The Economic Optimality of Sanction Mechanisms in Interorganizational Ego Networks – A Game Theoretical Analysis –
Muhamed Kudic, Marc Banaszak
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 15,
2009
Abstract
Even though small- and medium-sized firms (SMEs) were believed not to proceed beyond exporting in their internationalization routes, we can observe new types of co-operation intensive entrepreneurial firms – so-called “micromultinational enterprises” (mMNEs) – entering the global landscape. These firms face the challenge to manage and control a portfolio of national and international alliances simultaneously (ego network). The aim of this paper is to provide game theoretically consolidated conditions in order to analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of interorganizational sanction mechanisms in an alliance portfolio setting. A game theoretical framework is developed over three stages with increasing complexity. Results show that two out of six analyzed sanction mechanisms do not fulfill the game theoretical condition for effectiveness. The efficiency analysis sensibilizes for discretionary elements in governance structures and demonstrates that not one single sanction mechanism but rather the right choice and combination of different types of sanction mechanisms leads to efficient results. We contribute to the international business, alliance, and network literature in several ways by focusing on alliance portfolios held by mMNEs. In doing so, we move beyond the dyadic level and analyze sanction mechanisms from an ego network perspective, a still widely under-emphasized topic in the literature.
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Barriers to Internationalization: Firm-Level Evidence from Germany
Claudia M. Buch
IAW Discussion Paper No. 52,
2009
Abstract
Exporters and multinationals are larger and more productive than their domestic
counterparts. In addition to productivity, financial constraints and labor market
constraints might constitute barriers to entry into foreign markets. We present new
empirical evidence on the extensive and intensive margin of exports and FDI based on detailed micro-level data of German firms. Our paper has three main findings. First, in line with earlier literature, we find a positive impact of firm size and productivity on firms’ international activities. Second, small firms suffer more frequently from financial constraints than bigger firms, but financial conditions have no strong effect on internationalization. Third, labor market constraints constitute a more severe barrier to foreign activities than financial constraints. Being covered by collective bargaining particularly impedes international activities.
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Transmission of Nominal Exchange Rate Changes to Export Prices and Trade Flows and Implications for Exchange Rate Policy
Oliver Holtemöller, Mathias Hoffmann
Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper 21/2009,
2009
Abstract
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Russia: A Victim to Transition or to the Financial Crisis?
Marina Grusevaja
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 8,
2009
Abstract
The global financial crisis has revealed deficiencies of the Russian economic system which are caused by the path of the transformation from central planning to the market economy, and not only attributable to the downfall of crude oil prices. While the worldwide liquidity crunch impaired the availability of loans to enterprises, the situation in Russia has deteriorated especially by the large exposure of the private sector to short-term foreign liabilities and by the one-sided orientation of the economy relying on the natural resources industry. Until the mid-2008, the foreign debt of the private banks and non-banks had increased strongly and had strengthened the dependence of the Russian economy on the developments on the international financial markets. The Ruble devaluation at the end of January 2009 aggravated the situation. The high short-term foreign debt of the private sector and the dependence on exports of natural resources are typical outcomes of the Russian transformation path. Therefore, on the one hand, the banking sector has not being able to satisfy financing demand of the private sector beyond the natural resources industries, enterprises became forced to borrow short-term money abroad. On the other hand, the economic strategy of the past seventeen years has strengthened the influence of the state on the natural resources sector – with the strong priority to develop it further. Hence, the one-sided economic development negatively affects the adaptability of the real-economic sector to change during the crisis period. In essence, the present political preferences of the government are aimed at providing direct financial assistance and at protectionist measures. In the long run, these actions could lead to stronger intervention of the state in the economy. Due to these recent developments, the crisis is likely to continue in Russia longer than in the other transformation countries.
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Global Financial Crisis Seriously Hits Russian Economy Because of Structural Imbalances
Martina Kämpfe
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 6,
2009
Abstract
Due to the falling global demand for commodities and the heavy decline of world oil prices in last summer, Russian economy was affected seriously. The following decrease in export revenues and a wave of short-term capital withdrawals led to a crash of Russian stock and capital markets and a deterioration of the economic situation at the end of the previous year. The government decided to stabilize the exchange rate of the Rouble by interventions and to support the domestic banking sector in order to maintain credit availability. In respect of the approaching recession, the parliament approved an economic stimulus package that would help to stabilize the economy and to avoid too strong social burdens for the households. Nevertheless, there is a strong weakening of economic growth because of the economy’s dependency from oil prices and the lack of alternatives up to now.
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Currency Appreciation and Exports: Empirical Evidence for Germany
Götz Zeddies
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 6,
2009
Abstract
In the first decade after its introduction, the Euro didn’t just hold up well, but compared to important currencies even appreciated considerably. Of course, exchange rate risks were noticeably lowered by introducing the single currency, since the bulk of EMU Member States’ exports are conducted within the currency union. Nevertheless, a strong Euro is unfavourable especially for open economies like Germany.
The article investigates the effects of exchange rate movements on German exports over time. The analyses reveal a downward impact of nominal effective exchange rates, not only for total, but also for exports to countries outside the currency union. Although an increasing pass-through of exchange rate changes to export prices is apparently at hand, further reasons for the dwindling effect of nominal exchange rates on exports are likely to exist.
In this context, it is shown that exports are less sensitive not only with respect to nominal, but also with respect to real effective exchange rate changes, suggesting a declining price elasticity of demand. Instead, exports are increasingly determined by economic activity in trading partner countries. In consequence of its geographic proximity, Germany did particularly benefit from the economic upswing in Eastern Europe, overlaying the appreciation of the Euro. Additionally, the latter could hardly impair German export industries due to their specialization on capital and high-quality consumer goods less vulnerable to exchange rate fluctuations.
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24.06.2009 • 37/2009
Exportweltmeister trotz Euro-Höhenflug – Zum Einfluss der Wechselkurse auf die deutschen Ausfuhren –
Ein starker Euro wird häufig als Gefahr für die exportierenden Unternehmen gesehen, weil er deren preisliche Wettbewerbsfähigkeit schwächt. Jedoch werden die deutschen Ausfuhren zunehmend durch die konjunkturelle Entwicklung in den Handelspartnerländern bestimmt: So legten die deutschen Exporte in der Aufschwungphase der vergangenen Jahre – trotz starker Euro-Aufwertung – kräftig zu.
German Economy Drawn into the World Recession
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
1. Sonderausgabe
2009
Abstract
In spring 2009, the world economy is in a deep recession. The intensification of the financial crisis in autumn has caused a sharp contraction of demand. The reaction of monetary and fiscal policy was substantial, but up to now (April 2009), it has not succeeded in restoring confidence of economic agents. Although some leading indicators point to a stabilization of production in the coming quarters, the downturn will not come to an end before next winter, because the financial crisis will continue to put strain on the real economy for some time to come.
The German economy is in its deepest recession since the foundation of the Federal Republic. Germany is particularly affected, because at the core of the economy is the production of those goods for that world demand has collapsed most: capital goods and high-quality consumer durables. While exports and private investment activity will continue to shrink this year (albeit at a slower rate), private consumption will be a stabilizing factor for some time, as will public investment activity in the second half of the year. Later in 2009 and in 2010, rising unemployment will depress consumption, while in this forecast, it is assumed that exports and investment slowly recover in 2010, because the financial turmoil will calm down.
For economic policy, a recapitalization of the banking sector should have priority. The ECB should lower its key interest rate to 0.5%. Given the sharply increasing fiscal deficits, a new, third fiscal program would be counterproductive. Only if monetary policy fails to stabilize the economy, further fiscal measures, coordinated at a European level, should be considered.
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