The Role of Credit Ratings in Banking Regulations. Credit Ratings Are Insufficiently Anticipating the Risk for Currency Crises.
Tobias Knedlik, Johannes Ströbel
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 10,
2007
Abstract
This contribution analyses whether the behaviour of rating agencies has changed since their failure to predict the Asian crisis. The paper finds no robust econometric evidence that rating agencies have started to take micro-mismatches into account when assigning sovereign ratings. Thus, given the current approach of credit rating agencies, we have reservations concerning the effectiveness of Basel II to prevent the transmission from currency crises to banking crises for potential future crises.
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Banking Regulation: Minimum Capital Requirements of Basel II Intensify Transmission from Currency Crises to Banking Crises
Tobias Knedlik, Johannes Ströbel
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 8,
2007
Abstract
Emerging market currency crises are often followed by banking crises. One reason for the transmission is the increased value of foreign debt measured in local currency. Equity capital is often insufficient to ensure liquidity. This problem is addressed by Basel II, in particular by its minimum capital requirements. In difference to the current regulation (Basel I), Basel II employs a differentiated risk weighing on base of credit ratings. This contribution calculates the hypothetic effects of the new regulation on minimum capital requirements for the example of the South Korea currency and banking crises of 1997. The results are compared to current regulation. It can be shown that minimum capital requirements in the case of Basel II would have been lower than in the case of Basel I. Additionally, minimum capital requirements would have increased dramatically. The transmission from currency to banking crises would not have been prevented, but would have been accelerated. Thereby, minimum capital requirements under Basel I have been relatively low because of South Korea’s OECD membership. It can therefore be concluded that in other emerging market economies, which are not OECD members, the ratio of minimum capital requirements of Basel II to the minimum capital requirements of Basel I prior the crises would have been even lower. Therefore, the new instrument of banking regulation would have intensified the transmission from currency to banking crises.
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Interbank Exposures: An Empirical Examination of Contagion Risk in the Belgian Banking System
Hans Degryse, Grégory Nguyen
International Journal of Central Banking,
No. 2,
2007
Abstract
Robust (cross-border) interbank markets are important for the proper functioning of modern financial systems. However, a network of interbank exposures may lead to domino effects following the event of an initial bank failure. We investigate the evolution and determinants of contagion risk for the Belgian banking system over the period 1993–2002 using detailed information on aggregate interbank exposures of individual banks, large bilateral interbank exposures, and cross-border interbank exposures. The "structure" of the interbank market affects contagion risk. We find that a change from a complete structure (where all banks have symmetric links) toward a "multiplemoney-center" structure (where money centers are symmetrically linked to otherwise disconnected banks) has decreased the risk and impact of contagion. In addition, an increase in the relative importance of cross-border interbank exposures has lowered local contagion risk. However, this reduction may have been compensated by an increase in contagion risk stemming from foreign banks.
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The role of banking portfolios in the transmission from the currency crises to banking crises - potential effects of Basel II
Tobias Knedlik, Johannes Ströbel
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 21,
2006
Abstract
This paper evaluates the potential effects of the Basel II accord on preventing the transmission from currency crises to financial crises. By analyzing the case study of South Korea, it shows how mismatches on banks’ balance sheets were the primary cause for such a transmission, and models how Basel II would have affected those balance sheets. The paper shows that due to South Korea’s positive credit rating in the months leading up to the crisis, the regulatory capital reserves under Basel II would have been even lower than those under Basel I, and that therefore Basel II would have had adverse effects on the development of the crisis. In the second part, the article analyses whether the behavior of rating agencies has changed since their failure to predict the Asian crisis. The paper finds no robust econometric evidence that rating agencies have started to take micromismatches into account when assigning sovereign ratings. Thus, given the current approach of credit rating agencies, we have reservations concerning the effectiveness of Basel II to prevent the transmission from currency crises to banking crises, both for the case of South Korea and for potential future crises.
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Implementing an International Lender of Last Resort
Tobias Knedlik
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 20,
2006
Abstract
Current research discusses various general frameworks for installing an international lender of last resort (ILOLR). However, it remains unclear how the ILOLR should actually operate. This paper discusses six different options of construction of an ILOLR who supports central banks in the case of currency crises. The paper concludes that the cost efficient version of the ILOLR would be direct interventions by the IMF by the use of IMF resources and the right to dispose additional reserves from central banks. The paper considers measures of cost efficiency, such as cost of borrowing, intervention, and sterilization and moral hazard problems.
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The IWH signals approach: the present potential for a financial crisis in selected Central and East European countries and Turkey
Hubert Gabrisch, Simone Lösel
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 8,
2006
Abstract
The steep increase of oil prices, general threats rooting from Iran’s nuclear program, and doubts about the future policy of important central banks recently caused more uncertainties of investors on international financial markets. This explains the higher volatility and the fall of indices on stock markets including those of some Central and East European countries. International investors could respond with adjustments of their portfolio and trigger off a financial crisis. On this background, the article studies the potential for a financial crises in the region mentioned. The analytical tool is the IWH signals approach. The study concludes that the risk of the outbreak of a financial crisis within the next 18 months is rather unrealistic in most countries. A stable economic policy, high real growth rates, a financial system already robust compared to earlier times of transition, and appropriate exchange rate arrangements protect the countries against speculative attacks and portfolio adjustments. When the composite indicator shows deterioration like in the Baltic countries, it turned out to be negligible. For the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, the composite indicator even improved. A closer look to individual indicators reveals still some problems in the banking sectors of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, however, without out major impact on the composite indicator.
This general assessment does not apply to Romania, and, in particular, to Turkey. The composite indicator signals a significant increase of the risk potential for the next 18 months in both countries. There is a considerable need for sound policy action.
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Cross-border Banking and Transmission Mechanisms in Europe: Evidence from German Data
Claudia M. Buch
Applied Financial Economics,
No. 16,
2004
Abstract
International activities of commercial banks play a potential role for the transmission of shocks across countries. This paper presents stylized facts of the integration of European banking markets and analyses the potential of banks to transmit shocks across countries. Although the openness of banking systems has increased, bilateral financial linkages among EU countries are relatively small. The exceptions are claims of German banks on a number of smaller countries. These data are used for an analysis of the determinants of cross-border lending patterns.
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Bank Market Discipline and Indicators of Banking System Risk: The European Evidence
Reint E. Gropp
Market Discipline Across Countries and Industries,
2004
Abstract
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Measurement of Contagion in Banks' Equity Prices
Reint E. Gropp, G. Moerman
Journal of International Money and Finance,
No. 3,
2004
Abstract
This paper uses the co-incidence of extreme shocks to banks’ risk to examine within-country and across country contagion among large EU banks. Banks’ risk is measured by the first difference of weekly distances to default and abnormal returns. Using Monte Carlo simulations, the paper examines whether the observed frequency of large shocks experienced by two or more banks simultaneously is consistent with the assumption of a multivariate normal or a student t distribution. Further, the paper proposes a simple metric, which is used to identify contagion from one bank to another and identify “systemically important” banks in the EU.
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On the stability of the banking systems in the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary
Werner Gnoth
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 11,
2003
Abstract
The EU countries are interested in stable banking systems of candidate countries, because any kind of instability of the financial sector could have serious consequences to the financial and exchange rate system of the whole Community. In the article the state of stability of the banking systems is analyzed, based on several important indicators. At present the banking systems of candidate countries still look fairly stable: weak competition among the banks, a high inflation rate and a low intermediation rate in terms of total assets / GDP have enabled banks still to reach a sufficient net interest yield. So they have been able to stand a relatively high share of non- performing loans and also a relatively high amount of foreign exchange indebtedness. In order to ensure a problem-free integration of the banking systems of the candidate countries in the EU they must still meet several conditions. They need to widen and refine the supply of services and to lower the share of non-performing loans, mainly in the Czech Republic and Poland. The foreign exchange indebtedness of the banking and enterprises domains in Poland and Hungary needs to be restricted. Successful integration in EU competition requires in general increase in the banks own capital.
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