Prediction Markets: Prognosemärkte in Praxis und Theorie - Ein Überblick
Marian Berneburg
External Publications,
2008
Abstract
A common joke among economist is: Why has god created meteorologists? To make the forecasts of economist look less bad! At the heart of this joke stands the critique that economic forecasts are notoriously inaccurate. Prediction Markets are an attempt to improve these forecasts by aggregating the knowledge of many. The present article takes a closer look at these Prediction Markets. By analysing the existing literature in terms of the relevant theoretical as well as empirical basis, it is shown that an adapted version of the model by Kyle (1985) with noise and insider traders is able to explain the high degree of predictive accuracy, i. e. informational efficiency, of prediction markets. At the same time such a model is able to cope with the Grossman-Stiglitz Paradox (1976) or the No-Trade Theorem (Milgrom & Stokey, 1982), both are common theoretical arguments against informational efficiency. This allows the interpretation of market prices as event probabilities. Even though some empirical artefacts (e. g. the favorite-longshot bias) exist and more research, especially in terms of prediction markets covering economic events, is needed, the overall verdict on these forecasting tools has to be that they are roughly semi-strong efficient. They hence provide an interesting, very accurate and additional tool in forecasting.
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The Identification of Technology Regimes in Banking: Implications for the Market Power-Fragility Nexus
Michael Koetter, Tigran Poghosyan
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 8,
2009
Abstract
Neglecting the existence of different technologies in banking can contaminate efficiency, market power, and other performance measures. By simultaneously estimating (i) technology regimes conditional on exogenous factors, (ii) efficiency conditional on risk management, and (iii) Lerner indices of German banks, we identify three distinct technology regimes: Public & Retail, Small & Specialized, and Universal & Relationship. System estimation at the regional level reveals that greater bank market power increases bank profitability but also fosters corporate defaults. Corporate defaults, in turn, lead to higher probabilities of bank distress, which supports the market power-fragility hypothesis.
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Lending Technology, Bank Organization and Competition
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena, Günseli Tümer-Alkan
Journal of Financial Transformation,
2009
Abstract
This paper reviews recent theoretical and empirical studies investigating how both bank technology and organization shape bank-borrower interactions. We refer to two related concepts for bank technology. First, the technologies banks employ in loan granting decisions and second, the advances in information technology linked to the bank's lending technology. We also summarize and interpret the theoretical and empirical work on bank organization and its influence on lending technologies. We show that the choice of lending technology and bank organization depend heavily on the availability of information, the technological progress in the collection of information, as well as the banking market structure and the legal environment. We draw important policy conclusions from the literature. Competition authorities and supervisors have to remain alert to the consequences of the introduction of any new technology because: (1) advances in technology do not necessarily lead to more intense banking competition, and (2) the impact of technological and financial innovation on financial efficiency and stability depends on the incentives of the entire „loan production chain.‟
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Are European Equity Style Indices Efficient? – An Empirical Quest in Three Essays
Marian Berneburg
Schriften des IWH,
No. 28,
2008
Abstract
Many situations in the history of the stock markets indicate that assets are not always efficiently priced. But why does it matter whether the stock market is efficiently priced? Because “well-functioning financial markets are a key factor to high economic growth”. (Mishkin and Eakins, 2006, pp. 3-4) In three essays, it is the aim of the author to shed some more light on the topic of market efficiency, which is far from being resolved. Since European equity markets have increased in importance globally, the author, instead of focusing on US markets, looks at a unified European equity market. By testing for a random walk in equity prices, revisiting Shiller’s claim of excess volatility through the means of a vector error correction model, and modifying the Gordon-Growth-Model, the book concludes that a small degree of inefficiency cannot be ruled out. While usually European equity markets are pricing assets correctly, some periods (e.g. the late 1990s and early 2000s) show clear signs of mispricing; the hypothesis of a world with two states (regime one, a normal efficient state, and regime two, a state in which markets are more momentum driven) presents a possible explanation.
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Die volkswirtschaftliche Bedeutung von Private Equity
Ulrich Blum
Private Equity. Beurteilungs- und Bewertungsverfahren von Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften,
2008
Abstract
Private equity is a very specific institutional way of providing private capital to enterprises. The contribution inquires why it increased its economic importance and public visibility over the last years. The role of private capital within the framework of the innovation theory, transaction cost theory and the risk theory is assessed. Private equity is a specific way of organizing the procurement with private capital for enterprises in risky markets in order to efficiently reducing transaction costs. More and above, it is important for credible market-entry strategies. As most markets are incomplete and because of tax regulations which cannot be considered to be efficient under present conditions, the economic role of private equity has increased. The increase economic role, but also importance in the firm, necessitates a steering of enterprises along value-oriented objectives. As the “hype” has decreased in summer 2007, the article ends with an assessment of future prospects.
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Agenda 2010: Neues unter Deutschlands Himmel?
Ulrich Blum
Wirtschaftsdienst,
No. 3,
2008
Abstract
The paper analyzes to what extent the reform of the German social security and welfare system, known as the “Hartz-IV-Reforms” under the “Agenda 2010”, has been successful. It is shown that the integration of welfare and social security payments increased efficiency as did prior deregulations of the labor market. However, the implementation was partly inefficient due to a misalignment between crucial instruments and incentive structure of individuals. This led to unforeseen expenditures that partly continue until today. Due to this inefficiency, parts of the reform lost its political acceptance. Furthermore, the article shows that many of these reforms had already been prepared intellectually by selected think tanks in the 90ies. The reforms are consistent with a consensus among scholars regarding the ability of the modern state to protect citizens from individual life risks. Finally, the article discusses the future agenda with respect to other important economic policy instruments beyond the integration of welfare and social security such as incentive structure in the established taxation system.
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Culture as a Base for Efficient Economic Systems
Ulrich Blum
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
2008
Abstract
Globalization puts the German economic model, the so-called social market economy, under pressure. Constituting elements of this model are fundamental social and economic values. Globalization puts some of these values under pressure and creates inefficiencies because the costs of running the social and economic fabric rise. This is an important justification to inquire into the normative foundations of economic efficiency The following article discusses to what extent culture is a base for efficient economic systems. Information theory is regarded as a key element for explaining social change. The arguments are based on institutional economics with a special view on transaction costs and on cooperation structures. It is shown that specific information technologies promote forms of cooperation, which influence institutional arrangements. The related information technologies themselves are part of the cultural system and its value structures. As a consequence, competition among economic systems favours certain combinations of technologies, cultural arrangements and economic systems. In as much as cultural competition precedes economic competition in the sense of a certain way of thinking, the cultural system can be regarded as a strategic competitive parameter for an economy.
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Market Follows Standards
Ulrich Blum
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 10,
2007
Abstract
Standards are an important part of the codified knowledge of a society. In contrast to industry standards, formal standards are created in a consensus-based procedure open to all interested parties. Only if an economic interest for application exists will formal standards be produced. Interested parties have to shoulder participation costs themselves, which enforces economic interest. Up to a certain extent, governments also trigger and finance formal standardisation processes through the new approach, which creates a framework that is filled by private activity. Standards stand at the end of intellectual property rights if the totality of the value chain of knowledge production is looked at. One important aspect is their accessibility and the inclusion of all necessary intellectual property rights, especially patents, at reasonable prices. Conversely, consortia may exclude groups from the use of their standards. By preventing the licensing of those patents included in a standard, they can effectively block market entry. Thus, “successful” standards often face antitrust problems. Formal standards reduce costs of production through economies of scale, economies of scope and network-economies. Goods and processes that are standardized signal quality, the inclusion of high technological standards and permanent presence in the markets, which again accelerates market dissemination. Firms face a dilemma: On the one hand, the penetration of a markets with industry standards offers potentials for high profits; on the other hand, this has to be balanced against the risk of failure, especially if clients are hesitant because they do not know which standard will be successful in the end. Formal standards create and stabilize trust markets. This is especially true in the area of globalisation. Europe, which has to face an enormous competition in the international knowledge economy, needs an institutionally efficient approach to formal standardisation. This contribution addresses future problems of the European standardisation that have been developed within the framework of a working group of the European Standardisation Organisation called Future Landscape of European Standardisation (FLES).
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The East German Cement Cartel: Cartel Efficiency and Policy after Economic Transformation
Ulrich Blum
Eastern Economic Review,
2007
Abstract
In 2003 the German Antitrust Commission (GAC) proved the existence of a cartel in the German cement industry. The German cement producers involved in the case were fined € 661 million for having established quotas to extract additional rents. One of the main centers of this cartel was East Germany, where the East German Cement Combine with its giant facilities had been sold, in the early 1990s, to four large producers by Treuhand in the process of privatizing the economy. Only in respect to in this market did all defendants concede having had a part in forming a cartel.
In this paper, we challenge the argument of excess revenue that the GAC puts forward for the East German market. We argue that legal evidence does not necessarily translate into economic evidence. We show that demand for cement is realized in geographical and, to a more limited extent, in product space. Thus, in the absence of cartels we would expect monopolistic competition to prevail. We argue that any transition in the market regime, from the cartel to the post cartel period, must be traceable in the individual firm’s demand function which differs from the clients’ demand function because of costs for spatial and product differentiation. Within the framework of an econometric model, we cannot identify any structural changes in demand. Most likely, imports from Poland and the Czech Republic were dumped into the East German market and some medium sized producers were responsible for the cartel never working.
Finally the paper shows how difficult it is to generate competition in certain industries even under the umbrella of a well-established market economy, i.e. that of West Germany, and that the openness of the economy, i.e. trans-border shipments, are decisive.
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Slippery Slopes of Stress: Ordered Failure Events in German Banking
Thomas Kick, Michael Koetter
Journal of Financial Stability,
No. 2,
2007
Abstract
Outright bank failures without prior indication of financial instability are very rare. In fact, banks can be regarded as troubled to varying degrees before outright closure. But failure studies usually neglect the ordinal nature of bank distress. We distinguish four different kinds of increasingly severe events on the basis of the distress database of the Deutsche Bundesbank. Only the worst distress event entails a bank to exit the market. Since the four categories of hazard functions are not proportional, we specify a generalized ordered logit model to estimate respective probabilities of distress simultaneously. We find that the likelihood of ordered distress events changes differently in response to given changes in the financial profiles of banks. Consequently, bank failure studies should account more explicitly for the different shades of distress. This allows an assessment of the relative importance of financial profile components for different degrees of bank distress.
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