Professor Dr Boris Hirsch

Professor Dr Boris Hirsch
Current Position

since 12/16

Research Fellow Department of Structural Change and Productivity

Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association

since 08/16

Professor of Economics

Leuphana University of Lüneburg

 

 

Research Interests

  • labour markets
  • industrial relations
  • empirical labour economics

Boris Hirsch joined the Department of Structural Change and Productivity as a Research Fellow in December 2016. His research focuses on the theory and empirics of imperfectly competitive labour markets, empirical labour economics, industrial relations, and migration.

Boris Hirsch is Professor of Economics, in particular Microeconometrics and Policy Evaluation, at Leuphana University of Lüneburg.

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Professor Dr Boris Hirsch
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Publications

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Uncovered Workers in Plants Covered by Collective Bargaining: Who Are They and How Do They Fare?

Boris Hirsch Philipp Lentge Claus Schnabel

in: British Journal of Industrial Relations, forthcoming

Abstract

Abstract In Germany, employers used to pay union members and non-members in a plant the same union wage in order to prevent workers from joining unions. Using recent administrative data, we investigate which workers in firms covered by collective bargaining agreements still individually benefit from these union agreements, which workers are not covered anymore and what this means for their wages. We show that about 9 per cent of workers in plants with collective agreements do not enjoy individual coverage (and thus the union wage) anymore. Econometric analyses with unconditional quantile regressions and firm-fixed-effects estimations demonstrate that not being individually covered by a collective agreement has serious wage implications for most workers. Low-wage non-union workers and those at low hierarchy levels particularly suffer since employers abstain from extending union wages to them in order to pay lower wages. This jeopardizes unions' goal of protecting all disadvantaged workers.

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Non-base Compensation and the Gender Pay Gap

Boris Hirsch Philipp Lentge

in: LABOUR: Review of Labour Economics and Industrial Relations, No. 3, 2022

Abstract

This paper investigates whether non-base compensation contributes to the gender pay gap (GPG). Using administrative data from Germany, we find in wage decompositions that lower bonus payments to women explain about 10 per cent of the gap at the mean and at different quantiles of the unconditional wage distribution whereas the lower prevalence of shift premia and overtime pay among women is unimportant. Among managers, the contribution of bonuses to the mean gap more than doubles and is steadily rising as one moves up the wage distribution. Our findings suggest that gender differences in bonuses are an important contributor to the GPG, particularly in top jobs.

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The Urban Wage Premium in Imperfect Labour Markets

Boris Hirsch Elke J. Jahn Alan Manning Michael Oberfichtner

in: Journal of Human Resources, April 2022

Abstract

Using administrative data for West Germany, this paper investigates whether part of the urban wage premium stems from greater competition in denser labor markets. We show that employers possess less wage-setting power in denser markets. We further document that an important part of the observed urban wage premia can be explained by greater competition in denser labor markets.

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Working Papers

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Organised Labour, Labour Market Imperfections, and Employer Wage Premia

Sabien Dobbelaere Boris Hirsch Steffen Müller Georg Neuschäffer

in: IWH Discussion Papers, No. 20, 2022

Abstract

This paper examines how collective bargaining through unions and workplace codetermination through works councils shape labour market imperfections and how labour market imperfections matter for employer wage premia. Based on representative German plant data for the years 1999–2016, we document that employer monopsony involving below competitive wages is far more prevalent than the contrary worker monopoly. We further find a smaller prevalence and intensity of employer monopsony when unions or works councils are present and the opposite for worker monopoly. Finally, we document a close link between labour market imperfections and employer wage premia. The presence and intensity of employer monopsony are associated with a lower level and larger dispersion of premia, whereas more intense worker monopoly is accompanied by a higher level only.

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