On the Incentives to Provide Fuel-Efficient Automobiles
Hans Degryse, Andreas Irmen
Journal of Economics,
No. 2,
2001
Abstract
We argue that the provision of more fuel-efficient cars necessitates specific aerodynamic shapes. We show that the presence of this technological constraint may reduce the incentives to provide fuel efficiency. In equilibrium, cars become more similar and aerodynamic as fuel prices increase. However, the provided level of fuel efficiency falls short of the social optimal one such that a fuel-economy standard is welfare-enhancing.
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Pension Reform in Hungary
Peter Gedeon
IWH-Sonderhefte,
No. 5,
2000
Abstract
In Hungary social policy reforms in general and the pension reform in particular followed the introduction of the institutions of market economy with a considerable time lag, if at all. Although it was clear from the outset that the communist welfare state could not be sustained, comprehensive institutional reforms in the pension or health care systems were not introduced in the first six years of the postsocialist transition. This uneasiness to reform the social security systems has to do with the contradicting constraints decision makers have to face in the process of systemic change.
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Environmental policy under product differentiation and asymmetric costs - Does leapfrogging occur and is it worth it?
Jacqueline Rothfels
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 124,
2000
Abstract
This paper studies the influence of environmental policies on environmental quality, domestic firms, and welfare. Point of departure is Porter’s hypothesis that unilateral environmental regulation may enhance the competitiveness of domestic firms. This hypothesis has recently received considerable support in theoretical analyses, especially if imperfectly competitive markets with strategic behavior on behalf of the agents are taken into account. Our work contributes to this literature by explicitely investigating the implications of asymmetric cost structures between a domestic and a foreign firm sector. We use a partial-equilibrium model of vertical product differentiation, where the consumption of a product causes environmental harm. Allowing for differentiated products, the domestic industry can either assume the market leader position or lag behind in terms of the environmental quality of the produced product. Assuming as a benchmark case that the domestic industry lags behind, we investigate the possibility of the government to induce leapfrogging of the domestic firm, i.e. a higher quality produced by the domestic firm after regulation than that of the competitor prior to regulation. It is shown that in the case of a cost advantage for the domestic firm in the production process the imposition of a binding minimum quality standard can serve as a tool to induce leapfrogging. In case of a cost disadvantage the same result can be achieved through an adequate subsidization of quality dependend production costs. Thus, careful regulation enables the domestic firm in both scenarios to better its competitive position against foreign competitors and to earn larger profits. Additionally, environmental quality and welfare can be enhanced.
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Öffentliche Finanzen im „Post-Welfare-State“
Martin T. W. Rosenfeld
Diskussionsschriften aus dem Institut für Finanzwissenschaft der Universität Hamburg, Nr. 18 (mit Gunther Engelhardt, Birger P. Priddat, Frank Nullmeier und Eberhard Seifert),
1984
Abstract
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