31.07.2018 • 16/2018
Fairness pays off
When companies arbitrarily cut their wages, the motivation and productivity of the employees decrease – this is clear. Less obvious, however: employees also become less productive even if it is their colleagues who are treated unfairly and not them. This was confirmed by a research group led by Sabrina Jeworrek at the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association.
Sabrina Jeworrek
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Selection Versus Incentives in Incentive Pay: Evidence from a Matching Model
Shuo Xia
SSRN Working Papers,
2018
Abstract
Higher incentive pay is associated with better firm performance. I introduce a model of CEO-firm matching to disentangle the two confounding effects that drive this result. On one hand, higher incentive pay directly induces more effort; on the other hand, higher incentive pay indirectly attracts more talented CEOs. I find both effects are essential to explain the result, with the selection effect accounting for 12.7% of the total effect. The relative importance of the selection effect is the largest in industries with high talent mobility and in more recent years.
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Effectiveness and (In)Efficiencies of Compensation Regulation: Evidence from the EU Banker Bonus Cap
Stefano Colonnello, Michael Koetter, Konstantin Wagner
Abstract
We investigate the (unintended) effects of bank executive compensation regulation. Capping the share of variable compensation spurred average turnover rates driven by CEOs at poorly performing banks. Other than that, banks‘ responses to raise fixed compensation sufficed to retain the vast majority of non-CEO executives and those at well performing banks. We fail to find evidence that banks with executives that are more affected by the bonus cap became less risky. In fact, numerous results indicate an increase of risk, even in its systemic dimension according to selected measures. The return component of bank performance appears to be unaffected by the bonus cap. Risk hikes are consistent with an insurance effect associated with raised the increase in fixed compensation of executives. The ability of the policy to enhance financial stability is therefore doubtful.
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19.03.2018 • 4/2018
Economists – and the others
People with a background in economics react more strongly to financial incentives – both positively and negatively, as Dmitri Bershadskyy of the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association – found out. At the beginning of his laboratory experiment, economists were prepared to spend more money on a public good and keep to this social behaviour for a longer period than non-economists. However, towards the end of the experiment they were also the greatest free-riders.
Dmitri Bershadskyy
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Hidden Gems and Borrowers with Dirty Little Secrets: Investment in Soft Information, Borrower Self-selection and Competition
Reint E. Gropp, Andre Guettler
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 2,
2018
Abstract
This paper empirically examines the role of soft information in the competitive interaction between relationship and transaction banks. Soft information can be interpreted as a valuable signal about the quality of a firm that is observable to a relationship bank, but not to a transaction bank. We show that borrowers self-select to relationship banks depending on whether their observed soft information is positive or negative. Competition affects the investment in learning the soft information from firms by relationship banks and transaction banks asymmetrically. Relationship banks invest more; transaction banks invest less in soft information, exacerbating the selection effect.
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Imputation Rules for the Implementation of the Pre-unification Education Variable in the BASiD Data Set
André Diegmann
Journal for Labour Market Research,
2017
Abstract
Using combined data from the German Pension Insurance and the Federal Employment Agency (BASiD), this study proposes different procedures for imputing the pre-unification education variable in the BASiD data. To do so, we exploit information on education-related periods that are creditable for the Pension Insurance. Combining these periods with information on the educational system in the former GDR, we propose three different imputation procedures, which we validate using external GDR census data for selected age groups. A common result from all procedures is that they tend to underpredict (overpredict) the share of high-skilled (low-skilled) for the oldest age groups. Comparing our imputed education variable with information on educational attainment from the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB) reveals that the best match is obtained for the vocational training degree. Although regressions show that misclassification with respect to IEB information is clearly related to observables, we do not find any systematic pattern across skill groups.
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Transferability of Skills across Sectors and Heterogeneous Displacement Costs
Moises Yi, Steffen Müller, Jens Stegmaier
American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings,
No. 5,
2017
Abstract
We use rich German administrative data to estimate new measures of skill transferability between manufacturing and other sectors. These measures capture the value of workers' human capital when applied in different sectors and are directly related to workers' displacement costs. We estimate these transferability measures using a selection correction model, which addresses workers' endogenous mobility, and a novel selection instrument based on the social network of workers. Our results indicate substantial heterogeneity in how workers can transfer their skills when they move across sectors, which implies heterogeneous displacement costs that depend on the sector to which workers reallocate.
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Expertise in the Political Process — Benefits, Limits and Risks
Aida Ćumurović, Reint E. Gropp, Lars Brozus, Oliver Geden, Uwe Schneidewind, Karl-Heinz Paqué, Lars P. Feld
Wirtschaftsdienst,
No. 4,
2017
Abstract
Since the outbreak of the financial and economic crisis, confidence in politicians as well as the economists in their advisory expert panels seems to be at an all-time low. Why do politicians reject science-based advice unless it fits into their political agenda? Are economists misunderstood by politicians and vice versa? The tension between the ideal of evidence-based policy-making and the reality of policy-based evidence-making is hardly a new phenomenon. Therefore, the expectation that Donald Trump, the Brexiteers and European populists will necessarily disappoint their voters because they simply cannot deliver what they have promised is misleading. Experts would be well advised to use the debate on the post-factual era as an impetus to reflect critically on their profession. One opinion expressed in this Zeitgespräch is that the contested societal and political impact of modern economics is due to its restricted scientific self-concept. A more open, pluralistic and transdisciplinary self-definition of economics would strengthen its societal influence. Another contributor ponders the proper incentives to persuade academic economists to provide economic policy advice. Key is the independence of advisory institutions like the German Council of Economic Experts. The selection of people with the best scientific qualifications will ensure the reputation of such institutions.
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23.03.2017 • 16/2017
A conference from young economists for young economists
Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) and Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg are hosting the 22nd Spring Meeting of Young Economists.
From today until Saturday, the Spring Meeting of Young Economists (SMYE) takes place in Halle (Saale). It is jointly organised by the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association and the Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg. The international meeting is a well-known yearly conference organised by the European Association of Young Economists (EAYE). Its chairman, Stijn Baert, is impressed: “Judging from the organisation, the conference will just be great!”
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European Bank Efficiency and Performance: The Effects of Supranational Versus National Bank Supervision
Rients Galema, Michael Koetter
T. Beck, B. Casu (eds): The Palgrave Handbook of European Banking, London,
2016
Abstract
This chapter explores European bank efficiency and performance. First, the authors provide an overview of the key estimation methods for efficiency and discuss selected applications to the European banking sector. Second, they apply stochastic frontier analysis to investigate the extent to which the reallocation of supervisory powers is associated with efficiency differences between European banks. In doing so, the discussion focuses particularly on whether direct supervision by the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) as opposed to national competent authority (NCA) is related to cost and profit efficiency.
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