Islamic Finance in Europe
Pierluigi Caristi, Stéphane Couderc, Angela di Maria, Filippo di Mauro, Beljeet Kaur Grewal, Lauren Ho, Sergio Masciantonio, Steven Ongena, Sajjad Zaher
ECB Occasional Paper,
No. 146,
2013
Abstract
Islamic finance is based on ethical principles in line with Islamic religious law. Despite its low share of the global financial market, Islamic finance has been one of this sector's fastest growing components over the last decades and has gained further momentum in the wake of the financial crisis. The paper examines the development of and possible prospects for Islamic finance, with a special focus on Europe. It compares Islamic and conventional finance, particularly as concerns risks associated with the operations of respective institutions, as well as corporate governance. The paper also analyses empirical evidence comparing Islamic and conventional financial institutions with regard to their: (i) efficiency and profitability; and (ii) stability and resilience. Finally, the paper considers the conduct of monetary policy in an Islamic banking context. This is not uncomplicated given the fact that interest rates - normally a cornerstone of monetary policy - are prohibited under Islamic finance. Liquidity management issues are thus discussed here, with particular reference to the euro area.
Read article
Größenvorteile im Bereich kommunaler Leistungen – Bericht zum 4. Halleschen Kolloquium zur kommunalen Wirtschaft
Peter Haug, Albrecht Kauffmann, M. Kloss
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 6,
2012
Abstract
Das Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) veranstaltet unter Federführung der Forschungsabteilung Stadtökonomik alle zwei Jahre das „Hallesche Kolloquium zur kommunalen Wirtschaft“. Vor dem Hintergrund der kommunalen Gebietsreformen in Ostdeutschland befasste sich die Veranstaltung am 24. und 25. November 2011 mit der Frage, ob insbesondere mit Bezug auf den Kommunalbereich „bigger“ notwendigerweise auch „better“ (z. B. im Sinne einer möglichst kostengünstigen Versorgung mit öffentlichen Leistungen) bedeuten muss.
Die Konferenz richtete sich dabei sowohl an Wissenschaftler als auch an Praktiker aus Politik und Verwaltung. Im Mittelpunkt standen dabei wissenschaftliche Erkenntnisse zur Effizienz des öffentlichen Sektors auf verschiedenen Ebenen. Beleuchtet wurde dieses Thema nicht nur aus der volkswirtschaftlichen, sondern auch aus der rechts- und verwaltungswissenschaftlichen Perspektive. Nach den Fachvorträgen aus den genannten Bereichen bildete eine Podiumsdiskussion mit Vertretern aus Kommunalpolitik, Kommunalverbänden und Landesverwaltung
den Abschluss der Konferenz. Insgesamt zeigte die Veranstaltung auf, dass Größe nicht alles ist bei der Gestaltung künftiger Kommunalstrukturen und Gebietsreformen alles andere als ein Allheilmittel bei mangelnder Leistungsfähigkeit (z. B. Finanzschwäche) der Kommunen sind.
Read article
What are the benefits of cooperation and networking for the economic development of cities and metropolitan regions? Conference proceeding of the third “Halle Forum on Urban Economic Growth”
Christoph Hornych, Albrecht Kauffmann, M. Mühlberg, Martin T. W. Rosenfeld
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 1,
2011
Abstract
The Department of Urban Economics of the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) held on 2 and 3 December 2010 the third “Halle Forum on Urban Economic Growth“. The biennial “Halle Forum” focuses on the determinants of urban growth. This year's conference addressed the forms and benefits of cooperation and networking for the economic development of cities and metropolitan regions. The presentations and discussions focused on the one hand on the effects and determinants of inter-and intra-regional cooperation between firms, and on the other hand on cooperation between neighboring municipalities, especially through the establishment of metropolitan regions.
Read article
The Economic Optimality of Sanction Mechanisms in Interorganizational Ego Networks – A Game Theoretical Analysis –
Muhamed Kudic, Marc Banaszak
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 15,
2009
Abstract
Even though small- and medium-sized firms (SMEs) were believed not to proceed beyond exporting in their internationalization routes, we can observe new types of co-operation intensive entrepreneurial firms – so-called “micromultinational enterprises” (mMNEs) – entering the global landscape. These firms face the challenge to manage and control a portfolio of national and international alliances simultaneously (ego network). The aim of this paper is to provide game theoretically consolidated conditions in order to analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of interorganizational sanction mechanisms in an alliance portfolio setting. A game theoretical framework is developed over three stages with increasing complexity. Results show that two out of six analyzed sanction mechanisms do not fulfill the game theoretical condition for effectiveness. The efficiency analysis sensibilizes for discretionary elements in governance structures and demonstrates that not one single sanction mechanism but rather the right choice and combination of different types of sanction mechanisms leads to efficient results. We contribute to the international business, alliance, and network literature in several ways by focusing on alliance portfolios held by mMNEs. In doing so, we move beyond the dyadic level and analyze sanction mechanisms from an ego network perspective, a still widely under-emphasized topic in the literature.
Read article
Accounting for Distress in Bank Mergers
Michael Koetter, J. W. B. Bos, Frank Heid, James W. Kolari, Clemens J. M. Kool, Daniel Porath
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 10,
2007
Abstract
Most bank merger studies do not control for hidden bailouts, which may lead to biased results. In this study we employ a unique data set of approximately 1000 mergers to analyze the determinants of bank mergers. We use undisclosed information on banks’ regulatory intervention history to distinguish between distressed and non-distressed mergers. Among merging banks, we find that improving financial profiles lower the likelihood of distressed mergers more than the likelihood of non-distressed mergers. The likelihood to acquire a bank is also reduced but less than the probability to be acquired. Both distressed and non-distressed mergers have worse CAMEL profiles than non-merging banks. Hence, non-distressed mergers may be motivated by the desire to forestall serious future financial distress and prevent regulatory intervention.
Read article
A Concept of Incentive Ethics for the Enhancement of the Social Financial Security According to Hartz IV
Joachim Wilde
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 1,
2006
Abstract
Reforms of benefits for long-term unemployed in Germany are usually discussed in
terms of workfare and financial incentives. This paper broadens the discussion with a concept of incentive ethics. It analyzes how the dependency on benefits can be left out by allocating so-called moral goods to the long-term unemployed. Comparing the new concept with the last reform (“Hartz IV“), the shortcomings of this reform are revealed. Thus, the paper concludes with a new reform proposal.
Read article