The Maximum Level of Fines Restricts the Effect of European Competition Law
Henry Dannenberg, Nicole Steinat
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
2008
Abstract
In 2006, the fining guidelines for competition law infringements were completely renewed. The aim of this reform was twofold: on the one hand to decrease the incentive for cartelization and on the other hand to increase the likelihood of cartel detection.
The article studies how company’s decision for or against a cartel is influenced by these guidelines. We show that due to the maximum level of fines – which refers to the worldwide group turnover - an effective deterrence level can be achieved only for those companies, which realize just a small part of their turnover in the relevant market. Their incentive to blow the whistle increases with the cartel duration. This leads to a rising instability of cartels where one member generates only a small part of its turnover in the relevant market. In contrast, the deterrence level for companies that realize a large part of their sales in the relevant market is quite low due to the maximum level of fines.
The article gives a short overview of the risk factor competition law – from a company perspective. We illustrate how the expenditures related to cartel law infringements can be calculated. Further on, the minimum profit margins that are necessary for an economically advantageous cartel are determined. We show that for certain types of cartels already small rates of return are sufficient to make cartel participation attractive.
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Risk-factor competition law infringement
Henry Dannenberg, Nicole Steinat
Risk, Fraud & Compliance ZRFC,
No. 1,
2008
Abstract
During the last couple of years the European Commission increased the fines for competition law infringements. Regardless whether an infringement was only negligent or intended it can result in enormous financial risks for companies. The following article shows a distribution of the financial risk of cartel law infringements in Europe. The potential fine - which can amount to a multiple of annual sales in the relevant market - should sensitize managers to check their own undertaking whether they are involved in such violations.
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Implementation of Competition Law in Developing and Transition Countries. Theoretical and Empirical Considerations
Franz Kronthaler
Schriften des IWH,
No. 26,
2007
Abstract
The success of free market economies over the last 200 years supports the notion that competition increases individual and social wealth. Developing countries that have undergone the necessary reforms today are amongst the most driving “emerging” economies in the world.
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Paradigm Shift in European Competition Law
Nicole Steinat
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 11,
2007
Abstract
During the last decade, European competition law went through several procedural changes, which were mainly influenced by US-American law. Economic criteria rather than legal parameters are now used to evaluate the conduct of firms. Such a “more economic approach” is apparent both in legislation and jurisdiction.
The article discusses the reforms that resulted from the paradigm shift by focusing on the legislation perspective as well as their impact in terms of cartels. One of the most important instruments in European competition policy is nowadays the Leniency Regulation, which was implemented in 1996. Another tool are the renewed Fining Guidelines, which in general will lead to higher fines.
Although European competition law adopted some instruments from American law, there are still major differences between the two jurisdictions. The possibility to impose jail sentences does not exist on a European level yet. However, a few European countries included criminal sanctions in their national laws.
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Reform of Local Municipal Structures: Centralization not only Implicates Advantages
Peter Haug, Claus Michelsen
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 11,
2007
Abstract
The question whether centralized or decentralized municipal structures are more efficient has been discussed, not only in Germany, for a long time primarily under aspects of law and administrative sciences. In this article, we use an economic approach instead. The prevailing theories on interjurisdictional competition are not conclusive about the cost and welfare effects of centralization. Therefore, using the example of Saxony-Anhalt we investigate empirically if there are any significant differences in expenses or personnel between more centralized municipal governance forms (“Einheitsgemeinden”) or rather decentralized forms (“Verwaltungsgemeinschaften”). Our cross-section analysis for selected municipal activities reveals that both types are very similar in their cost and manning structures. Significant differences can be explained rather by different population densities than by the organizational structure. Considering these results we do not recommend a forced amalgamation of the municipalities in Saxony-Anhalt. Especially, if frustration cost or the political transaction cost, which both rise with centralization, are taken into account.
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Market Follows Standards
Ulrich Blum
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 10,
2007
Abstract
Standards are an important part of the codified knowledge of a society. In contrast to industry standards, formal standards are created in a consensus-based procedure open to all interested parties. Only if an economic interest for application exists will formal standards be produced. Interested parties have to shoulder participation costs themselves, which enforces economic interest. Up to a certain extent, governments also trigger and finance formal standardisation processes through the new approach, which creates a framework that is filled by private activity. Standards stand at the end of intellectual property rights if the totality of the value chain of knowledge production is looked at. One important aspect is their accessibility and the inclusion of all necessary intellectual property rights, especially patents, at reasonable prices. Conversely, consortia may exclude groups from the use of their standards. By preventing the licensing of those patents included in a standard, they can effectively block market entry. Thus, “successful” standards often face antitrust problems. Formal standards reduce costs of production through economies of scale, economies of scope and network-economies. Goods and processes that are standardized signal quality, the inclusion of high technological standards and permanent presence in the markets, which again accelerates market dissemination. Firms face a dilemma: On the one hand, the penetration of a markets with industry standards offers potentials for high profits; on the other hand, this has to be balanced against the risk of failure, especially if clients are hesitant because they do not know which standard will be successful in the end. Formal standards create and stabilize trust markets. This is especially true in the area of globalisation. Europe, which has to face an enormous competition in the international knowledge economy, needs an institutionally efficient approach to formal standardisation. This contribution addresses future problems of the European standardisation that have been developed within the framework of a working group of the European Standardisation Organisation called Future Landscape of European Standardisation (FLES).
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Effects of European Competition Policy Reform for Central East Europe - an Institutional Perspective
Johannes Stephan, Jens Hölscher
Intellectual Economics,
No. 1,
2007
Abstract
With the Central and East European countries increasingly included into the international division of labour in the European Economic space, we are prompted to ask whether this integration operates on a level playing field with respect to competition policy. In fact, a comparison between the more advanced West European countries and countries in Central and East Europe reveals that effectiveness of implementation of competition law and policy and intensity of competition are lower in the East and in particular also in the new EU member countries of Central East Europe, where the institutional framework of the West had been taken over some years ago now. In this situation, the EU recently decided to reform competition policy by delegating some of its powers to national competition agencies. We discuss whether this reform will likely spur competition or whether this may turn out to be rather ill-designed for the particularities in post-socialist economies.
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Factors Accounting for the Enactment of a Competition Law - an Empirical Analysis
Franz Kronthaler, Johannes Stephan
Antitrust Bulletin,
No. 52,
2007
Abstract
This work is concerned with the factors accounting for decisions to enact a national competition law. We first update and enlarge existing data bases of countries that have enacted a competition law. We then identify and discuss the factors that may influence the decision to enact a competition law. Panel-data logit analysis is then used to test a set of hypotheses relating to the factors involved across time and across countries. The results are interpreted in terms of significance and the sign of their influence on the probability that a country enacts. The results shed light on the probability of individual countries, particularly developing countries, taking the step of enactment.
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Effectiveness of Competition Law: A Panel Data Analysis
Franz Kronthaler
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 7,
2007
Abstract
The paper explores what macroeconomic factors can tell us about the effectiveness of recently enacted national competition laws. Qualitative evidence suggests that numerous countries fall short in implementing competition law. Furthermore, there seems to be significant differences between countries. To examine what factors might contribute to the explanation of effectiveness of competition law panel regression analysis is used. The results indicate that the level of economic development matters, however the institutional learning curve is also relevant. Furthermore, larger countries should be more concerned with competition advocacy activities than smaller countries and it seems to be the case that the problem of capture of competition law is serious in countries with high levels of corruption.
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Progressivity and flexibility in developing an effective competition regime: using experiences of Poland, Ukraine and South Africa for developing countries. Forschungsbericht innerhalb des EU-Projektes: Competition Policy Foundations for Trade Reform, Regulatory Reform, and Sustainable Development, 2005
Franz Kronthaler, Johannes Stephan
One-off Publications,
No. 5,
2005
Abstract
The paper discusses the role of the concept of special and differential treatment in the framework of regional trade agreements for the development of a competition regime. After a discussion of the main characteristics and possible shortfalls of those concepts, three case countries are assessed in terms of their experience with progressivity, flexibility, and technical and financial assistance: Poland was led to align its competition laws to match the model of the EU. The Ukraine opted voluntarily for the European model, this despite its intense integration mainly with Russia. South Africa, a developing country that emerged from a highly segregated social fabric and an economy dominated by large conglomerates with concentrated ownership. All three countries enacted (or comprehensively reformed) their competition laws in an attempt to face the challenges of economic integration and catch up development on the one hand and particular social problems on the other. Hence, their experience may be pivotal for a variety of different developing countries who are in negotiations to include competition issues in regional trade agreements. The results suggest that the design of such competition issues have to reflect country-particularities to achieve an efficient competition regime.
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