Revenue Boosting Instruments in Municipal Finance from a Public Choice Perspective
Peter Haug
Diamond, J. (ed.), Proceedings. 98th Annual Conference on Taxation, Miami, Florida, November 17-19, 2005 and Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the National Tax Association, Thrusday, November 17, 2005,
2006
Abstract
German municipalities are currently struggling with growing budget deficits, decreasing revenues, and rising expenditures. We argue that from a public choice perspective local politicians under financial pressure might prefer fiscal instruments that minimize the local voters' resistance and create fiscal illusion. According to Germany, suitable sources of additional revenues include the reallocation of revenues from the local business tax between the levels of government and increased profitability of local public utilities. Revenue Data from 1992 to 2004 indicate that changes in the relative significance of the net local business tax revenues are rather caused by changes in the share of the federal government in the revenues ('Gewerbesteuerumlage') than by changes in the local tax multipliers. Furthermore, we find a significant rise in profits of local public utilities in large German cities.
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Fiscal economy potentials of a county structure reform in Saxony-Anhalt
Simone Scharfe
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 5,
2006
Abstract
In view of the foreseeable demographic and finance-political developments the public house holds of Eastern Germany are under considerable strain to consolidate. This applies particularly to Saxony-Anhalt and there especially to local authorities. In 2003 the municipal expenses level (running material expenses and personnel expenses) of counties and communities in Saxony-Anhalt amounted 1,015 Euro per inhabitant and was clearly higher than the other East German states. Beyond the means of economisation through the efficient application of public funds, considerations are given to the potentials of country structure reforms. In the last legislative period, the CDU/FDP government already established the amalgamation of 24 counties to eleven new ones with the bill of 11.11.2005. The SPD - as an oppositional party at that time - submitted a proposal for an even further-reaching structural change with a concentration to five counties. This article comprises an estimation of the fiscal economisation potentials of both versions. In the first step, the (long term accessible) county expense levels of Saxony-Anhalt within the scope of the existing structure of a county is determined with the help of a Benchmarkanalysis. These results are then compared with expected expense levels of a reformed county structure which leads to the saving effect of the respective county reform. In the result of the analysis it appears that the suggestion of the SPD to the county structure reform allows to expect clearly higher saving effects than the suggestion of the former CDU/FDP government, a strong meaning of the already enforced community administrative reform is imputable.
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Non-market Allocation in Transport: A Reassessment of its Justification and the Challenge of Institutional Transition
Ulrich Blum
50 Years of Transport Research: Experiences Gained and Major Challenges Ahead,
2005
Abstract
Economic theory knows two systems of coordination: through public choice or through the market principle. If the market is chosen, then it may either be regulated, or it may be fully competitive (or be in between these two extremes). This paper first inquires into the reasons for regulation, it analyses the reasons for the important role of government in the transportation sector, especially in the procurement of infrastructure. Historical reasons are seen as important reasons for bureaucratic objections to deregulation. Fundamental economic concepts are forwarded that suggest market failure and justify a regulatory environment. The reasons for regulation cited above, however, may be challenged; we forward theoretical concepts from industrial organization theory and from institutional economics which suggest that competition is even possible on the level of infrastructure. The transition from a strongly regulated to a competitive environment poses problems that have given lieu to numerous failures in privatization and deregulation. Structural inertia plays an important role, and the incentive-compatible management of infrastructure is seen as the key element of any liberal transportation policy. It requires that the setting of rules on the meta level satisfies both local and global efficiency ends. We conclude that, in market economies, competition and regulation should not be substitutes but complements. General rules, an "ethic of competition" have to be set that guarantee a level playing field to agents; it is complimented by institutions that provide arbitration in case of misconduct.
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Network Access Charges, Vertical Integration, and Property Rights Structure
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Energy Economics,
No. 2,
2005
Abstract
After the deregulation of the German electricity markets in 1998, the German government opted for a regulatory regime called negotiated third party access, which would be subject to ex post control by the federal cartel office. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers. As the electricity networks are incontestable natural monopolies, the local and regional network operators are able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, limited only by their concerns over possible interference by the federal cartel office (Bundeskartellamt). In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for varying charging behaviour depending on a supplier`s economic independence (structure of property rights) or its level of vertical integration. For this purpose we hypothesise that incorporated and vertically integrated suppliers set different charges than independent utility companies. Multivariate estimations show a relation between network access charges and the network operator’s economic independence as well as level of vertical integration. On the low voltage level, for an estimated annual consumption of 1700 kW/h, vertically integrated firms set – as predicted by our hypothesis - significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers. There is insufficient evidence available to confirm these results for other consumptions or voltage levels.
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The influence of Vertical Integration and Property Rights on Network Access Charges in the German Electricity Markets
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
External Publications,
No. 6,
2004
Abstract
German Electricity markets were deregulated in the late nineties of the last century. In contrast to other European countries, the German government enacted negotiated third party access instead of installing a regulation authority. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers, which specify the calculation schemes for access charges. Local and regional suppliers are nevertheless able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, restricted only by the possibility of interference competition authorities. While some of those suppliers have been acquired by one of the four Transmission System Operators and become vertically integrated, the majority is still independent public utility companies. In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for different charging behaviour depending on the supplier’s economic independence or its level of vertical integration. Controlling for other coefficients as the so called structural features and related cost differences as well as the influence of competition law suits, multivariate estimations show significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers for at least one typical case.
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What can a town achieve today? Integration, urban regimes, and the acceptance of models
Peter Franz
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 56,
1997
Abstract
Since 1990, the date of German reunification, urban development and especially the recovery of inner cities in East Germany has been delayed by several factors including real estate restitution claims, inflexible preservation codes for historic buildings, and the shortage of stores for retailers. This blockade situation has resulted in the quick and intensified development of shopping centres as „inner city substitutes“ on the urban periphery. The combined effect of the factors preventing revitalisation strategies and the newly realised and practised potential for autonomous action by the authorities of smaller municipalities was a severe restriction for the governing capacities of the authorities of the larger cities. in regaining their governance capability city governments are dependent on urban groups joining and supporting public developmental strategies. In accordance with Stone (1993) and Stoker and Mossberger (1994) urban groups active in urban development policy can be described as urban regimes. In Germany three types of regimes can be differentiated. The cities differ with respect to the political strength and the forms of coalition and conflict between different urban regimes. Specific conditions in East Germany have led to a special regime constellation with a powerful „conservation regime“ on the one hand and a vivid „globalisation regime“ on the other hand. This conflicting constellation results in a developmental blockade. The hypothesis is that a third regime type, the „local alliance“, is missing and still has to be created by practices such as city marketing and city management. Only when this regime building process has advanced will new constellations of political coalitions and compromise become possible and be able to reduce governance problems of city government in the long run.
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Reallocation of Competences between Local and Higher Levels of Government as so-called „Functional Reforms“: A Case of (De-) Centralization?
Martin T. W. Rosenfeld
Fiscal Decentralization,
1987
Abstract
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