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Equity Crowdfunding: High-quality or Low-quality Entrepreneurs?
Daniel Blaseg, Douglas Cumming, Michael Koetter
Entrepreneurship, Theory and Practice,
No. 3,
2021
Abstract
Equity crowdfunding (ECF) has potential benefits that might be attractive to high-quality entrepreneurs, including fast access to a large pool of investors and obtaining feedback from the market. However, there are potential costs associated with ECF due to early public disclosure of entrepreneurial activities, communication costs with large pools of investors, and equity dilution that could discourage future equity investors; these costs suggest that ECF attracts low-quality entrepreneurs. In this paper, we hypothesize that entrepreneurs tied to more risky banks are more likely to be low-quality entrepreneurs and thus are more likely to use ECF. A large sample of ECF campaigns in Germany shows strong evidence that connections to distressed banks push entrepreneurs to use ECF. We find some evidence, albeit less robust, that entrepreneurs who can access other forms of equity are less likely to use ECF. Finally, the data indicate that entrepreneurs who access ECF are more likely to fail.
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19.09.2019 • 19/2019
Long-term effects of privatisation in eastern Germany: award-winning US economist begins large-scale research project at the IWH
It is one of the most prestigious awards in the German scientific community: the Max Planck-Humboldt Research Award 2019 endowed with €1.5 million goes to Ufuk Akcigit, Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago. At the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH), Akcigit aims to use innovative methods to investigate why the economy in eastern Germany is still lagging behind that in western Germany – and what role the privatisation process 30 years ago played in this.
Reint E. Gropp
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Tail-risk Protection Trading Strategies
Natalie Packham, Jochen Papenbrock, Peter Schwendner, Fabian Wöbbeking
Quantitative Finance,
No. 5,
2017
Abstract
Starting from well-known empirical stylized facts of financial time series, we develop dynamic portfolio protection trading strategies based on econometric methods. As a criterion for riskiness, we consider the evolution of the value-at-risk spread from a GARCH model with normal innovations relative to a GARCH model with generalized innovations. These generalized innovations may for example follow a Student t, a generalized hyperbolic, an alpha-stable or a Generalized Pareto distribution (GPD). Our results indicate that the GPD distribution provides the strongest signals for avoiding tail risks. This is not surprising as the GPD distribution arises as a limit of tail behaviour in extreme value theory and therefore is especially suited to deal with tail risks. Out-of-sample backtests on 11 years of DAX futures data, indicate that the dynamic tail-risk protection strategy effectively reduces the tail risk while outperforming traditional portfolio protection strategies. The results are further validated by calculating the statistical significance of the results obtained using bootstrap methods. A number of robustness tests including application to other assets further underline the effectiveness of the strategy. Finally, by empirically testing for second-order stochastic dominance, we find that risk averse investors would be willing to pay a positive premium to move from a static buy-and-hold investment in the DAX future to the tail-risk protection strategy.
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The Forward-looking Disclosures of Corporate Managers: Theory and Evidence
Reint E. Gropp, Rasa Karapandza, Julian Opferkuch
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 25,
2016
Abstract
We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project’s potential for success. We find that if the manager’s disclosures are costly, she will never release forward-looking statements that do not convey information to external investors. Furthermore, managers of firms that are transparent and face significant disclosure-related costs will refrain from forward-looking disclosures. In contrast, managers of opaque and profitable firms will follow a policy of accurate disclosures. To test our findings empirically, we devise an index that captures the quantity of forward-looking disclosures in public firms’ 10-K reports, and relate it to multiple firm characteristics. For opaque firms, our index is positively correlated with a firm’s profitability and financing needs. For transparent firms, there is only a weak relation between our index and firm fundamentals. Furthermore, the overall level of forward-looking disclosures declined significantly between 2001 and 2009, possibly as a result of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
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26.11.2015 • 43/2015
Political lendings of German Savings Banks
A recent paper of the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) suggests that German local politicians take advantage of their influence on the credit decisions of German savings banks. “German savings banks on average increase the supply of commercial loans by €7.6 million in the year of a local election”, says IWH president Reint E. Gropp. Loans that the savings banks generate during election years also perform worse and lead to lower interest income. The results suggest that local politicians take advantage of savings banks to further their chances of re-election.
Reint E. Gropp
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Cost of Transaction and the Search for Skilled Workers: A Theoretical Explanation Based on the Theory of Institutions
Herbert S. Buscher, R. Ohliger, Andreas Siegert
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 11,
2013
Abstract
Germany will have an increasing need of qualified staff across regions and economical sectors. Not only does this concern highly qualified of so-called MINT-professions (mathematics, IT, natural sciences and technology), but expands to qualified laborers of the health business and the arts and crafts sector. This demand cannot be met through the employment of jobless people from within the country, as the demographic change of a shrinking and ageing population works against it. Societal responsibility thus demands to attract qualified laborers as immigrants. In order to improve Germany’s image as a country of immigration for qualified staff, so-called soft-criteria should be strengthened aside hard facts, like income or employment opportunities. Such a policy actively needs to communicate to migrants that they and their family members are welcome to stay for good. Such an approach has recently been discussed as “Willkommenskultur” (“culture of welcoming”). It signals a change of paradigm in German immigration policy. A policy of „Willkommenskultur“ does not yet exist in Germany, at least it has not yet reached a satisfying level to be recognized and accepted as such by potential immigrants. Based on the theoretical conception of the Institutional Economy, approaches of a political change and its implementation are outlined. Those changes would imply governmental, societal and micro-economical shifts and changes.
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