Competition, Risk-shifting, and Public Bail-out Policies
Reint E. Gropp, H. Hakenes, Isabel Schnabel
Review of Financial Studies,
No. 6,
2011
Abstract
This article empirically investigates the competitive effects of government bail-out policies. We construct a measure of bail-out perceptions by using rating information. From there, we construct the market shares of insured competitor banks for any given bank, and analyze the impact of this variable on banks' risk-taking behavior, using a large sample of banks from OECD countries. Our results suggest that government guarantees strongly increase the risk-taking of competitor banks. In contrast, there is no evidence that public guarantees increase the protected banks' risk-taking, except for banks that have outright public ownership. These results have important implications for the effects of the recent wave of bank bail-outs on banks' risk-taking behavior.
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Economic Effects of the Halle Institute for Economic Research
Ulrich Blum
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 10,
2008
Abstract
The most important approach to assess the scholarly performance of an institute is to evaluate its academic output. Economic research institutes such as the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) furthermore are targeted at providing policy advice to public authorities. This adds an additional criterion, the ability to impact policy discussions in Germany and beyond.
A rarely discussed issue is the effect of an institute on the local economy. The IWH is located in a region of East Germany that is still catching up economically. Transformation problems are still very visible. In such an economic environment, the expenditures of an institute play an important role in stabilizing local demand. The analysis shows, by using input-output-methods, that the most important factor for the local economy is the demand stemming from wages earned by the employees of the institute. Especially the local area, where most of the staff lives, heavily benefits from this effect. Expenditures of about 4.6 million Euros which include the salaries of the staff of about 70 persons generates sufficient demand in the area to guarantee employment for another 35 persons. In addition, as crowding out of activities by additional demand is presently not an issue in East Germany, the taxes generated account for a considerable part of the budget.
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Non-market Allocation in Transport: A Reassessment of its Justification and the Challenge of Institutional Transition
Ulrich Blum
50 Years of Transport Research: Experiences Gained and Major Challenges Ahead,
2005
Abstract
Economic theory knows two systems of coordination: through public choice or through the market principle. If the market is chosen, then it may either be regulated, or it may be fully competitive (or be in between these two extremes). This paper first inquires into the reasons for regulation, it analyses the reasons for the important role of government in the transportation sector, especially in the procurement of infrastructure. Historical reasons are seen as important reasons for bureaucratic objections to deregulation. Fundamental economic concepts are forwarded that suggest market failure and justify a regulatory environment. The reasons for regulation cited above, however, may be challenged; we forward theoretical concepts from industrial organization theory and from institutional economics which suggest that competition is even possible on the level of infrastructure. The transition from a strongly regulated to a competitive environment poses problems that have given lieu to numerous failures in privatization and deregulation. Structural inertia plays an important role, and the incentive-compatible management of infrastructure is seen as the key element of any liberal transportation policy. It requires that the setting of rules on the meta level satisfies both local and global efficiency ends. We conclude that, in market economies, competition and regulation should not be substitutes but complements. General rules, an "ethic of competition" have to be set that guarantee a level playing field to agents; it is complimented by institutions that provide arbitration in case of misconduct.
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