The Rise of Populist Parties in Europe
The Rise of Populist Parties in Europe: The Dark Side of Globalisation and Technological Change? ...
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Behaviour
The maths behind gut decisions First carefully weigh up the costs and benefits and then make a rational...
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Wiederhold wp
Does Information about Inequality and Discrimination in Early Child Care Affect Policy Preferences? ...
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Financial Stability
Financial Systems: The Anatomy of the Market Economy How the financial system is...
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Quotations
Quotations IWH: No shortenings of complex facts - but putting things in a nutshell....
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The German Model of Industrial Relations: Balancing Flexibility and Collective Action
Simon Jäger, Shakked Noy, Benjamin Schoefer
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
No. 4,
2022
Abstract
We give an overview of the "German model" of industrial relations. We organize our review by focusing on the two pillars of the model: sectoral collective bargaining and firm-level codetermination. Relative to the United States, Germany outsources collective bargaining to the sectoral level, resulting in higher coverage and the avoidance of firm-level distributional conflict. Relative to other European countries, Germany makes it easy for employers to avoid coverage or use flexibility provisions to deviate downwards from collective agreements. The greater flexibility of the German system may reduce unemployment, but may also erode bargaining coverage and increase inequality. Meanwhile, firm-level codetermination through worker board representation and works councils creates cooperative dialogue between employers and workers. Board representation has few direct impacts owing to worker representatives' minority vote share, but works councils, which hold a range of substantive powers, may be more impactful. Overall, the German model highlights tensions between efficiency-enhancing flexibility and equity-enhancing collective action.
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The Effect of Foreign Institutional Ownership on Corporate Tax Avoidance: International Evidence
Iftekhar Hasan, Incheol Kim, Haimeng Teng, Qiang Wu
Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation,
March
2022
Abstract
We find that foreign institutional investors (FIIs) reduce their investee firms’ tax avoidance. We provide evidence that the effect is driven by the institutional distance between FIIs’ home countries/regions and host countries/regions. Specifically, we find that the effect is driven by the influence of FIIs from countries/regions with high-quality institutions (i.e., common law, high government effectiveness, and high regulatory quality) on investee firms located in countries/regions with low-quality institutions. Furthermore, we show that the effect is concentrated on FIIs with little experience in the investee countries/regions or FIIs with stronger monitoring incentives. Finally, we find that FIIs are more likely to vote against management if the firm has a higher level of tax avoidance.
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Quid Pro Quo? Political Ties and Sovereign Borrowing
Gene Ambrocio, Iftekhar Hasan
Journal of International Economics,
November
2021
Abstract
Do stronger political ties with a global superpower improve sovereign borrowing conditions? We use data on voting at the United Nations General Assembly along with foreign aid flows to construct an index of political ties and find evidence that suggests stronger political ties with the US is associated with both better sovereign credit ratings and lower yields on sovereign bonds especially among lower income countries. We use official heads-of-state visits to the White House and coalition forces troop contributions as additional measures of the strength of political ties to further reinforce our findings.
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Political Cycles in Bank Lending to the Government
Michael Koetter, Alexander Popov
Review of Financial Studies,
No. 6,
2021
Abstract
We study how political party turnover after German state elections affects banks’ lending to the regional government. We find that between 1992 and 2018, party turnover at the state level leads to a sharp and substantial increase in lending by local savings banks to their home-state government. This effect is accompanied by an equivalent reduction in private lending. A statistical association between political party turnover and government lending is absent for comparable cooperative banks that exhibit a similar regional organization and business model. Our results suggest that political frictions may interfere with government-owned banks’ local development objectives.
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