Optimizing Policymakers’ Loss Functions in Crisis Prediction: Before, Within or After?
Peter Sarlin, Gregor von Schweinitz
Macroeconomic Dynamics,
No. 1,
2021
Abstract
Early-warning models most commonly optimize signaling thresholds on crisis probabilities. The expost threshold optimization is based upon a loss function accounting for preferences between forecast errors, but comes with two crucial drawbacks: unstable thresholds in recursive estimations and an in-sample overfit at the expense of out-of-sample performance. We propose two alternatives for threshold setting: (i) including preferences in the estimation itself and (ii) setting thresholds ex-ante according to preferences only. Given probabilistic model output, it is intuitive that a decision rule is independent of the data or model specification, as thresholds on probabilities represent a willingness to issue a false alarm vis-à-vis missing a crisis. We provide simulated and real-world evidence that this simplification results in stable thresholds and improves out-of-sample performance. Our solution is not restricted to binary-choice models, but directly transferable to the signaling approach and all probabilistic early-warning models.
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17.12.2020 • 27/2020
Much more bankruptcies expected than currently observed in Germany
In a recession, the number of bankruptcies usually increases with some delay. However, despite the corona crisis, the number of bankruptcies in Germany is lower than predicted based on the long-term trend. The state aid packages and the suspension of the insolvency rules have led to fewer bankruptcies than expected. The Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) has estimated how many bankruptcies would actually have been likely to occur by industry because of the corona recession if the typical economic pattern had been in place. The results indicate that after the end of the state aid and exception rules bankruptcies are likely to pick up.
Oliver Holtemöller
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16.12.2020 • 26/2020
New wave of infections delays economic recovery in Germany
The lockdown is causing production in Germany to decline at the end of the year. When restrictions will be relaxed again, the recovery is likely to pick up pace only slowly, partly because the temporary reduction in value-added taxes is expiring. In spring, milder temperatures and an increasing portion of the population being vaccinated are likely to support the German economy to expand more strongly. The Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) forecasts that gross domestic product will increase by 4.4% in 2021, following a 5% decline in 2020. In East Germany, both the decline and the recovery will be significantly less pronounced.
Oliver Holtemöller
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High public deficit not only because of Corona - Medium-term options for action for the state
Andrej Drygalla, Oliver Holtemöller, Axel Lindner, Matthias Wieschemeyer, Götz Zeddies, Katja Heinisch
Konjunktur aktuell,
No. 4,
2020
Abstract
According to the IWH's medium-term projection, Germany's gross domestic product will grow by an average of ½% in price-adjusted terms in the years to 2025, which is 1 percentage point slower than in the period from 2013 to 2019. This is due not only to the sharp slump in 2020, but also to the fact that the labour force will decline noticeably. Government revenues will be expanding much more slowly than in previous years. Even after the pandemic crisis is overcome, the state budget is likely to have a structural deficit of about 2% relative to GDP if the legal framework remains unchanged, and the debt brake will continue to be violated. Consolidation measures to reduce this deficit ratio to ½ % would push production in Germany below the normal rate of capacity utilization. Simulations with the IWH fiscal policy model show that consolidation on the expenditure side would reduce production by less than consolidation on the revenue side. There is much to be said, also from a theoretical point of view, for not abolishing the debt brake, but for relaxing it to some extent.
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Kommentar: Finanzstabilität in Zeiten von Corona
Reint E. Gropp
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 3,
2020
Abstract
Die Corona-bedingte Wirtschaftskrise könnte den deutschen Bankensektor massiv in Mitleidenschaft ziehen, wenn die nationale und europäische Aufsicht nicht in den nächsten Monaten gegensteuert. Das ist die Aussage einer IWH-Studie, in der wir die Jahresabschlüsse von mehr als einer halben Million deutscher Unternehmen mit den Bilanzdaten von über 1 000 hiesigen Banken verknüpft haben. Die Stichprobe umfasst rund 90% der Bilanzsumme aller Banken und schließt alle großen systemrelevanten Geldhäuser mit ein. Wir benutzen dabei sektorspezifische Prognosen für die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung: Wir beziehen also die Tatsache mit ein, dass die Tourismusbranche besonders und die Baubranche relativ wenig von der Krise betroffen ist. Wir simulieren mehrere Szenarien: eines mit einer schnellen Erholung (V-förmig), eines mit einer relativ langsamen Erholung (U) und ein Szenario, in dem die Krise noch eine längere Zeit anhält (L).
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Aktuelle Trends: Spiegelt sich die Mehrwertsteuersenkung in den Verbraucherpreisen wider?
Birgit Schultz
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 3,
2020
Abstract
Die Bundesregierung hat im Rahmen der Corona-Soforthilfemaßnahmen eine temporäre Mehrwertsteuer senkung von Juli 2020 bis Ende des Jahres beschlossen. Unter der Annahme, dass die Unternehmen die Mehrwertsteuersenkung über die Güterpreise vollständig an die Verbraucher weitergeben, würde die Mehrwertsteuersenkung von 19% auf 16% für sich genommen zu 2,5% niedrigeren Preisen und beim ermäßigten Steuersatz (von 7% auf 5%) für sich genommen zu 1,9% geringeren Preisen führen. Gaststätten dürfen die Mehrwertsteuer für Speisen ab Juli 2020 sogar von 19% auf 5% senken.
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IWH-Flash-Indikator IV. Quartal 2020 und I. Quartal 2021
Katja Heinisch, Oliver Holtemöller, Axel Lindner, Birgit Schultz
IWH Flash Indicator,
No. 4,
2020
Abstract
Weil weitreichende Eindämmungsmaßnahmen gelockert wurden, war die deutsche Wirtschaft im Sommer 2020 auf Erholungskurs. Dazu hat auch die Wirtschaftspolitik entscheidend beigetragen. Nach dem pandemiebedingten Einbruch um 9,8% im zweiten Quartal stieg das Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) im dritten Quartal um 8,2%. Im Vergleich zum vierten Quartal 2019 – dem letzten Quartal ohne Einfluss der Pandemie – beträgt der Rückgang noch 4%. Allerdings sind die Covid-19-Neuinfektionen im Herbst wieder stark gestiegen, und für den November wurden insbesondere für den privaten Bereich erneut erhebliche Einschränkungen erlassen. Für weite Teile der gewerblichen Wirtschaft gelten diese Einschränkungen aber nicht. Die Wirtschaftsleistung dürfte daher im vierten Quartal 2020 nicht so stark einbrechen wie in der ersten Jahreshälfte. Der IWH-Flash-Indikator für das Bruttoinlandsprodukt deutet auf einen Rückgang um 2,1% hin, gefolgt von einer Expansion um 5,0% im ersten Quartal 2021 (vgl. Abbildung 1)
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Decentralisation of Collective Bargaining: A Path to Productivity?
Daniele Aglio, Filippo di Mauro
IWH-CompNet Discussion Papers,
No. 3,
2020
Abstract
Productivity developments have been rather divergent across EU countries and particularly between Central Eastern Europe (CEE) and elsewhere in the continent (non-CEE). How is such phenomenon related to wage bargaining institutions? Starting from the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) shock, we analyse whether the specific set-up of wage bargaining prevailing in non-CEE may have helped their respective firms to sustain productivity in the aftermath of the crisis. To tackle the issue, we merge the CompNet dataset – of firm-level based productivity indicators – with the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) survey on wage bargaining institutions. We show that there is a substantial difference in the institutional set-up between the two above groups of countries. First, in CEE countries the bulk of the wage bargaining (some 60%) takes place outside collective bargaining schemes. Second, when a collective bargaining system is adopted in CEE countries, it is prevalently in the form of firm-level bargaining (i. e. the strongest form of decentralisation), while in non-CEE countries is mostly subject to multi-level bargaining (i. e. an intermediate regime, only moderately decentralised). On productivity impacts, we show that firms’ TFP in the non-CEE region appears to have benefitted from the chosen form of decentralisation, while no such effects are detectable in CEE countries. On the channels of transmission, we show that decentralisation in non-CEE countries is also negatively correlated with dismissals and with unit labour costs, suggesting that such collective bargaining structure may have helped to better match workers with firms’ needs.
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Recovery Loses Momentum – Economy and Politics Still Shaped by the Pandemic
Oliver Holtemöller, Stefan Kooths, Claus Michelsen, Torsten Schmidt, Timo Wollmershäuser
Wirtschaftsdienst,
No. 11,
2020
Abstract
The corona pandemic has left substantial marks on the German economy and its impact is more persistent than presumed in the spring. In their autumn reports, leading German economic research institutes have revised their economic outlook downwards by roughly one percentage point for both this and next year. They now expect gross domestic product to fall by 5.4 % in 2020 (previously 4.2 %) and to grow by 4.7 % (5.8 %) in 2021 and 2.7 % in 2022. The downgrade of the forecast follows a more pessimistic assessment of the recovery, which is being held back by those sectors that are particularly dependent on social contacts. The precrisis level of output will not be reached until the end of 2021 with GDP remaining at 2.5 % below the level that would have prevailed without the pandemic. Despite massively falling back on shorttime working schemes, an estimated 820,000 jobs were lost due to the crisis. The government will run a record high budget deficit of 183 billion euros in 2020. In 2021 and 2022, deficits will remain substantial at 118 billion euros and 92 billion euros, respectively.
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