07.01.2016 • 1/2016
IWH launches new logo and corporate design
At the turn of the year, the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association launches a new corporate design. A central starting point for this is a new logo which shares characteristic elements of the old logo and reinterprets them.
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Wo steht Sachsen-Anhalt? – Zur wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung anhand ausgewählter Indikatoren
Martin T. W. Rosenfeld
Jahrbuch für Politik und Gesellschaft in Sachsen-Anhalt 2002,
2002
Abstract
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Is There a Gap in the Gap? Regional Differences in the Gender Pay Gap
Boris Hirsch, Marion König, Joachim Möller
Scottish Journal of Political Economy,
No. 4,
2013
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate regional differences in the gender pay gap both theoretically and empirically. Within a spatial model of monopsonistic competition, we show that more densely populated labour markets are more competitive and constrain employers’ ability to discriminate against women. Utilizing a large administrative data set for western Germany and a flexible semi-parametric propensity score matching approach, we find that the unexplained gender pay gap for young workers is substantially lower in large metropolitan than in rural areas. This regional gap in the gap of roughly 10 percentage points remained surprisingly constant over the entire observation period of 30 years.
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Firm Leadership and the Gender Pay Gap: Do Active Owners Discriminate more than Hired Managers?
Boris Hirsch, Steffen Müller
Journal for Labour Market Research,
No. 1,
2014
Abstract
Using a large linked employer–employee data set for Germany, we investigate differences in the unexplained gender pay gap between owner-run and manager-run firms. We hypothesise that owner-managers and hired managers differ in their discretion to engage in profit-reducing taste discrimination against women, which would translate into different pay gaps depending on leadership regime. We find that unexplained gaps are significantly higher in owner-run firms, both statistically and economically. Yet, scrutinising these results by restricting our analysis to firms that only differ in leadership regime, this substantial difference disappears. Therefore, our findings do not support that active owners are more discriminatory per se.
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Do Government Owned Banks Trade Market Power for Slack?
Andreas Hackethal, Michael Koetter, Oliver Vins
Applied Economics,
No. 33,
2012
Abstract
The ‘Quiet Life Hypothesis (QLH)’ posits that banks with market power have less incentives to maximize revenues and minimize cost. Especially government owned banks with a public mandate precluding profit maximization might succumb to a quiet life. We use a unified approach that simultaneously measures market power and efficiency to test the quiet life hypothesis of German savings banks. We find that average local market power declined between 1996 and 2006. Cost and profit efficiency remained constant. Nonparametric correlations are consistent with a quiet life regarding cost efficiency but not regarding profit efficiency. The quiet life on the cost side is negatively correlated with bank size, quality of loan portfolio and local per capita income. The last result indicates that the quiet cost life is therefore potentially due to benevolent excess consumption of local input factors by public savings banks.
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Corporate Boards and Bank Loan Contracting
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Michael Koetter, Qiang Wu
Journal of Financial Research,
No. 4,
2012
Abstract
We investigate the role of corporate boards in bank loan contracting. We find that when corporate boards are more independent, both price and nonprice loan terms (e.g., interest rates, collateral, covenants, and performance-pricing provisions) are more favorable, and syndicated loans comprise more lenders. In addition, board size, audit committee structure, and other board characteristics influence bank loan prices. However, they do not consistently affect all nonprice loan terms except for audit committee independence. Our study provides strong evidence that banks recognize the benefits of board monitoring in mitigating information risk ex ante and controlling agency risk ex post, and they reward higher quality boards with more favorable loan contract terms.
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