College Choice, Selection, and Allocation Mechanisms: A Structural Empirical Analysis
We use rich microeconomic data on performance and choices of students at college entry to analyze interactions between the selection mechanism, eliciting college preferences through exams, and the allocation mechanism. We set up a framework in which success probabilities and student preferences are shown to be identified from data on their choices and their exam grades under exclusion restrictions and support conditions. The counterfactuals we consider balance the severity of congestion and the quality of the match between schools and students. Moving to deferred acceptance or inverting the timing of choices and exams are shown to increase welfare. Redistribution among students and among schools is also sizeable in all counterfactual experiments.
IWH FDI Micro Database
IWH FDI Micro Database The IWH FDI Micro Database (FDI = Foreign Direct...
Potential International Employment Effects of a Hard Brexit
IWH Discussion Papers,
We use the World Input Output Database (WIOD) to estimate the potential employment effects of a hard Brexit in 43 countries. In line with other studies we assume that imports from the European Union (EU) to the UK will decline by 25% after a hard Brexit. The absolute effects are largest in big EU countries which have close trade relationships with the UK like Germany and France. However, there are also large countries outside the EU which are heavily affected via global value chains like China, for example. The relative effects (in percent of total employment) are largest in Malta and Ireland. UK employment will also be affected via intermediate input production. Within Germany, the motor vehicle industry and in particular the “Autostadt” Wolfsburg are most affected.
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College Choice Allocation Mechanisms: Structural Estimates and Counterfactuals
IZA Discussion Paper, Heft 8550,
We evaluate a simple allocation mechanism of students to majors at college entry that was commonly used in universities in Brazil in the 1990s and 2000s. Students first chose a single major and then took exams that select them in or out of the chosen major. The literature analyzing student placement, points out that this decentralized mechanism is not stable and is not strategy-proof. This means that some pairs of major & students can be made better off and that students tend to disguise their preferences using such a mechanism. We build up a model of performance and school choices in which expectations are carefully specified and we estimate it using cross-section data reporting choices between two medical schools and grade performances at the entry exams. Given those estimates, we evaluate changes in selection and students’ expected utilities when other mechanisms are implemented. Results highlight the importance of strategic motives and redistributive effects of changes of the allocation mechanisms.
Methodical limits of calculating productivity in the new Länder
IWH Discussion Papers,
The „Arbeitskreis Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung der Länder“ now publishes figures concerning the value added in Germany. Formerly the Statistische Bundesamt had this assignment. Some corporations have plant locations in the new Länder as well as in the old Länder. The employed method for splitting-up the value added produce by these corporations might lead to an underestimation of the overall value added produced in the new Länder. However, an estimation using the firm panel of the IAB shows that the East German productivity gap for manufacturing is overestimated by maximally two percentage points. Still in sectors that are dominated by multi plant corporations this effect is stronger. All in all the East German productivity gab is overestimated by maximally three percentage points.