Forecasting Currency Crises: Which Methods signaled the South African Crisis of June 2006?
Tobias Knedlik, Rolf Scheufele
South African Journal of Economics,
2008
Abstract
In this paper we test the ability of three of the most popular methods to forecast South African currency crises with a special emphasis on their out-of-sample performance. We choose the latest crisis of June 2006 to conduct an out-of-sample experiment. The results show that the signals approach was not able to forecast the out-of-sample crisis correctly; the probit approach was able
to predict the crisis but only with models, that were based on raw data. The Markov-regime- switching approach predicts the out-of-sample crisis well. However, the results are not straightforward. In-sample, the probit models performed remarkably well and were also able to detect, at least to some extent, out-of-sample currency crises before their occurrence. The recommendation is to not restrict the forecasting to only one approach.
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German Economy on the Brink of Recession
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
2. Sonderausgabe
2008
Abstract
In autumn 2008, the word economy is in a downswing, caused by the commodity and energy price hike of the first half of the year, housing crises in the US and some other important countries, and in particular by the financial crisis that has recently intensified. The downswing will continue this year and for some time during 2009, and will only come to an end later next year if governments and central banks succeed in stabilizing financial markets in the coming months. In this case, lower prices of commodities and still high growth dynamics in important emerging markets countries will lead to a tentative revival of the world economy.
The German economy is on the brink of a recession. It is particularly vulnerable to a global downswing because exports of investment goods are of upmost importance for the overall economy. Because the uncertainty about the worldwide effects of the financial crisis is very high, the forecast is split. A more probable scenario is based on the assumption of a stabilizing world economy. In this scenario, the growth rate of the German economy in 2009 is 0.2%. The second scenario is based on the assumption of a worldwide recession next year and forecasts that German GDP will shrink by 0.8% in 2009.
Concerning policy, the institutes recommend a strengthening of the capital base of banks via injection of government money. This should be done in a way that gives incentives to banks for attracting additional capital from private sources.
A special chapter of the report analyzes the nature and causes of the price hikes of energy and commodities in the first half of 2008.
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Stages of the Ongoing Global Financial Crisis: Is There a Wandering Asset Bubble?
Lucjan T. Orlowski
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 11,
2008
Abstract
This study argues that the severity of the current global financial crisis is strongly influenced by changeable allocations of the global savings. This process is named a “wandering asset bubble”. Since its original outbreak induced by the demise of the subprime mortgage market and the mortgage-backed securities in the U.S., this crisis has reverberated across other credit areas, structured financial products and global financial institutions. Four distinctive stages of the crisis are identified: the meltdown of the subprime mortgage market, spillovers into broader credit market, the liquidity crisis epitomized by the fallout of Bear Sterns with some contagion effects on other financial institutions, and the commodity price bubble. Monetary policy responses aimed at stabilizing financial markets are proposed.
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Stages of the Global Financial Crisis: Is There a Wandering Asset Bubble?
Lucjan T. Orlowski
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 9,
2008
Abstract
This study argues that the severity of the current global financial crisis is strongly influenced by changeable allocations of the global excess liquidity. This process is named a “wandering asset bubble”. Since its original outbreak induced by the demise of the subprime mortgage market and the mortgage-backed securities in the U.S., this crisis has reverberated across other credit areas, structured financial products and global financial institutions. Four distinctive stages of the crisis are distinguished: the meltdown of the subprime mortgage market, spillovers into broader credit market, the fallout of Bear Sterns with some contagion effects on other financial institutions, and the commodity price bubble. Monetary policy responses aimed at stabilizing financial markets are proposed.
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Business Cycle Forecast: On the Edge?
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 9,
2008
Abstract
During the summer of 2008, the world economy was further slowing. The financial crisis affects the real economy by tightened credit standards in the US and in the European Union, and housing markets are now in a severe crisis not only in the US, but also in some countries in Western Europe. Finally, consumption of households is affected by stagnating real disposable incomes due to the energy price hike. The slowing world economy, however, has caused the oil price to fall since July, and most emerging markets economies are, up to now, quite resilient.
In Germany, sentiment has deteriorated significantly. Production appears to be about stagnating in the summer. During winter, the devaluation of the euro and a beginning pick up of demand since July will help producers of tradable goods in Germany. Domestic demand will be supported by lower energy prices and healthily growing wage incomes. All in all, gross domestic product (gdp) (adjusted for the number of working days) will increase by 1,8% this year and by 0,8% in 2009.
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Der lange Schatten des Sozialismus: Folgen für die Wirtschaftspolitik in Ostdeutschland
Ulrich Blum
List Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik,
2008
Abstract
East Germany’s economy growth was not able to close, over the last ten years, the lag against the West German economy. This paper inquires into the economic reasons, especially those that can be traced in history. It is shown that the exodus of elites from what was Central Germany started in the 1930s because of the persecution of the Jewish elites. During the period after the Second World War until the construction of the wall in 1961 especially young and qualified people left the Soviet Zone and later the G.D.R. Thus, the elites destroyed in the Third Reich and the Second World War could not be replaced exogenously. In the 1970s, an inadequate economic system destroyed the still existing industrial middle class which was an important base of productivity and helped to generate foreign income because of its export intensity to the Western countries. This generated a current account crisis which was only overcome by a loan from West Germany, the so-called “Strauß-Kredit”. In 1988, however, the fundamental problems again became visible and enforced a change of the economic system. The privatisation strategy by the Treuhand by and large did not sell or restitute enterprises but sold plants out of the fragmented combines. Today, the visible deficit in headquarter function is the most important single obstacle against growth and wealth in the New Lander. It can be expected that this will only disappear within a new technology cycle.
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Internationale Unternehmen im Kontext von Bankenregulierung, Kredit-Ratings und Währungskrisen
Tobias Knedlik, Johannes Ströbel
Internationales Management – Fachspezifische Tendenzen und Best-Practice,
2008
Abstract
Bonitätsbewertungen von Staaten durch Rating-Agenturen sind ein wichtiges Kriterium für international agierende Unternehmen. Da die Zahlungsfähigkeit von Ländern in Abhängigkeit zum Risiko für Währungskrisen steht, sind diese Rating-Ergebnisse auch von Interesse, um Erwartungen bezüglich der Stabilität von Währungen zu treffen.
Rating-Agenturen gewinnen durch die unter dem Stichwort Basel II diskutierten Reformvorschläge zur Bankenregulierung an Bedeutung. Insbesondere hängt das regulatorische Mindesteigenkapital unter dem standardisierten Ansatz von Basel II von der Bewertung der Kreditrisiken durch externe Rating-Agenturen ab. Bonitätsbewertungen, speziell von souveränen Schuldnern, bestimmen damit wesentlich die Höhe des Mindesteigenkapitals von Banken.
In der Vergangenheit haben Rating-Agenturen Währungskrisenrisiken systematisch unterschätzt. Diese sind jedoch für die Bewertung des Kreditausfallrisikos von souveränen Schuldnern wichtig. Nur wenn die währungskriseninduzierten Kreditausfallrisiken angemessen berücksichtigt werden, können die prozyklischen Effekte von Basel II, die vor allem dadurch entstehen, dass im Falle von Währungskrisen aufgrund der zu positiven Bewertung im Vorfeld der Krise schlagartig massive Schlechterbewertungen notwendig werden, minimiert werden.
Die Kritik an der Methode der Rating-Agenturen, insbesondere an mangelnder Berücksichtigung neuerer Währungskrisenmodelle in Folge der Asienkrisen von 1997/8, führte zu Reaktionen bei den Agenturen. So sagte z.B. Sandard & Poor’s die Berücksichtigung von mikroökonomischen Indikatoren zu, die bei aktuellen Krisen als Krisenfaktoren erkannt wurden. In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird untersucht, inwiefern sich empirische Anzeichen dafür erkennen lassen, dass mikroökonomische Indikatoren in der Praxis der Bonitätsprüfung beachtet werden.
Das Ergebnis der empirischen Untersuchungen zeigt, dass traditionelle makroökonomische Indikatoren die Rating-Ergebnisse dominieren. Es können keine Anzeichen für eine stärkere Berücksichtigung von Mikro-Indikatoren in aktuellen Ratings gefunden werden. Es muss daher geschlussfolgert werden, dass weiterhin prozyklische, krisenverstärkende Effekte von Basel II ausgehen. Die Rating-Agenturen erfüllen bislang die Rolle als frühzeitige Antizipatoren für Währungskrisenrisiken unzureichend.
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Business Cycle Forecast, Summer 2008: Price Hikes and Financial Crisis Cloud Growth Prospects
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 7,
2008
Abstract
In the summer of 2008 the turmoil on financial markets and that on the markets for energy dim the prospects for the world economy. The acceleration of the oil price hike during the first half of the year has led to an increase in expected inflation and to higher interest rates on capital markets, while stock prices are going down. At the same time, the financial crisis is far from over, and banks in the US and in Western Europe continue in their efforts to consolidate their balance sheets. Thus, the expansion of credit supply will be scarcer in the next quarters. All this means that demand will slow in the developed economies during the next quarters. However, the massive fiscal stimulus will help the US economy to stabilize, and the world economy still benefits from the high growth dynamics in the emerging markets economies. All in all, the developed economies will not reach their potential growth rate before the second half of 2009. In Germany, the upswing comes to a temporary halt during summer of this year. Slowing foreign demand and the oil price hike induce firms to postpone investments, and private consumption, the soft spot of the upswing in Germany, is still sluggish due to high inflation rates that impair purchasing power. For the end of 2008, chances are good that growth in Germany accelerates again, because German exporters are still penetrating emerging markets as competitiveness does not diminish. All in all, the German economy will grow by 2.3% in 2008 (mainly due to the very high dynamics at the beginning of the year) and by 1.3% in 2009. A main risk of this forecast is that monetary policy fails in easing the high inflationary pressures. As to fiscal policy, efforts to reach sustainable public finances should not weaken.
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Eastern German Economy: No Catching-up in 2008 and 2009
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 6,
2008
Abstract
In the New Lander, growth of production is characterized by two diverging developments. On the one hand, the manufacturing sector has expanded strongly while the public service sector as well as the retail sectors has considerably damped economic activity. On the other hand, those firms primarily bound to local markets have gained hardly any momentum, whereas others have been stimulated by external markets in Western Germany and abroad. These differences are mainly due to weak local demand in the wake of a low purchasing power and an ongoing reduction in the population. At the same time, export-oriented firms in the manufacturing sector have benefited from strong external demand, and they will further benefit from it, although somewhat less owing to the slowing world economy. However, as East German exporting firms are less exposed to those countries where the ongoing crisis in the real estate and the financial sector has unfolded its dampening effects the most, they are also less prone to it. Accordingly, gross domestic product will increase by 1,7% this year and 0,8% in 2009. This translates into further improvements on labor markets. Registered unemployment will fall below one million. In particular, manufacturing firms and the private business service sector will increase their demand for labor.
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International Financial Integration and Stability: On the Causes of the International Banking Crisis 2007/08 and Some Preliminary Lessons.
Diemo Dietrich, Achim Hauck
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 5,
2008
Abstract
Since its beginning, the recent financial market turmoil that has come to be known as the „subprime crisis“ has provoked considerable controversy among both, policymakers and scientists. The debate mainly focuses on two questions. The first is whether and how short-term measures should be taken to stabilize the global financial system. The second is which general lessons can be drawn from this crisis. Up to now, several potential causes of the crisis have been discussed in a more or less isolated manner. However, a predominant source of the crisis has not been identified yet. Accordingly, there is still a lack of knowledge regarding general consequences of the crisis for economic policy.
The purpose of this article is twofold. First, we show that to a large extent the crisis is due to the economic integration of formerly peripheral countries into the world economy that led to significant savings and investment imbalances. Thus, we argue that the crisis not only is a global phenomenon in its effects but also has global roots. Based on this argument, the second purpose of our paper is to derive implications for economic policy, where we also discuss the consequences for the future design of the global financial architecture.
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