Germany’s Production of Export Goods: Human Capital Content Slightly Exceeds that of Imports
Hans-Ulrich Brautzsch, Udo Ludwig
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 11,
2009
Abstract
In the decade before the present, world financial crisis exports out of Germany expanded enormously. This was caused by the growing world demand as well as the internationalization of the national production processes and favoured by the improving price competitiveness. At the same time, against the background of the tertiarisation of the economy, the qualification of employees has increased considerably. In our study, we investigate the changes of labour quality in the production of export goods using the standard open input-output model. Hereby, labour input is measured in terms of different formal qualification levels of the employees. The results are compared with the labour input for imported goods. We find out that the input of high qualified labour per unit of produced export goods exceeds only marginally the comparable input value of the imports. It should be mentioned that the comparison is strongly influenced by the assumption of identical production functions for both Germany and its trading partners.
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Tentative Recovery, Public Debt on the Rise
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
2. Sonderausgabe
2009
Abstract
In autumn 2009, the world economy appears to be growing again. The situation has improved mainly because drastic measures of central banks and governments stabilized the financial sector. More recently, the real economy is supported by fiscal programs taking effect. However, recoveries are usually slow if, as it is the case now, recessions have been intertwined with banking and housing crises. Thus, the industrial economies will not gain much dynamics this year and next, while chances for an upswing in emerging economies are much better.
The German economy stabilized during summer as well, with remarkably robust private consumption. An upswing, however, is, due to several factors, not in sight: Some important export markets will not rebound quickly, and consumption will be dampened by rising unemployment that, up to now, has been contained, not least with the aid of short-term working schemes. All in all, production shrinks by 5% in 2009 and will increase by no more than 1.2% next year. Public deficits are on the rise, with (in relation to GDP) 3.2% this year and 5.2% in 2010.
A credit crunch due to deteriorating balance sheets of banks is a major risk for the German economy. Policy should address this problem by making sure that equity ratios are sufficiently high. One way would be to impose public capital on banks that do not comply with certain regulatory ratios. These should be higher than the ones presently in force. Fiscal policy should begin consolidating in 2011, mainly by dampening the rise of expenditures. Tax cuts are only justified if they are accompanied by very ambitious spending cuts.
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Monopolistic Competition and Costs in the Health Care Sector
Ingmar Kumpmann
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 17,
2009
Abstract
Competition among health insurers is widely considered to be a means of enhancing efficiency and containing costs in the health care system. In this paper, it is argued that this could be unsuccessful since health care providers hold a strong position on the market for health care services. Physicians exert a type of monopolistic power which can be described by Chamberlin’s model of monopolistic competition. If many health insurers compete with one another, they cannot counterbalance the strong bargaining position of the physicians. Thus, health care expenditure is higher, financing either extra profits for physicians or a higher number of them. In addition, health insurers do not have an incentive to contract selectively with health care providers as long as there are no price differences between physicians. A monopolistic health insurer is able to counterbalance the strong position of physicians and to achieve lower costs.
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The Gender Pay Gap under Duopsony: Joan Robinson meets Harold Hotelling
Boris Hirsch
Scottish Journal of Political Economy,
No. 5,
2009
Abstract
This paper presents an alternative explanation of the gender pay gap resting on a simple Hotelling-style duopsony model of the labour market. Since there are only two employers, equally productive women and men have to commute and face travel cost to do so. We assume that some women have higher travel cost, e.g., due to more domestic responsibilities. Employers exploit that women on average are less inclined to commute and offer lower wages to all women. Since women's firm-level labour supply is for this reason less wage-elastic, this model is in line with Robinson's explanation of wage discrimination.
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Cartel Identification in Spatial Markets: An Analysis of the East German Cement Market
Ulrich Blum
Jahrbuch für Regionalwissenschaft,
2009
Abstract
In 2003, the German cement industry was fined more than six hundred million Euros for, allegedly, having fixed prices and quantities in the four regional German cement markets. When this case was finally resolved by the courts in 2009, the fine was reduced by a large amount as the German Antitrust Commission (GAC) was unable to provide sufficient evidence on the level excessive pricing by the cartelists.
This paper takes up again the case of the East German cement cartel that ended in early 2002 and shows that the quota agreement which was established in the mid 1990s was economically inactive. From the perspective of the individual players, the rationale of preserving the cartel can only be explained by limited knowledge of the true market forces. Based on a spatial approach for the years 1997 to 2002, the regional price-setting behavior and its changes can be analyzed against the situation. Econometric analysis suggests that competition was already rather strong in the cartel years as transport costs and rebate systems were used to fine-tune offers. Strategic imports from post-communist countries into the East German market as well as supply from medium-sized enterprises not included in the cartel exerted pressure on the markets.
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East German Exports: Remarkable Catch-up, but Still Lagging Behind
Götz Zeddies
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
20 Jahre Deutsche Einheit - Teil 1 -
2009
Abstract
German reunification entailed severe adjustment processes in East German export industries. With political and economic transition in Eastern Europe, at that time the main export market for East German producers, export demand initially collapsed in the early 1990s. Additionally, the introduction of the Deutschmark in Eastern Germany amounted to a massive revaluation, and international competitiveness of East German producers deteriorated. However, manufacturers in the New Federal States opened up new markets, especially in Western Europe and the Americas. As a consequence, after the downturn of construction activity and investment in the mid-1990s, international trade became the driving force of GDP-growth in Eastern Germany. Although since then, goods exports of the New Federal States grew twice as much as those of Western Germany, export ratio (goods exports as a percentage of GDP) only amounts to 22 per cent in Eastern Germany, compared to 42 per cent in the western part of the country. Even in comparison to Eastern European countries in transition, openness to trade of the New Federal States is still comparatively low. As an empirical analysis shows, this must be largely traced back to smaller firm sizes in the New Federal States as well as to the lower importance of manufacturing industries, which are traditionally more export-oriented. Moreover, East German manufacturers largely specialized on intermediate inputs, which are supplied to final assembly lines in Western Germany, but are not recorded as exports. Thereby, East German export performance is considerably underestimated.
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Organization and Financing of Innovation, and the Choice between Corporate and Independent Venture Capital
Paolo Fulghieri, Merih Sevilir
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
No. 6,
2009
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of competition on the optimal organization and financing structures in innovation-intensive industries. We show that as an optimal response to competition, firms may choose external organization structures established in collaboration with specialized start-ups where they provide start-up financing from their own resources. As the intensity of the competition to innovate increases, firms move from internal to external organization of projects to increase the speed of product innovation and to obtain a competitive advantage with respect to rival firms in their industry. We also show that as the level of competition increases, firms provide a higher level of financing for externally organized projects in the form of corporate venture capital (CVC). Our results help explain the emergence of organization and financing arrangements such as CVC and strategic alliances, where large established firms organize their projects in collaboration with external specialized firms and provide financing for externally organized projects from their own internal resources.
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Financial constraints and the margins of FDI
Claudia M. Buch
Bundesbank Discussion Paper 29/2009,
2009
Abstract
Recent literature on multinational firms has stressed the importance of low productivity as a barrier to the cross-border expansion of firms. But firms may also need external finance to shoulder the costs of entering foreign markets. We develop a model of multinational firms facing real and financial barriers to foreign direct investment (FDI), and we analyze their impact on the FDI decision (the extensive margin) and foreign affiliate sales (the intensive margin). We provide empirical evidence based on a detailed dataset of German multinationals which contains information on parent-level and affiliate-level financial constraints as well as about the location the foreign affiliates. We find that financial factors constrain firms’ foreign investment decisions, an effect felt in particular by large firms. Financial constraints at the parent level matter for the extensive, but less
so for the intensive margin. For the intensive margin, financial constraints at the affiliate level are relatively more important.
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Barriers to Internationalization: Firm-Level Evidence from Germany
Claudia M. Buch
IAW Discussion Paper No. 52,
2009
Abstract
Exporters and multinationals are larger and more productive than their domestic
counterparts. In addition to productivity, financial constraints and labor market
constraints might constitute barriers to entry into foreign markets. We present new
empirical evidence on the extensive and intensive margin of exports and FDI based on detailed micro-level data of German firms. Our paper has three main findings. First, in line with earlier literature, we find a positive impact of firm size and productivity on firms’ international activities. Second, small firms suffer more frequently from financial constraints than bigger firms, but financial conditions have no strong effect on internationalization. Third, labor market constraints constitute a more severe barrier to foreign activities than financial constraints. Being covered by collective bargaining particularly impedes international activities.
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Investitionszuschüsse nur bei Schaffung von Arbeitsplätzen? Schlussfolgerungen aus der Förderung eines Investitionsprojektes über die Gemeinschaftsaufgabe im Land Brandenburg
Mirko Titze
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik,
2009
Abstract
The Joint Task “For the Improvement of the Regional Economic Structure“ is one of the most important Instruments of the German regional policy. This instrument is applied in regions with strong structural problems and aims to reduce unemployment. The instruments institutional framework demands the creation of additional permanent posts. This paper explores that these requirements can provoke inefficient combinations of production factors. The reasons for that problem can be seen in market failures as well as political disappointments. The government of each federal state has an incentive to demand permanent posts as much as possible because public revenue can equal the government expenditures after a relative short time period due to employment and production effects. The institutional framework of the German financial equalization scheme between the federal states contributes to that problem too - the expenditures for subsidization can be balanced by perequations paid by the other federal states.
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