable, committing to invest only little there eases this constraint, although it implies a deviation from a return maximizing allocation.
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Banks’ Internationalization Strategies: The Role of Bank Capital Regulation
Diemo Dietrich, Uwe Vollmer
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 18,
2006
Abstract
This paper studies how capital requirements influence a bank’s mode of entry into foreign financial markets. We develop a model of an internationally operating bank that creates and allocates liquidity across countries and argue that the advantage of multinational banking over offering cross-border financial services depends on the benefit and the cost of intimacy with local markets. The benefit is that it allows to create more liquidity. The cost is that it causes inefficiencies in internal capital markets, on which a multinational bank relies to allocate liquidity across countries. Capital requirements affect this trade-off by influencing the degree of inefficiency in internal capital markets.
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Asset Tangibility and Capital Allocation within Multinational Corporations
Diemo Dietrich
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 4,
2006
Abstract
We investigate capital allocation across a firm's divisions that differ with respect to the degree of asset tangibility. We adopt an incomplete contracting approach where the outcome of potential debt renegotiations depends on the liquidation value of assets. However, with diversity in terms of asset tangibility, liquidation proceeds depend on how funds have been allocated across divisions. As diversity can be traced back to institutional differences between countries, we provide a rationale for multidivisional decision- making in an international context. A main finding is that multinationals may be bound to go to certain countries when financiers cannot control the capital allocation.
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