Tentative Recovery, Public Debt on the Rise
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
2. Sonderausgabe
2009
Abstract
In autumn 2009, the world economy appears to be growing again. The situation has improved mainly because drastic measures of central banks and governments stabilized the financial sector. More recently, the real economy is supported by fiscal programs taking effect. However, recoveries are usually slow if, as it is the case now, recessions have been intertwined with banking and housing crises. Thus, the industrial economies will not gain much dynamics this year and next, while chances for an upswing in emerging economies are much better.
The German economy stabilized during summer as well, with remarkably robust private consumption. An upswing, however, is, due to several factors, not in sight: Some important export markets will not rebound quickly, and consumption will be dampened by rising unemployment that, up to now, has been contained, not least with the aid of short-term working schemes. All in all, production shrinks by 5% in 2009 and will increase by no more than 1.2% next year. Public deficits are on the rise, with (in relation to GDP) 3.2% this year and 5.2% in 2010.
A credit crunch due to deteriorating balance sheets of banks is a major risk for the German economy. Policy should address this problem by making sure that equity ratios are sufficiently high. One way would be to impose public capital on banks that do not comply with certain regulatory ratios. These should be higher than the ones presently in force. Fiscal policy should begin consolidating in 2011, mainly by dampening the rise of expenditures. Tax cuts are only justified if they are accompanied by very ambitious spending cuts.
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Russia: A Victim to Transition or to the Financial Crisis?
Marina Grusevaja
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 8,
2009
Abstract
The global financial crisis has revealed deficiencies of the Russian economic system which are caused by the path of the transformation from central planning to the market economy, and not only attributable to the downfall of crude oil prices. While the worldwide liquidity crunch impaired the availability of loans to enterprises, the situation in Russia has deteriorated especially by the large exposure of the private sector to short-term foreign liabilities and by the one-sided orientation of the economy relying on the natural resources industry. Until the mid-2008, the foreign debt of the private banks and non-banks had increased strongly and had strengthened the dependence of the Russian economy on the developments on the international financial markets. The Ruble devaluation at the end of January 2009 aggravated the situation. The high short-term foreign debt of the private sector and the dependence on exports of natural resources are typical outcomes of the Russian transformation path. Therefore, on the one hand, the banking sector has not being able to satisfy financing demand of the private sector beyond the natural resources industries, enterprises became forced to borrow short-term money abroad. On the other hand, the economic strategy of the past seventeen years has strengthened the influence of the state on the natural resources sector – with the strong priority to develop it further. Hence, the one-sided economic development negatively affects the adaptability of the real-economic sector to change during the crisis period. In essence, the present political preferences of the government are aimed at providing direct financial assistance and at protectionist measures. In the long run, these actions could lead to stronger intervention of the state in the economy. Due to these recent developments, the crisis is likely to continue in Russia longer than in the other transformation countries.
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Currency Appreciation and Exports: Empirical Evidence for Germany
Götz Zeddies
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 6,
2009
Abstract
In the first decade after its introduction, the Euro didn’t just hold up well, but compared to important currencies even appreciated considerably. Of course, exchange rate risks were noticeably lowered by introducing the single currency, since the bulk of EMU Member States’ exports are conducted within the currency union. Nevertheless, a strong Euro is unfavourable especially for open economies like Germany.
The article investigates the effects of exchange rate movements on German exports over time. The analyses reveal a downward impact of nominal effective exchange rates, not only for total, but also for exports to countries outside the currency union. Although an increasing pass-through of exchange rate changes to export prices is apparently at hand, further reasons for the dwindling effect of nominal exchange rates on exports are likely to exist.
In this context, it is shown that exports are less sensitive not only with respect to nominal, but also with respect to real effective exchange rate changes, suggesting a declining price elasticity of demand. Instead, exports are increasingly determined by economic activity in trading partner countries. In consequence of its geographic proximity, Germany did particularly benefit from the economic upswing in Eastern Europe, overlaying the appreciation of the Euro. Additionally, the latter could hardly impair German export industries due to their specialization on capital and high-quality consumer goods less vulnerable to exchange rate fluctuations.
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German Economy Drawn into the World Recession
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
1. Sonderausgabe
2009
Abstract
In spring 2009, the world economy is in a deep recession. The intensification of the financial crisis in autumn has caused a sharp contraction of demand. The reaction of monetary and fiscal policy was substantial, but up to now (April 2009), it has not succeeded in restoring confidence of economic agents. Although some leading indicators point to a stabilization of production in the coming quarters, the downturn will not come to an end before next winter, because the financial crisis will continue to put strain on the real economy for some time to come.
The German economy is in its deepest recession since the foundation of the Federal Republic. Germany is particularly affected, because at the core of the economy is the production of those goods for that world demand has collapsed most: capital goods and high-quality consumer durables. While exports and private investment activity will continue to shrink this year (albeit at a slower rate), private consumption will be a stabilizing factor for some time, as will public investment activity in the second half of the year. Later in 2009 and in 2010, rising unemployment will depress consumption, while in this forecast, it is assumed that exports and investment slowly recover in 2010, because the financial turmoil will calm down.
For economic policy, a recapitalization of the banking sector should have priority. The ECB should lower its key interest rate to 0.5%. Given the sharply increasing fiscal deficits, a new, third fiscal program would be counterproductive. Only if monetary policy fails to stabilize the economy, further fiscal measures, coordinated at a European level, should be considered.
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Financial Crisis Burdens Economic Activity in Poland
Martina Kämpfe
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 12,
2008
Abstract
In the first half of the year 2008, domestic demand –the main force behind growth – only marginally declined. Still extraordinarily high was the demand for the output of construction firms. Although demand from Western European countries declined since spring, the foreign trade was not much behind its level of the previous year because of high export activity to Asian and Eastern European countries. In the second half of the year, both, the finance and banking system as well as the real economy, were impacted by the consequences of global financial crisis. Indications of that are the temporary collapse of the polish stock market, the rapid fall of the Złoty and the weakening of domestic demand and exports. Against this background, expansion of economic activity in 2009 will continue at a markedly lower level.
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The Great Risk Shift? Income Volatility in an International Perspective
Claudia M. Buch
CESifo Working Paper No. 2465,
2008
Abstract
Weakening bargaining power of unions and the increasing integration of the world economy may affect the volatility of capital and labor incomes. This paper documents and explains changes in income volatility. Using a theoretical framework which builds distribution risk into a real business cycle model, hypotheses on the determinants of the relative volatility of capital and labor are derived. The model is tested using industry-level data. The data cover 11 industrialized countries, 22 manufacturing and services industries, and a maximum of 35 years. The paper has four main findings. First, the unconditional volatility of labor and capital incomes has declined, reflecting the decline in macroeconomic volatility. Second, the idiosyncratic component of income volatility has hardly changed over time. Third, crosssectional heterogeneity in the evolution of relative income volatilities is substantial. If anything, the labor incomes of high- and low-skilled workers have become more volatile in relative terms. Fourth, income volatility is related to variables measuring the bargaining power of workers. Trade openness has no significant impact.
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In Focus: State is Winner of Recent German Upswing
Axel Lindner
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 9,
2008
Abstract
In 2006 and 2007, production expanded briskly in Germany. Real disposable incomes of private households, however, were almost stagnant. This article sheds, with help of national accounts data, some light on the reasons for this discrepancy: By far the most important factor is that the share of the general government in the disposable income of the whole economy increased strongly. The share of corporations in the disposable income increased, too. Finally, the deflator for consumption rose by more than the deflator of GDP mainly because of the price hike for imported commodities and energy.
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Business Cycle Forecast: On the Edge?
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 9,
2008
Abstract
During the summer of 2008, the world economy was further slowing. The financial crisis affects the real economy by tightened credit standards in the US and in the European Union, and housing markets are now in a severe crisis not only in the US, but also in some countries in Western Europe. Finally, consumption of households is affected by stagnating real disposable incomes due to the energy price hike. The slowing world economy, however, has caused the oil price to fall since July, and most emerging markets economies are, up to now, quite resilient.
In Germany, sentiment has deteriorated significantly. Production appears to be about stagnating in the summer. During winter, the devaluation of the euro and a beginning pick up of demand since July will help producers of tradable goods in Germany. Domestic demand will be supported by lower energy prices and healthily growing wage incomes. All in all, gross domestic product (gdp) (adjusted for the number of working days) will increase by 1,8% this year and by 0,8% in 2009.
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Monetary Policy and Financial (In)stability: An Integrated Micro–Macro Approach
Ferre De Graeve, Thomas Kick, Michael Koetter
Journal of Financial Stability,
No. 3,
2008
Abstract
Evidence on central banks’ twin objective, monetary and financial stability, is scarce. We suggest an integrated micro–macro approach with two core virtues. First, we measure financial stability directly at the bank level as the probability of distress. Second, we integrate a microeconomic hazard model for bank distress and a standard macroeconomic model. The advantage of this approach is to incorporate micro information, to allow for non-linearities and to permit general feedback effects between financial distress and the real economy. We base the analysis on German bank and macro data between 1995 and 2004. Our results confirm the existence of a trade-off between monetary and financial stability. An unexpected tightening of monetary policy increases the probability of distress. This effect disappears when neglecting microeffects and non-linearities, underlining their importance. Distress responses are largest for small cooperative banks, weak distress events, and at times when capitalization is low. An important policy implication is that the separation of financial supervision and monetary policy requires close collaboration among members in the European System of Central Banks and national bank supervisors.
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