Delay Determinants of European Banking Union Implementation
Michael Koetter, Thomas Krause, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
To safeguard financial stability and harmonise regulation, the European Commission substantially reformed banking supervision, resolution, and deposit insurance via EU directives. But most countries delay the transposition of these directives. We ask if transposition delays result from strategic considerations of governments conditional on the state of their financial, regulatory, and political systems? Supervisors might try to protect national banking systems and local politicians maybe reluctant to surrender national sovereignty to deal with failed banks. Alternatively, intricate financial regulation might require more implementation time in large and complex financial and political systems. We therefore collect data on the transposition delays of the three Banking Union directives and investigate observed delay variation across member states. Our correlation analyses suggest that existing regulatory and institutional frameworks, rather than banking market structure or political factors, matter for transposition delays.
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09.08.2017 • 29/2017
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During the financial crisis, billions were spent to rescue banks that were according to their governments too big to be allowed to fail. But a study by Michael Koetter from the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) and co-authors shows that besides the size of the banks, the centrality within the global financial network was also pivotal for financial institutions to receive a bail-out.
Michael Koetter
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Transposition Frictions, Banking Union, and Integrated Financial Markets in Europe
Michael Koetter, Thomas Krause, Lena Tonzer
G20 Insights Policy Brief, Policy Area "Financial Resilience",
2017
Abstract
In response to the financial crisis of 2007/2008, policymakers implemented comprehensive changes concerning the regulation and supervision of banks. Many of those changes, including Basel III or the directives pertaining to the Single Rulebook in the European Union (EU), are agreed upon at the supranational level, which constitutes a key step towards harmonized regulation and supervision in an integrated European financial market. However, the success of these reforms depends on the uniform and timely implementation at the national level. Avoiding strategic delays to implement EU regulation into national laws should thus constitute a main target of the G20.
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Drivers of Systemic Risk: Do National and European Perspectives Differ?
Claudia M. Buch, Thomas Krause, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
In Europe, the financial stability mandate generally rests at the national level. But there is an important exception. Since the establishment of the Banking Union in 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) can impose stricter regulations than the national regulator. The precondition is that the ECB identifies systemic risks which are not adequately addressed by the macroprudential regulator at the national level. In this paper, we ask whether the drivers of systemic risk differ when applying a national versus a European perspective. We use market data for 80 listed euro-area banks to measure each bank’s contribution to systemic risk (SRISK) at the national and the euro-area level. Our research delivers three main findings. First, on average, systemic risk increased during the financial crisis. The difference between systemic risk at the national and the euro-area level is not very large, but there is considerable heterogeneity across countries and banks. Second, an exploration of the drivers of systemic risk shows that a bank’s contribution to systemic risk is positively related to its size and profitability. It decreases in a bank’s share of loans to total assets. Third, the qualitative determinants of systemic risk are similar at the national and euro-area level, whereas the quantitative importance of some determinants differs.
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Urban Development by Protecting Historic Buildings? An Analysis of Incentives and Regulations in Heritage Conservation
Peter Franz
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 6,
2010
Abstract
Regulations in heritage conservation play an important role in the redevelopment processes of East German cities. Numerous cities dispose of built cultural heritage still lending the cityscapes its character. As a reaction to the neglect of this cultural heritage during the GDR regime the East German Länder have enacted relatively restrictive heritage conservation laws. In addition to this the federal program “Städtebaulicher Denkmalschutz” was started in 1991 especially for the East German cities. In many cities activities for and investment in historic buildings have led to attractive urban centers. On the other side indicators become visible that an exaggerated heritage protection policy can turn out to be an obstacle for urban development. This paper takes an economic perspective on the topic of built heritage protection. In addition to this it contains a systematic overview over the policy arena, involving national and sub-national levels, actors and regulations. The financing of built heritage protection and recognizable intended and not intended effects of its measures are further topics of the paper. The results show that in East Germany a higher proportion of buildings is listed as in West Germany. The same is true when the public expenditures per head for heritage protection are compared. The analysis suffers from difficulties in assessing an optimal state of built heritage protection; a fact that signals further need in specific research.
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On the Rationale of Leniency Programs: a Game-Theoretical Analysis
Ulrich Blum, Nicole Steinat, Michael A. Veltins
European Journal of Law and Economics,
2008
Abstract
In order to enhance the enforcement of Antitrust Law, leniency policies were introduced in nearly all industrialized countries. These programs aim at deterring and eliminating cartels. In this paper we analyze the rationale of the current European and German leniency regulation. We challenge the contemporary view that the standard leniency privilege is incentive-compatible with respect to its aim to enhance competition. Instead, we argue for it to be used as a preemptive strike against competitors under circumstances where cartels become unstable. This implies a tightening of markets in subsequent periods and, thus, a potential reduction in competition intensity. Given strategic reasoning by agents, the principal witness may assure an economically privileged position in the future. This consequence might not be intended by the bonus regulations. Nevertheless if the leniency policies lead to more competition in the market the results should be welcomed by the national cartel offices. We give anecdotal evidence of the German cement case and base our arguments on a game-theoretical model.
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Paradigm Shift in European Competition Law
Nicole Steinat
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 11,
2007
Abstract
During the last decade, European competition law went through several procedural changes, which were mainly influenced by US-American law. Economic criteria rather than legal parameters are now used to evaluate the conduct of firms. Such a “more economic approach” is apparent both in legislation and jurisdiction.
The article discusses the reforms that resulted from the paradigm shift by focusing on the legislation perspective as well as their impact in terms of cartels. One of the most important instruments in European competition policy is nowadays the Leniency Regulation, which was implemented in 1996. Another tool are the renewed Fining Guidelines, which in general will lead to higher fines.
Although European competition law adopted some instruments from American law, there are still major differences between the two jurisdictions. The possibility to impose jail sentences does not exist on a European level yet. However, a few European countries included criminal sanctions in their national laws.
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The Impact of Technology and Regulation on the Geographical Scope of Banking
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena
Oxford Review of Economic Policy,
No. 4,
2004
Abstract
We review how technological advances and changes in regulation may shape the (future) geographical scope of banking. We first review how both physical distance and the presence of borders currently affect bank lending conditions (loan pricing and credit availability) and market presence (branching and servicing). Next we discuss how technology and regulation have altered this impact and analyse the current state of the European banking sector. We discuss both theoretical contributions and empirical work and highlight open questions along the way. We draw three main lessons from the current theoretical and empirical literature: (i) bank lending to small businesses in Europe may be characterized both by (local) spatial pricing and resilient (regional and/or national) market segmentation; (ii) because of informational asymmetries in the retail market, bank mergers and acquisitions seem the optimal route of entering another market, long before cross-border servicing or direct entry are economically feasible; and (iii) current technological and regulatory developments may, to a large extent, remain impotent in further dismantling the various residual but mutually reinforcing frictions in the retail banking markets in Europe. We conclude the paper by offering pertinent policy recommendations based on these three lessons.
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The Contestable Markets Theory - Efficient Advice for Economic Policy
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
External Publications,
2004
Abstract
During the nineties of the last century several formerly monopolistic markets (telecommunication, electricity, gas, and railway) have been deregulated in Germany based on European directives and theoretically inspired by the theory of contestable markets. The original contestable market theory implied three assumptions necessary to be satisfied to establish potential competition: Free market entry, market exit possible without any costs, and the price adjustment lag exceeding the entry lag. Our analysis shows that if the incumbent reduces its prices slowly (high adjustment lag) and the market entry can be performed quickly (low entry lag), a new competitor will be able to earn back sunk costs. Therefore it is not necessary that all three conditions be complied with for potential competition to exist. Applying this „revised“ contestable market theory to the deregulated sectors in Germany, natural monopolies can be identified in telecommunication sections local loops and local/regional connection networks, in the national electricity grid and the regional/local electricity distribution networks, in the national and regional/local gas transmission/distribution sections, and in the railroad network. These sections are not contestable due to sunk costs, expected high entry lags and a probably short price adjustment lag. They are identified as bottlenecks, which should be regulated. The function of system operators in energy and railroad are closely related to the non-contestable monopolistic networks.
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Information or Regulation: What Drives the International Activities of Commercial Banks?
Claudia M. Buch
Journal of Money Credit,
No. 6,
2003
Abstract
Information costs and regulatory barriers distinguish international financial markets from national ones. Using panel data on bilateral assets and liabilities of commercial banks, I empirically determine the impact of information, costs and regulations, and I isolate intra-EU financial linkages. I confirm that information costs and regulations are important factors influencing international asset choices of banks, but their relative importance differs among countries.
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