29.07.2021 • 20/2021
Communication instead of conflict – why are female CEOs so interesting for hedge funds
The value of female-led firms is enhanced more by the intervention of activist investors than that of firms with male CEOs. This is the result of a recent paper by Iftekhar Hasan (Fordham University and IWH) and Qiang Wu (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, RPI) at the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH). "The results show that female CEOs particularly benefit from the intervention of hedge fund activists due to their strong communication and interpersonal skills," explains Iftekhar Hasan. This is because, on average, the intervention of an activist hedge fund increases the value of the firm ex post. To achieve this, activist hedge funds such as Carl Icahn, Trian Fundmanagement or Elliott prefer to rely on communication and cooperation with the management.
Reint E. Gropp
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Organised Labour, Labour Market Imperfections, and Employer Wage Premia
Sabien Dobbelaer, Boris Hirsch, Steffen Müller, Georg Neuschäffer
CESifo Working Paper,
No. 8739,
2020
published in: ILR Review
Abstract
This paper examines how collective bargaining through unions and workplace co-determination through works councils shape labour market imperfections and how labourmarket imperfections matter for employer wage premia. Based on representative Germanplant data for the years 1999{2016, we document that labour market imperfections arethe norm rather than the exception. Wage mark-downs, that is wages below the marginalrevenue product of labour rooted in employers' monopsony power, are the most prevalentoutcome. We further nd that both types of organised labour are accompanied by asmaller prevalence and intensity of wage mark-downs whereas the opposite holds for wagemark-ups, that is wages above the marginal revenue product of labour rooted in workers'monopoly power. Finally, we document a close link between our production-based labourmarket imperfection measures and employer wage premia. The prevalence and intensityof wage mark-downs are associated with a smaller level and larger dispersion of premiawhereas wage mark-ups are only accompanied by a higher premium level.
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Organised Labour, Labour Market Imperfections, and Employer Wage Premia
Sabien Dobbelaer, Boris Hirsch, Steffen Müller, Georg Neuschäffer
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper,
No. 81,
2020
published in: ILR Review
Abstract
This paper examines how collective bargaining through unions and workplace co-determination through works councils shape labour market imperfections and how labourmarket imperfections matter for employer wage premia. Based on representative Germanplant data for the years 1999{2016, we document that labour market imperfections arethe norm rather than the exception. Wage mark-downs, that is wages below the marginalrevenue product of labour rooted in employers' monopsony power, are the most prevalentoutcome. We further nd that both types of organised labour are accompanied by asmaller prevalence and intensity of wage mark-downs whereas the opposite holds for wagemark-ups, that is wages above the marginal revenue product of labour rooted in workers'monopoly power. Finally, we document a close link between our production-based labourmarket imperfection measures and employer wage premia. The prevalence and intensityof wage mark-downs are associated with a smaller level and larger dispersion of premiawhereas wage mark-ups are only accompanied by a higher premium level.
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Organised Labour, Labour Market Imperfections, and Employer Wage Premia
Sabien Dobbelaer, Boris Hirsch, Steffen Müller, Georg Neuschäffer
IZA Discussion Paper,
No. 13909,
2020
published in: ILR Review
Abstract
This paper examines how collective bargaining through unions and workplace co-determination through works councils shape labour market imperfections and how labourmarket imperfections matter for employer wage premia. Based on representative Germanplant data for the years 1999{2016, we document that labour market imperfections arethe norm rather than the exception. Wage mark-downs, that is wages below the marginalrevenue product of labour rooted in employers' monopsony power, are the most prevalentoutcome. We further nd that both types of organised labour are accompanied by asmaller prevalence and intensity of wage mark-downs whereas the opposite holds for wagemark-ups, that is wages above the marginal revenue product of labour rooted in workers'monopoly power. Finally, we document a close link between our production-based labourmarket imperfection measures and employer wage premia. The prevalence and intensityof wage mark-downs are associated with a smaller level and larger dispersion of premiawhereas wage mark-ups are only accompanied by a higher premium level.
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Criminal Network Formation and Optimal Detection Policy: The Role of Cascade of Detection
Liuchun Deng, Yufeng Sun
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
September
2017
Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of cascade of detection, how detection of a criminal triggers detection of his network neighbors, on criminal network formation. We develop a model in which criminals choose both links and actions. We show that the degree of cascade of detection plays an important role in shaping equilibrium criminal networks. Surprisingly, greater cascade of detection could reduce ex ante social welfare. In particular, we prove that full cascade of detection yields a weakly denser criminal network than that under partial cascade of detection. We further characterize the optimal allocation of the detection resource and demonstrate that it should be highly asymmetric among ex ante identical agents.
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Smuggling Illegal Goods Across the US–Mexico Border: A Political-economy Perspective
A. Buehn, Stefan Eichler
Applied Economics Letters,
No. 12,
2012
Abstract
We analyse the impact that political business cycles and party preferences have on smuggling illegal goods across the US–Mexico border during the years 1980–2004. We find that smuggling is significantly reduced prior to Congressional elections – but only if the incumbent President is Republican.
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Regionale Unterschiede der Kooperationsmuster der deutschen Photovoltaik-Industrie
Christoph Hornych
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 12,
2011
Abstract
Der Beitrag analysiert das Kooperationsgeschehen in der deutschen Photovoltaik-Industrie. Ausgehend von den theoretischen Vorteilen, die Kooperationen in stadt- und regionalökonomischen Ansätzen zugeschrieben werden, wird geprüft, inwieweit die tatsächlich bestehenden Kooperationsmuster in den verschiedenen Bundesländern den aus theoretischer Sicht günstigen Kooperationsmustern entsprechen. Hierzu erfolgt eine vergleichende Beschreibung der Kooperationsstrukturen der Industrie in und zwischen den einzelnen Bundesländern. Die Untersuchung basiert auf der „IWH-Unternehmensdatenbank Photovoltaik“, die u. a. Informationen zu den Kooperationsbeziehungen zwischen den in der Datenbank enthaltenen Unternehmen und öffentlichen Forschungseinrichtungen enthält. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass sich die Kooperationsintensitäten in und zwischen den Bundesländern deutlich voneinander unterscheiden. Dabei sind insbesondere die mitteldeutschen Bundesländer Sachsen, Sachsen- Anhalt und Thüringen durch eine starke gegenseitige und deutschlandweite Vernetzung gekennzeichnet. Hingegen sind die Akteure in der Region Berlin-Brandenburg, die ähnlich wie Mitteldeutschland durch eine hohe
Konzentration an Photovoltaikunternehmen gekennzeichnet ist, deutlich weniger in Netzwerkstrukturen eingebunden.
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Preventing Innovative Cooperations: The Legal Exemptions Unintended Side Effect
Christian Growitsch, Nicole Nulsch, Margarethe Rammerstorfer
European Journal of Law and Economics,
No. 1,
2012
Abstract
In 2004, European competition law had been considerable changed by the introduction of the new Council Regulation No. 1/2003. One of the major renewals was the replacement of the centralized notification system for inter-company cooperations in favor of a so-called legal exemption system. We analyze the implications of this reform and its arising uncertainty on the agreements firms implement, especially on innovative agreements like vertical R&D agreements. By means of a decision theoretic approach, we show that the law’s intention to reduce the incentive to establish illegal cartels will be reached but innovating cooperations might be prevented. To avoid this unintended side effect, fines but not the monitoring activities should be increased.
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On the Determinants of the Cooperative Behavior of Firms in the German Photovoltaic Industry
Christoph Hornych, Matthias Brachert
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 20,
2010
Abstract
The article examines the determinants of the number of cooperation partners and the share of regional cooperations of firms in the German photovoltaic industry. Based on an overview about possible effects of the cooperation of firms with partners inside and outside their region, we derive hypotheses on the relationship between both firm-specific and region-specific variables and the cooperative behavior of firms. The hypotheses are tested with regression models using a data set of 178 firms of the German photovoltaic industry. The results show that in particular large firms and firms with a high absorptive capacity have significantly more co-operation partners. Furthermore, firms cooperate within their region especially when a large number of potential partners are located in the same region. Regarding foreign-owned firms, the results show that these firms tend to cooperate in particular with partners, inside the region where they are located.
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Phonebanking
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse
European Economic Review,
No. 2,
1995
Abstract
In a two-stage game, we study under what conditions banks offer phonebanking (first stage). In the second stage, they are competitors in the market for deposits. Offering the phone option creates two opposing effects. The first is a demand effect as depositors strictly prefer to manage some of their financial transactions by phone. The second (strategic) effect is that competition is increased as transaction costs are lowered. Universal phonebanking prevails when the demand effect dominates the strategic effect. Specialization can occur in that one bank offers the phone option while the other does not.
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