What can a town achieve today? Integration, urban regimes, and the acceptance of models
Peter Franz
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 56,
1997
Abstract
Since 1990, the date of German reunification, urban development and especially the recovery of inner cities in East Germany has been delayed by several factors including real estate restitution claims, inflexible preservation codes for historic buildings, and the shortage of stores for retailers. This blockade situation has resulted in the quick and intensified development of shopping centres as „inner city substitutes“ on the urban periphery. The combined effect of the factors preventing revitalisation strategies and the newly realised and practised potential for autonomous action by the authorities of smaller municipalities was a severe restriction for the governing capacities of the authorities of the larger cities. in regaining their governance capability city governments are dependent on urban groups joining and supporting public developmental strategies. In accordance with Stone (1993) and Stoker and Mossberger (1994) urban groups active in urban development policy can be described as urban regimes. In Germany three types of regimes can be differentiated. The cities differ with respect to the political strength and the forms of coalition and conflict between different urban regimes. Specific conditions in East Germany have led to a special regime constellation with a powerful „conservation regime“ on the one hand and a vivid „globalisation regime“ on the other hand. This conflicting constellation results in a developmental blockade. The hypothesis is that a third regime type, the „local alliance“, is missing and still has to be created by practices such as city marketing and city management. Only when this regime building process has advanced will new constellations of political coalitions and compromise become possible and be able to reduce governance problems of city government in the long run.
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Employment effects of a reduction of continued pay in case of sickness
Hans-Ulrich Brautzsch, Christian Dreger
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
1997
Abstract
Eine Kürzung der Lohnfortsetzung im Krankheitsfall führt zu einem Rückgang der Lohnne-benkosten und damit zu einer Stärkung der Wettbewerbsposition, was – für sich genommen – einen Beschäftigungsaufbau befördert. Eine eingeschränkte Lohnfortzahlung führt jedoch letztlich auch zu einer Verringerung der Nettolohn- und -gehaltssumme und damit der ge-samtwirtschaftlichen Nachfrage sowie des Beschäftigungsniveaus. Die komplexen Wirkungen der gegenläufigen Effekte einer Verringerung der Lohnfortzahlung im Krankheitsfall werden hier mit Hilfe des makroökonometrischen Modells des IWH berechnet. Es wird deutlich, dass die jetzt gesetzlich möglichen Einschränkungen der Lohnfortzahlung im Krankheitsfall eher gering sind.
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Phonebanking
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse
European Economic Review,
No. 2,
1995
Abstract
In a two-stage game, we study under what conditions banks offer phonebanking (first stage). In the second stage, they are competitors in the market for deposits. Offering the phone option creates two opposing effects. The first is a demand effect as depositors strictly prefer to manage some of their financial transactions by phone. The second (strategic) effect is that competition is increased as transaction costs are lowered. Universal phonebanking prevails when the demand effect dominates the strategic effect. Specialization can occur in that one bank offers the phone option while the other does not.
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Corporate Taxation and Capital Structure Choice in Germany: A General Equilibrium Model
Reint E. Gropp
FinanzArchiv,
No. 2,
1995
Abstract
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