Die Schließung von Polizeiposten führt zu einem Anstieg der Diebstahlkriminalität
André Diegmann, Sebastian Blesse
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 1,
2023
Abstract
Die Zusammenlegung von Polizeikräften durch die Schließung von Polizeiposten ist ein vielbeobachtetes Phänomen in entwickelten Volkswirtschaften. Polizeiposten stellen einen bedeutenden und sichtbaren Teil der öffentlichen Infrastruktur dar. Als Ergebnis der vorliegenden Studie zeigt sich, dass die Schließung von Polizeiposten zu einem Anstieg von Autodiebstählen und Wohnungseinbrüchen führt. Diese Resultate können nicht durch Verdrängungseffekte in andere Regionen, veränderte Einsatzstrategien der Polizeieinheiten oder eine geringere Inhaftierung von Kriminellen erklärt werden. Vielmehr sind sie konsistent mit einer veränderten Wahrnehmung der Aufklärungswahrscheinlichkeit. Somit zeigt sich, dass die Sichtbarkeit von lokalen Polizeiposten zur Abschreckung und demnach zur Kriminalitätsbekämpfung beiträgt.
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The Labor Effects of Judicial Bias in Bankruptcy
Aloisio Araujo, Rafael Ferreira, Spyridon Lagaras, Flavio Moraes, Jacopo Ponticelli, Margarita Tsoutsoura
Journal of Financial Economics,
No. 2,
2023
Abstract
We study the effect of judicial bias favoring firm continuation in bankruptcy on the labor market outcomes of employees by exploiting the random assignment of cases across courts in the State of São Paulo in Brazil. Employees of firms assigned to courts that favor firm continuation are more likely to stay with their employer, but they earn, on average, lower wages three to five years after bankruptcy. We discuss several potential mechanisms that can rationalize this result, and provide evidence that imperfect information about outside options in the local labor market and adjustment costs associated with job change play an important role.
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Political Ideology and International Capital Allocation
Elisabeth Kempf, Mancy Luo, Larissa Schäfer, Margarita Tsoutsoura
Journal of Financial Economics,
No. 2,
2023
Abstract
Does investors’ political ideology shape international capital allocation? We provide evidence from two settings—syndicated corporate loans and equity mutual funds—to show ideological alignment with foreign governments affects the cross-border capital allocation by U.S. institutional investors. Ideological alignment on both economic and social issues plays a role. Our empirical strategy ensures direct economic effects of foreign elections or government ties between countries are not driving the result. Ideological distance between countries also explains variation in bilateral investment. Combined, our findings imply ideological alignment is an important, omitted factor in models of international capital allocation.
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What Does Codetermination Do?
Simon Jäger, Shakked Noy, Benjamin Schoefer
ILR Review,
No. 4,
2022
Abstract
The authors provide a comprehensive overview of codetermination, that is, worker representation in firms’ governance and management. The available micro evidence points to zero or small positive effects of codetermination on worker and firm outcomes and leaves room for moderate positive effects on productivity, wages, and job stability. The authors also present new country-level, general-equilibrium event studies of codetermination reforms between the 1960s and 2010s, finding no effects on aggregate economic outcomes or the quality of industrial relations. They offer three explanations for the institution’s limited impact. First, existing codetermination laws convey little authority to workers. Second, countries with codetermination laws have high baseline levels of informal worker voice. Third, codetermination laws may interact with other labor market institutions, such as union representation and collective bargaining. The article closes with a discussion of the implications for recent codetermination proposals in the United States.
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Paying Outsourced Labor: Direct Evidence from Linked Temp Agency-Worker-Client Data
Andres Drenik, Simon Jäger, Pascuel Plotkin, Benjamin Schoefer
Review of Economics and Statistics,
No. 1,
2023
Abstract
We estimate how much firms differentiate pay premia between regular and outsourced workers in temp agency work arrangements. We leverage unique Argentinian administrative data that feature links between user firms (the workplaces where temp workers perform their labor) and temp agencies (their formal employers). We estimate that a high-wage user firm that pays a regular worker a 10% premium pays a temp worker on average only a 4.9% premium, compared to what these workers would earn in a low-wage user firm in their respective work arrangements—the midpoint between the benchmarks for insiders (one) and the competitive spot-labor market (zero).
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