Why do banks hold capital in excess of regulatory requirements? A functional approach
Diemo Dietrich, Uwe Vollmer
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 192,
2004
Abstract
This paper provides an explanation for the observation that banks hold on average a capital ratio in excess of regulatory requirements. We use a functional approach to banking based on Diamond and Rajan (2001) to demonstrate that banks can use capital ratios as a strategic tool for renegotiating loans with borrowers. As capital ratios affect the ability of banks to collect loans in a nonmonotonic way, a bank may be forced to exceed capital requirements. Moreover, high capital ratios may also constrain the amount a banker can borrow from investors. Consequently, the size of the banking sector may shrink.
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Investment Behaviour of Financially Constrained Multinational Corporations: Consequences for the International Transmission of Business Cycle Fluctuations
Diemo Dietrich
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 165,
2002
Abstract
The paper investigates the investment decision of a financially constrained multinational
corporation (MNC) planning investment projects both at home and in a developing
country. The collateral values of the projects diverge because of country specific
transactions costs so that the willingness of banks to grant a loan depends not only on
the MNCs financial wealth but also on the share of FDI in total investment. It is shown
that i) variations in the MNCs financial standing affects FDI stronger than domestic
investment, ii) FDI is likely to decrease following a macroeconomic shock to the MNC
parent, and iii) domestic investment is likely to increase following a macroeconomic
shock to the MNC affiliate.
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Bank Concentration and Retail Interest Rates
S. Corvoisier, Reint E. Gropp
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 11,
2002
Abstract
The recent wave of mergers in the euro area raises the question whether the increase in concentration has offset the increase in competition in European banking through deregulation. We test this question by estimating a simple Cournot model of bank pricing. We construct country and product specific measures of bank concentration and find that for loans and demand deposits increasing concentration may have resulted in less competitive pricing by banks, whereas for savings and time deposits, the model is rejected, suggesting increases in contestability and/or efficiency in these markets. Finally, the paper discusses some implications for tests of the effect of concentration on monetary policy transmission.
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