Race to the Market: Can Standards Survive the Acceleration of Innovation and Product Life Cycles?
Ulrich Blum
Spatial Dispersed Production and Network Governance, Papers Presented at the 11th Uddevalla Symposium, 15 – 17. May 2008, Kyoto, Research Report 2008,
2008
Abstract
Plagiarism of emerging market countries has for a considerable time been seen as the main challenge to the western approach of codifying and securing intellectual property rights (IPRs). This neglects the fact that historically all countries which tried to converge to the level of successful economies copied technology. The discussion shadows our view that the more imminent question is whether the steady increase in competition intensity which shortens product life cycles and puts pressure on the invention and innovation system, provides enough time to patent and to standardize. As patent activity not only provides incentives for sinking costs into R&D but is also a first step in the dissemination of technologies, and as standards, especially formal standards, generate level playing fields in broad and reliable markets, this may be critical in the long run. Furthermore, the migration of technologies as a result of a steady reorganization of the spatial division of labor may lead to the adverse situation that countries harboring technologies do not have appropriate institutions for knowledge codification.
Exogenous factors that – at least in the short run – cannot be influenced by the standardization bodies are the level of cooperation among interested parties (and mutual trust and institutional linkage), the competitiveness of the technology, the ability to generate externalities by knowledge codification, and the productivity of the technologies. The most important single success factor that standardization bodies can influence is the speed with which a committee proceeds to timely publish formal standards. With reference to a game-theoretical model and based on data for 1997 and 2007 on published formal standards, we show that until now, standardization bodies seem to have successfully coped with the situation.
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German Economy on the Brink of Recession
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
2. Sonderausgabe
2008
Abstract
In autumn 2008, the word economy is in a downswing, caused by the commodity and energy price hike of the first half of the year, housing crises in the US and some other important countries, and in particular by the financial crisis that has recently intensified. The downswing will continue this year and for some time during 2009, and will only come to an end later next year if governments and central banks succeed in stabilizing financial markets in the coming months. In this case, lower prices of commodities and still high growth dynamics in important emerging markets countries will lead to a tentative revival of the world economy.
The German economy is on the brink of a recession. It is particularly vulnerable to a global downswing because exports of investment goods are of upmost importance for the overall economy. Because the uncertainty about the worldwide effects of the financial crisis is very high, the forecast is split. A more probable scenario is based on the assumption of a stabilizing world economy. In this scenario, the growth rate of the German economy in 2009 is 0.2%. The second scenario is based on the assumption of a worldwide recession next year and forecasts that German GDP will shrink by 0.8% in 2009.
Concerning policy, the institutes recommend a strengthening of the capital base of banks via injection of government money. This should be done in a way that gives incentives to banks for attracting additional capital from private sources.
A special chapter of the report analyzes the nature and causes of the price hikes of energy and commodities in the first half of 2008.
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Die Wende in Mitteleuropa aus Sicht wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Schulen
Ulrich Blum
Ein anderes Europa: Innovation – Anstöße – Tradition in Mittel- und Osteuropa,
2008
Abstract
The contribution inquires into the ability of different schools of economic thought to explain the decline, the transition and the later rise of the reform countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It shows that none of these disciplines, be they old or new institution economics or be they functionalist or structural schools, can provide a satisfactory complete explanation for decline and reconstruction. A consistent explanation rests on a transaction-cost approach extended to information economics. It sees false adaptations of institutions in the technological sense and with respect to incentive structures as main problems.
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Improving Hartz IV after the Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court
Joachim Wilde
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 8,
2008
Abstract
In 2005, the assistance for the long-term unemployed in Germany was restructured by the so-called „Hartz IV reform“. An important part of the reform was to replace the former different administrations by a single institution. However, in December 2007, the Federal Constitutional Court decided that the new institution is not consistent with the constitutional law of the Federal Republic of Germany. Thus, a reform of the institution or a change of the constitutional law is necessary.
Different reform ideas have been proposed. However, all of them only solve the juristic problem. Not one single reform tries to improve the system. Therefore, the article introduces a new concept of incentive ethics. It shows how the dependency on benefits can be left out by allocating so-called moral goods to the long-term unemployed. A first empirical result supports the concept. Pilot projects should be conducted to get more valid results.
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On the Rationale of Leniency Programs: a Game-Theoretical Analysis
Ulrich Blum, Nicole Steinat, Michael A. Veltins
European Journal of Law and Economics,
2008
Abstract
In order to enhance the enforcement of Antitrust Law, leniency policies were introduced in nearly all industrialized countries. These programs aim at deterring and eliminating cartels. In this paper we analyze the rationale of the current European and German leniency regulation. We challenge the contemporary view that the standard leniency privilege is incentive-compatible with respect to its aim to enhance competition. Instead, we argue for it to be used as a preemptive strike against competitors under circumstances where cartels become unstable. This implies a tightening of markets in subsequent periods and, thus, a potential reduction in competition intensity. Given strategic reasoning by agents, the principal witness may assure an economically privileged position in the future. This consequence might not be intended by the bonus regulations. Nevertheless if the leniency policies lead to more competition in the market the results should be welcomed by the national cartel offices. We give anecdotal evidence of the German cement case and base our arguments on a game-theoretical model.
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Agenda 2010: Neues unter Deutschlands Himmel?
Ulrich Blum
Wirtschaftsdienst,
No. 3,
2008
Abstract
The paper analyzes to what extent the reform of the German social security and welfare system, known as the “Hartz-IV-Reforms” under the “Agenda 2010”, has been successful. It is shown that the integration of welfare and social security payments increased efficiency as did prior deregulations of the labor market. However, the implementation was partly inefficient due to a misalignment between crucial instruments and incentive structure of individuals. This led to unforeseen expenditures that partly continue until today. Due to this inefficiency, parts of the reform lost its political acceptance. Furthermore, the article shows that many of these reforms had already been prepared intellectually by selected think tanks in the 90ies. The reforms are consistent with a consensus among scholars regarding the ability of the modern state to protect citizens from individual life risks. Finally, the article discusses the future agenda with respect to other important economic policy instruments beyond the integration of welfare and social security such as incentive structure in the established taxation system.
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Real Options of Private House Owners in the East German Housing Market – How Demolition Subsidies Affect Investment Prospects for Private House Owners
Dominik Weiß
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 6,
2008
Abstract
The subsidies of the German urban renewal program “Stadtumbau Ost” are claimed mainly by communal and cooperative housing companies. The instruments do not fit very well for private proprietors that hold a great part of the older housing stock in central locations, for example in Wilhelminian style districts. Interim evaluation reports concerning the implementation of the “Stadtumbau” program show good results for big housing blocks, but constantly high vacancy rates in the inner city quarters. It becomes obvious that the political targets have not been achieved completely so far and that market forces limit the extensive restoration of historic buildings.
The opportunities, economic incentives and the decisions of landlords and house owners will be analyzed with a real option approach. A detailed view considers the different available forms of subsidies, examining its power to affect real estate values and to initiate politically desired urban transformations. It can be shown that the current forms of subsidies fail to promote investment of private house owners because of rising value expectations. Downgrading the building zones to lower density might reduce unrealistic expectations that were identified as a hurdle to invest. As a consequence from this consideration, municipalities should implement alternative urban development concepts and adjust the subsidy policy.
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Preventing Innovative Cooperations: The Legal Exemptions Unintended Side Effect
Christian Growitsch, Nicole Nulsch, Margarethe Rammerstorfer
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 6,
2008
Abstract
In 2004, European competition law had been faced with considerable changes due to the introduction of the new Council Regulation No. 1/2003. One of the major renewals was the replacement of the centralized notification system for inter-company cooperations in favor of a so-called legal exemption system. We analyze the implications of this reform on the agreements firms implement. In contrast to previous research we focus on the reform’s impact on especially welfare enhancing, namely innovative agreements. We show that the law’s intention to reduce the incentive to establish illegal cartels will be reached. However, by the same mechanism, also highly innovative cooperations might be prevented. To avoid this unintended effect, we conclude that only fines but not the monitoring activities should be increased in order to deter illegal but not innovative agreements.
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The European Emissions Trading System: What Have We Learned so Far?
Wilfried Ehrenfeld
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 3,
2008
Abstract
The IWH occupies with the consequences of the emission trading for the effected companies. The first period of the European Emission Trading System was conceived as a learning phase during which two problems occurred: The first and most obvious one was the surplus of certificates. The incentives to invest in the mitigation of CO2 can therefore be considered to be low. The second problem resulted from the allocation which was entirely for free. While electricity customers had to bear the main financial burden, electricity producers profited as the certificate-prices were obviously added to the electricity-prices as opportunity costs. The analysis comes to the conclusion that it was right to shorten the amount of certificates on the EU-level for the second trade period and to establish the partly sales or auctioning of certificates in German legislation. Furthermore, the simplification of the allocation method in Germany can be considered to be a progress.
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The Maximum Level of Fines Restricts the Effect of European Competition Law
Henry Dannenberg, Nicole Steinat
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
2008
Abstract
In 2006, the fining guidelines for competition law infringements were completely renewed. The aim of this reform was twofold: on the one hand to decrease the incentive for cartelization and on the other hand to increase the likelihood of cartel detection.
The article studies how company’s decision for or against a cartel is influenced by these guidelines. We show that due to the maximum level of fines – which refers to the worldwide group turnover - an effective deterrence level can be achieved only for those companies, which realize just a small part of their turnover in the relevant market. Their incentive to blow the whistle increases with the cartel duration. This leads to a rising instability of cartels where one member generates only a small part of its turnover in the relevant market. In contrast, the deterrence level for companies that realize a large part of their sales in the relevant market is quite low due to the maximum level of fines.
The article gives a short overview of the risk factor competition law – from a company perspective. We illustrate how the expenditures related to cartel law infringements can be calculated. Further on, the minimum profit margins that are necessary for an economically advantageous cartel are determined. We show that for certain types of cartels already small rates of return are sufficient to make cartel participation attractive.
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