24.09.2015 • 38/2015
German Households Benefit from Low Interest Environment
Calculations of the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association show that the average household in Germany has benefited from the low policy rate environment. The average return on their portfolio was higher than in the pre-crisis period while at the same time, they benefited from lower interest on new loans. Households in Germany had a total Euro benefit of more than 364 billion Euro over a five-year period relative to 2003 to 2007. Increases in stock prices and real estate prices over-compensate lower interest rates on savings accounts, despite their relatively low share in households’ portfolios. There are benefits across the income distribution. Households that do not own real estate lost though, but their losses are very small at on average about 100 Euro per year.
Reint E. Gropp
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Devaluation Expectations Based on Cross-listed Stocks: Evidence for Financial Crises in Argentina Then and Now
Stefan Eichler
Applied Economics Letters,
No. 10,
2014
Abstract
I use the relative prices of American Depositary Receipts and their underlying stocks to derive devaluation expectations. I find that stockholders currently perceive an overvalued peso. Devaluation expectations are driven by the incentive of competitive devaluation and sovereign default risk.
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An Empirical Analysis of Legal Insider Trading in The Netherlands
Frank de Jong, Jérémie Lefebvre, Hans Degryse
De Economist,
No. 1,
2014
Abstract
In this paper, we employ a registry of legal insider trading for Dutch listed firms to investigate the information content of trades by corporate insiders. Using a standard event-study methodology, we examine short-term stock price behavior around trades. We find that purchases are followed by economically large abnormal returns. This result is strongest for purchases by top executives and for small market capitalization firms, which is consistent with the hypothesis that legal insider trading is an important channel through which information flows to the market. We analyze also the impact of the implementation of the Market Abuse Directive (European Union Directive 2003/6/EC), which strengthens the existing regulation in the Netherlands. We show that the new regulation reduced the information content of sales by top executives.
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An Options-based Approach to Forecast Competing Bids: Evidence for Canadian Takeover Battles
Stefan Eichler, Dominik Maltritz
Applied Economics,
No. 34,
2013
Abstract
During takeover battles, a tender offer provides a call option right to the target’s shareholders: it guarantees the offered price but maintains the chance of a higher offer. We present an options-based approach to estimate the probability and expected value of higher competing takeover bids using target stock price data. Analysing Canadian takeover battles in the period 1997 to 2007 we find that during the 5 trading days prior to the occurrence of an increased takeover bid, the estimated probability of a higher bid exceeds 80% on average and the expected value of a potential competing bid almost matches the realized value.
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Federal grants for local development to stop economic decline? – Lessons from Germany
Peter Haug, Martin T. W. Rosenfeld
Consequences of the International Crisis for European SMEs – Vulnerability and resilience. Routledge Studies in the European Economy, Routledge,
2012
Abstract
The chapter analyses theoretically and empirically the supply-side effects of the public investments funded by the German „Economic Stimulus Package II“(Konjunkturpaket II), which was implemented in 2009. In the theoretical part, we address the distortionary effects of investment grants on public capital provision and local economic development. According to the theoretical literature on the efficient provision of public goods, public inputs and economic growth, conditional investment grants have several negative allocation effects: First, they distort the relative factor prices for the local government stimulating excess public capital stocks and Pareto-inefficient provision of public goods. Second, long-term growth-enhancing effects of debt-financed public investment could only be expected for public inputs, which either directly increase the productivity of the private sector or increase factor productivity, especially by increasing the stock of human capital. In the empirical part, we find that despite of the recent increase in municipal investments in the German state of Saxony our regression results do not confirm a connection with the ESPII funds. Furthermore, no relationship between the municipal fiscal strength and the amount of ESPII grants received could be found. All in all, due to the focus of the grants on public consumption goods rather than public inputs only marginal future growth effects can be expected from the subsidized investments.
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The Financial Crisis from a Forecaster's Perspective
Katja Drechsel, Rolf Scheufele
Kredit und Kapital,
No. 1,
2012
Abstract
This paper analyses the recession in 2008/2009 in Germany. This recession is very different from previous recessions in particular regarding their causes and magnitude. We show to what extent forecasters and forecasts based on leading indicators fail to detect the timing and the magnitude of the recession. This study shows that large forecast errors for both expert forecasts and forecasts based on leading indicators resulted during this recession which implies that the recession was very difficult to forecast. However, some leading indicators (survey data, risk spreads, stock prices) have indicated an economic downturn and hence, beat univariate time series models. Although the combination of individual forecasts provides an improvement compared to the benchmark model, the combined forecasts are worse than several individual models. A comparison of expert forecasts withthe best forecasts based on leading indicators shows only minor deviations. Overall, the range for an improvement of expert forecasts in the crisis compared to indicator forecasts is small.
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Informed and Uninformed Investment in Housing: The Downside of Diversification
Elena Loutskina, Philip E. Strahan
Review of Financial Studies,
No. 5,
2011
Abstract
Mortgage lenders that concentrate in a few markets invest more in information collection than diversified lenders. Concentrated lenders focus on the information-intensive jumbo market and on high-risk borrowers. They are better positioned to price risks and, thus, ration credit less. Adverse selection, however, leads to higher retention of mortgages relative to diversified lenders. Finally, concentrated lenders have higher profits than diversified lenders, their profits vary less systematically, and their stock prices fell less during the 2007—2008 credit crisis. The results imply that geographic diversification led to a decline in screening by lenders, which likely played a role in the 2007–2008 crisis.
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The Term Structure of Banking Crisis Risk in the United States: A Market Data Based Compound Option Approach
Stefan Eichler, Alexander Karmann, Dominik Maltritz
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 4,
2011
Abstract
We use a compound option-based structural credit risk model to estimate banking crisis risk for the United States based on market data on bank stocks on a daily frequency. We contribute to the literature by providing separate information on short-term, long-term and total crisis risk instead of a single-maturity risk measure usually inferred by Merton-type models or barrier models. We estimate the model by applying the Duan (1994) maximum-likelihood approach. A strongly increasing total crisis risk estimated from early July 2007 onwards is driven mainly by short-term crisis risk. Banks that defaulted or were overtaken during the crisis have a considerably higher crisis risk (especially higher long-term risk) than banks that survived the crisis.
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The Financial Crisis from a Forecaster’s Perspective
Katja Drechsel, Rolf Scheufele
Abstract
This paper analyses the recession in 2008/2009 in Germany, which is very different from previous recessions, in particular regarding its cause and magnitude. We show to what extent forecasters and forecasts based on leading indicators fail to detect the timing and the magnitude of the recession. This study shows that large forecast errors for both expert forecasts and forecasts based on leading indicators resulted during this recession which implies that the recession was very difficult to forecast. However, some leading indicators (survey data, risk spreads, stock prices) have indicated an economic downturn and hence, beat univariate time series models. Although the combination of individual forecasts provides an improvement compared to the benchmark model, the combined forecasts are worse than several individual models. A comparison of expert forecasts with the best forecasts based on leading indicators shows only minor deviations. Overall, the range for an improvement of expert forecasts during the crisis compared to indicator forecasts is relatively small.
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