Modelling Macroeconomic Risk: The Genesis of the European Debt Crisis
Gregor von Schweinitz
Hochschulschrift, Online-Publikation,
2013
Abstract
Diverging European sovereign bond yields after 2008 are the most visible sign of the European debt crisis. This dissertation examines in a first step, to which extent the development of yields is driven by credit and liquidity risk, and how it is influenced by general uncertainty on financial markets. It can be shown that yields are driven to a significant degree by a flight towards bonds of high liquidity in times of high market uncertainty. In a second step, high yields are interpreted as a sign of an existing crisis in the respective country. Using the signals approach, the early-warning capabilities of four different proposals for the design of the scoreboard as part of the “Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure” (introduced in December 2011 by the European Commission) are tested, advocating a scoreboard including a variety of many different indicators. In a third step, the methodology of the signals approach is extended to include also results on significance.
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The Ex Ante versus Ex Post Effect of Public Guarantees
H. Evren Damar, Reint E. Gropp, Adi Mordel
The Role of Central Banks in Financial Stability: How has it Changed?,
2013
Abstract
In October 2006, Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS) introduced new ratings for banks that account for the potential of government support. The rating changes are not a reflection of any changes in the respective banks’ credit fundamentals. We use this natural experiment to evaluate the consequences of bail out expectations for bank behavior using a difference in differences approach. The results suggest a striking difference between the effects of bail out probabilities during calm times (“ex ante”) versus during crisis times (“ex post”). During calm times, higher bail-out probabilities result in higher risk taking, consistent with the moral hazard view and much of the empirical literature. However, in crisis times, we find that banks with higher bail out probabilities tend to increase their risk taking less compared to banks that were ex ante unlikely to be bailed-out. Charter values are one part of the explanation: Supported banks may have a funding advantage relative to non-supported banks during the crisis. However, we cannot rule out that other factors also may be playing a role, including tighter supervision of supported banks in crisis times.
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Sovereign Default Risk and Decentralization: Evidence for Emerging Markets
Stefan Eichler, M. Hofmann
European Journal of Political Economy,
No. 32,
2013
Abstract
We study the impact of decentralization on sovereign default risk. Theory predicts that decentralization deteriorates fiscal discipline since subnational governments undertax/overspend, anticipating that, in the case of overindebtedness, the federal government will bail them out. We analyze whether investors account for this common pool problem by attaching higher sovereign yield spreads to more decentralized countries. Using panel data on up to 30 emerging markets in the period 1993–2008 we confirm this hypothesis. Higher levels of fiscal and political decentralization increase sovereign default risk. Moreover, higher levels of intergovernmental transfers and a larger number of veto players aggravate the common pool problem.
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Banks and Sovereign Risk: A Granular View
Claudia M. Buch, Michael Koetter, Jana Ohls
Abstract
In this paper, we use detailed data on the sovereign debt holdings of all German banks to analyse the determinants of sovereign debt exposures and the implications of sovereign exposures for bank risk. Our main findings are as follows. First, sovereign bond holdings are heterogeneous across banks. Larger, weakly capitalised banks and banks with a small depositor base hold more sovereign bonds. Around 31% of all German banks hold no sovereign bonds at all. Second, the sensitivity of banks to macroeconomic factors increased significantly in the post-Lehman period. Banks hold more bonds from euro area countries, from low-inflation countries, and from countries with high sovereign bond yields. Third, there has been no marked impact of sovereign bond holdings on bank risk. This result could indicate the widespread absence of marking-to-market for sovereign bond holdings at the onset of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe.
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Flight Patterns and Yields of European Government Bonds
Gregor von Schweinitz
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 10,
2013
Abstract
The current European Debt Crisis has led to a reinforced effort to identify the sources of risk and their influence on yields of European Government Bonds. Until now, the potentially nonlinear influence and the theoretical need for interactions reflecting flight-to-quality and flight-to-liquidity has been widely disregarded. I estimate government bond yields of the Euro-12 countries without Luxembourg from May 2003 until December 2011. Using penalized spline regression, I find that the effect of most explanatory variables is highly nonlinear. These nonlinearities, together with flight patterns of flight-to-quality and flight-to-liquidity, can explain the co-movement of bond yields until September 2008 and the huge amount of differentiation during the financial and the European debt crisis without the unnecessary assumption of a structural break. The main effects are credit risk and flight-to-liquidity, while the evidence for the existence of flight-to-quality and liquidity risk (the latter measured by the bid-ask spread and total turnover of bonds) is comparably weak.
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The Term Structure of Sovereign Default Risk in EMU Member Countries and Its Determinants
Stefan Eichler, Dominik Maltritz
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 6,
2013
Abstract
We analyze the determinants of sovereign default risk of EMU member states using government bond yield spreads as risk indicators. We focus on default risk for different time spans indicated by spreads for different maturities. Using a panel framework we analyze whether there are different drivers of default risk for different maturities. We find that lower economic growth and larger openness increase default risk for all maturities. Higher indebtedness only increases short-term risk, whereas net lending, trade balance and interest rate costs only drive long-term default risk.
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What Can Currency Crisis Models Tell Us about the Risk of Withdrawal from the EMU? Evidence from ADR Data
Stefan Eichler
Journal of Common Market Studies,
No. 4,
2011
Abstract
We study whether ADR (American depositary receipt) investors perceive the risk that countries such as Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal or Spain could leave the eurozone to address financial problems produced by the sub-prime crisis. Using daily data, we analyse the impact of vulnerability measures related to currency crisis theories on ADR returns. We find that ADR returns fall when yield spreads of sovereign bonds or CDSs (credit default swaps) rise (i.e. when debt crisis risk increases); when banks' CDS premiums rise or stock returns fall (i.e. when banking crisis risk increases); or when the euro's overvaluation increases (i.e. when the risk of competitive devaluation increases).
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Interest Rate Convergence in the Euro-Candidate Countries: Volatility Dynamics of Sovereign Bond Yields
Hubert Gabrisch, Lucjan T. Orlowski
Emerging Markets Finance and Trade,
2010
Abstract
We argue that a “static“ specification of the Maastricht criterion for long-term bond yields is not conducive to assessing stability of financial systems in euro-candidate countries. Instead, we advocate a dynamic approach to assessing interest rate convergence to a common currency that is based on the analysis of financial system stability. Accordingly, we empirically test volatility dynamics of the ten-year sovereign bond yields of the 2004 EU accession countries in relation to the eurozone yields during the January 2, 2001-January 22, 2009, sample period. Our results show a varied degree of the relationship between domestic and eurozone sovereign bond yields, the most pronounced for the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Poland, and weaker for Hungary and Slovakia. We find some divergence of relative bond yields since the EU accession.
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A New Metric for Banking Integration in Europe
Reint E. Gropp, A. K. Kashyap
Europe and the Euro,
2010
Abstract
Most observers have concluded that while money markets and government bond markets are rapidly integrating following the introduction of the common currency in the euro area, there is little evidence that a similar integration process is taking place for retail banking. Data on cross-border retail bank flows, cross-border bank mergers and the law of one price reveal no evidence of integration in retail banking. This paper shows that the previous tests of bank integration are weak in that they are not based on an equilibrium concept and are neither necessary nor sufficient statistics for bank integration. The paper proposes a new test of integration based on convergence in banks' profitability. The new test emphasises the role of an active market for corporate control and of competition in banking integration. European listed banks profitability appears to converge to a common level. There is weak evidence that competition eliminates high profits for these banks, and underperforming banks tend to show improved profitability. Unlisted European banks differ markedly. Their profits show no tendency to revert to a common target rate of profitability. Overall, the banking market in Europe appears far from being integrated. In contrast, in the U.S. both listed and unlisted commercial banks profits converge to the same target, and high profit banks see their profits driven down quickly.
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