13.04.2022 • 9/2022
Economy in East Germany will not suffer more from the war in Ukraine than in Germany as a whole – Implications of the Joint Economic Forecast Spring 2022 and new data for the East German economy
The recovery of the East German economy, like that of Germany as a whole, will weaken considerably due to Russia’s war in Ukraine. However, the economic slump and recovery were not as pronounced as in West Germany. In 2021, East German output grew by 2.3%, less than in Germany as a whole (2.9%). According to the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH), GDP growth in East Germany is also likely to be lower than in Germany as a whole in 2022 (2.1% in East Germany vs. 2.7% in Germany) and 2023 (2.5% vs. 3.1%).
Oliver Holtemöller
Read press release
14.10.2021 • 26/2021
East German economy less affected by supply bottlenecks than German economy as a whole, but lower vaccination rates pose risks – Implications of the Joint Economic Forecast Autumn 2021 and of Länder data from recent publications of the Federal Statisti
Supply bottlenecks affect production in the manufacturing sector in East Germany somewhat less than in Germany as a whole. With 1.8%, the increase in Gross Domestic Product in eastern Germany in 2021 therefore is likely to be lower than in Germany as a whole (2.4%); this gap is likely to enlarge in 2022, when supply bottlenecks hamper less (East Germany: 3.6%, Germany 4.8%).
Oliver Holtemöller
Read press release
Executive Compensation, Macroeconomic Conditions, and Cash Flow Cyclicality
Stefano Colonnello
Finance Research Letters,
November
2020
Abstract
I model the joint effects of debt, macroeconomic conditions, and cash flow cyclicality on risk-shifting behavior and managerial wealth-for-performance sensitivity. The model shows that risk-shifting incentives rise during recessions and that the shareholders can eliminate such adverse incentives by reducing the equity-based compensation in managerial contracts. Moreover, this reduction should be larger in highly procyclical firms. These novel, testable predictions provide insights into optimal shareholder responses to agency costs of debt throughout the business cycle.
Read article
14.10.2020 • 22/2020
Economic slump in East Germany not as severe as in Germany as a whole ‒ Implications of the Joint Economic Forecast and new data for East Germany
The German economy started recovering quickly after the drastic pandemic-related slump in spring 2020. The recovery, however, loses much of its momentum in the second half of the year. The Joint Economic Forecast predicts that production levels seen before the crisis will not be reached again until the second half of 2021. In principle, the East German economy is following this pattern, although the economic slump is likely to be somewhat milder.
Oliver Holtemöller
Read press release
To Securitise or to Price Credit Default Risk?
Huyen Nguyen, Danny McGowan
Abstract
We evaluate if lenders price or securitise mortgages to mitigate credit risk. Exploiting exogenous variation in regional credit risk created by differences in foreclosure law along US state borders, we find that financial institutions respond to the law in heterogeneous ways. In the agency market where Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) provide implicit loan guarantees, lenders transfer credit risk using securitisation and do not price credit risk into mortgage contracts. In the non-agency market, where there is no such guarantee, lenders increase interest rates as they are unable to shift credit risk to loan purchasers. The results inform the debate about the design of loan guarantees, the common interest rate policy, and show that underpricing regional credit risk leads to an increase in the GSEs‘ debt holdings by $79.5 billion per annum, exposing taxpayers to preventable losses in the housing market.
Read article
17.06.2020 • 10/2020
High risk of corporate bankruptcy due to the corona shutdown
The Corona shutdown increases the probability of corporate bankruptcy. An analysis based on corporate financial statements from 2014 to 2018 reveals that in the United Kingdom, 73% of shutdown firms are not able to cover interest expenses from earnings before interest and taxes if they lose one twelfth of annual turnover. In Germany, the fraction amounts to 81%.
Oliver Holtemöller
Read press release
Why are some Chinese Firms Failing in the US Capital Markets? A Machine Learning Approach
Gonul Colak, Mengchuan Fu, Iftekhar Hasan
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,
June
2020
Abstract
We study the market performance of Chinese companies listed in the U.S. stock exchanges using machine learning methods. Predicting the market performance of U.S. listed Chinese firms is a challenging task due to the scarcity of data and the large set of unknown predictors involved in the process. We examine the market performance from three different angles: the underpricing (or short-term market phenomena), the post-issuance stock underperformance (or long-term market phenomena), and the regulatory delistings (IPO failure risk). Using machine learning techniques that can better handle various data problems, we improve on the predictive power of traditional estimations, such as OLS and logit. Our predictive model highlights some novel findings: failed Chinese companies have chosen unreliable U.S. intermediaries when going public, and they tend to suffer from more severe owners-related agency problems.
Read article
The Joint Dynamics of Sovereign Ratings and Government Bond Yields
Makram El-Shagi, Gregor von Schweinitz
Journal of Banking and Finance,
2018
Abstract
Can a negative shock to sovereign ratings invoke a vicious cycle of increasing government bond yields and further downgrades, ultimately pushing a country toward default? The narratives of public and political discussions, as well as of some widely cited papers, suggest this possibility. In this paper, we will investigate the possible existence of such a vicious cycle. We find no evidence of a bad long-run equilibrium and cannot confirm a feedback loop leading into default as a transitory state for all but the very worst ratings. We use a bivariate semiparametric dynamic panel model to reproduce the joint dynamics of sovereign ratings and government bond yields. The individual equations resemble Pesaran-type cointegration models, which allow for valid interference regardless of whether the employed variables display unit-root behavior. To incorporate most of the empirical features previously documented (separately) in the literature, we allow for different long-run relationships in both equations, nonlinearities in the level effects of ratings, and asymmetric effects in changes of ratings and yields. Our finding of a single good equilibrium implies the slow convergence of ratings and yields toward this equilibrium. However, the persistence of ratings is sufficiently high that a rating shock can have substantial costs if it occurs at a highly speculative rating or lower. Rating shocks that drive the rating below this threshold can increase the interest rate sharply, and for a long time. Yet, simulation studies based on our estimations show that it is highly improbable that rating agencies can be made responsible for the most dramatic spikes in interest rates.
Read article
Can Lenders Discern Managerial Ability from Luck? Evidence from Bank Loan Contracts
Dien Giau Bui, Yan-Shing Chen, Iftekhar Hasan, Chih-Yung Lin
Journal of Banking and Finance,
2018
Abstract
We investigate the effect of managerial ability versus luck on bank loan contracting. Borrowers showing a persistently superior managerial ability over previous years (more likely due to ability) enjoy a lower loan spread, while borrowers showing a temporary superior managerial ability (more likely due to luck) do not enjoy any spread reduction. This finding suggests that banks can discern ability from luck when pricing a loan. Firms with high-ability managers are more likely to continue their prior lower loan spread. The spread-reduction effect of managerial ability is stronger for firms with weak governance structures or poor stakeholder relationships, corroborating the notion that better managerial ability alleviates borrowers’ agency and information risks. We also find that well governed banks are better able to price governance into their borrowers’ loans, which helps explain why good governance enhances bank value.
Read article