Paradigm Shift in European Competition Law
Nicole Steinat
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 11,
2007
Abstract
During the last decade, European competition law went through several procedural changes, which were mainly influenced by US-American law. Economic criteria rather than legal parameters are now used to evaluate the conduct of firms. Such a “more economic approach” is apparent both in legislation and jurisdiction.
The article discusses the reforms that resulted from the paradigm shift by focusing on the legislation perspective as well as their impact in terms of cartels. One of the most important instruments in European competition policy is nowadays the Leniency Regulation, which was implemented in 1996. Another tool are the renewed Fining Guidelines, which in general will lead to higher fines.
Although European competition law adopted some instruments from American law, there are still major differences between the two jurisdictions. The possibility to impose jail sentences does not exist on a European level yet. However, a few European countries included criminal sanctions in their national laws.
Read article
The Role of Credit Ratings in Banking Regulations. Credit Ratings Are Insufficiently Anticipating the Risk for Currency Crises.
Tobias Knedlik, Johannes Ströbel
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 10,
2007
Abstract
This contribution analyses whether the behaviour of rating agencies has changed since their failure to predict the Asian crisis. The paper finds no robust econometric evidence that rating agencies have started to take micro-mismatches into account when assigning sovereign ratings. Thus, given the current approach of credit rating agencies, we have reservations concerning the effectiveness of Basel II to prevent the transmission from currency crises to banking crises for potential future crises.
Read article
Banking Regulation: Minimum Capital Requirements of Basel II Intensify Transmission from Currency Crises to Banking Crises
Tobias Knedlik, Johannes Ströbel
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 8,
2007
Abstract
Emerging market currency crises are often followed by banking crises. One reason for the transmission is the increased value of foreign debt measured in local currency. Equity capital is often insufficient to ensure liquidity. This problem is addressed by Basel II, in particular by its minimum capital requirements. In difference to the current regulation (Basel I), Basel II employs a differentiated risk weighing on base of credit ratings. This contribution calculates the hypothetic effects of the new regulation on minimum capital requirements for the example of the South Korea currency and banking crises of 1997. The results are compared to current regulation. It can be shown that minimum capital requirements in the case of Basel II would have been lower than in the case of Basel I. Additionally, minimum capital requirements would have increased dramatically. The transmission from currency to banking crises would not have been prevented, but would have been accelerated. Thereby, minimum capital requirements under Basel I have been relatively low because of South Korea’s OECD membership. It can therefore be concluded that in other emerging market economies, which are not OECD members, the ratio of minimum capital requirements of Basel II to the minimum capital requirements of Basel I prior the crises would have been even lower. Therefore, the new instrument of banking regulation would have intensified the transmission from currency to banking crises.
Read article
Broadband Investment and the Threat of Regulation: Preventing Monopoly Exploitation or Infrastructure Construction?
Ulrich Blum, Christian Growitsch, Niels Krap
Review of Network Economics,
2007
Abstract
Recently, investments in new generation networks in Germany have been curtailed, since potential investors required this new network be unregulated. To develop a regulator's strategy that allows investments to occur but prevents monopolistic prices, we model an investor's decision problem under a threat of regulation. We show that the mere threat of a regulator's intervention may prevent supernormal profits without actual price regulation. The regulator, on the other hand, can influence both the investment decision and the investor's price via her signals on regulation probability and price.
Read article
asset price inflation
Tobias Knedlik, A. Knorr
Systeme monetärer Steuerung - Analyse und Vergleich geldpolitischer Strategien - Schriften zu Ordnungsfragen der Wirtschaft, Band 86,
No. 86,
2007
Abstract
Most of the influential central banks managed to bring inflation down to a sustainable path in the last two decades. However, during the same time asset prices increased significantly. From the perspective of economic policy, this development might constitute a problem in the case that price increases are not due to changes in fundamentals but are of a speculative nature. During the current past the number of asset price bubbles increased. The aim of this contribution is to analyze policy options with regard to asset price inflation. We identify the relevant markets, discuss their specific price mechanisms, discuss transmission mechanisms, and the usefulness of monetary policy and alternative instruments to deal with asset price inflation. We show that, once asset price inflation is present, monetary policy can do little to stop processes of speculative bubbles. It is the more important that that alternatives are considered. These include the analysis of monetary conditions, a straight forward communication, better regulation, and a strengthening of institutions that allow for diversifying risks to handle the necessary structural changes with lowest possible economic costs.
Read article
Requirements on Regulation Frameworks: What is the Best Way of Securing Efficiency in the Water Sector?
Peter Haug
Competition Policy in Network Industries, INFER Research Perspectives, Vol. 3,
2007
Abstract
The paper investigates the effects of several characteristics of regulatory frameworks in the water sector on the efficiency of water provision. Several requirements on efficient regulatory frameworks suggested in other studies of network industries are modified and others are derived from different economic theories of regulation. The resulting set of criteria is applied to the regulation systems of the Dutch, German and US-American water industry. A comparison of several performance indicators for the three countries suggests that some relationship between the design of regulatory frameworks and the price-quality-ratios in the water sector might exist.
Read article
Developing Collaborative Advantage: Preconditions and Restrictions for ‘Knowledge City’ Strategies in East Germany
Peter Franz
Institutions for Knowledge Generation and Knowledge Flows - Building Innovative Capabilities for Regions. Papers presented at the 10th Uddevalla Symposium 2007,
2007
Abstract
The trend of cities, serving as a location for universities and research institutes, to take into consideration new strategies utilizing this location factor for growth-oriented urban development can also be observed in Germany. An overview of the quantitative preconditions shows that many German cities dispose of favorite preconditions for such a knowledge city strategy. An analysis of the policy arena comes to the result that the political actors are confronted with the task of a complex multi-level-policy where networking skills become essential. A comparison with the policy conditions in the U.S. makes it quite clear that especially the German universities have the status of semi-autonomous actors complicating negotiating and coordinating activities between city and science representatives. First examples of deregulation show that these hurdles can be overcome in the future.
Read article
Bank Lending, Bank Capital Regulation and Efficiency of Corporate Foreign Investment
Diemo Dietrich, Achim Hauck
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 4,
2007
Abstract
In this paper we study interdependencies between corporate foreign investment and the capital structure of banks. By committing to invest predominantly at home, firms can reduce the credit default risk of their lending banks. Therefore, banks can refinance loans to a larger extent through deposits thereby reducing firms’ effective financing costs. Firms thus have an incentive to allocate resources inefficiently as they then save on financing costs. We argue that imposing minimum capital adequacy for banks can eliminate this incentive by putting a lower bound on financing costs. However, the Basel II framework is shown to miss this potential.
Read article
Banks’ Internationalization Strategies: The Role of Bank Capital Regulation
Diemo Dietrich, Uwe Vollmer
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 18,
2006
Abstract
This paper studies how capital requirements influence a bank’s mode of entry into foreign financial markets. We develop a model of an internationally operating bank that creates and allocates liquidity across countries and argue that the advantage of multinational banking over offering cross-border financial services depends on the benefit and the cost of intimacy with local markets. The benefit is that it allows to create more liquidity. The cost is that it causes inefficiencies in internal capital markets, on which a multinational bank relies to allocate liquidity across countries. Capital requirements affect this trade-off by influencing the degree of inefficiency in internal capital markets.
Read article
Knowledge-Based Economy and Urban Development in Germany
Peter Franz
Die anderen Städte. IBA Stadtumbau 2010 - The other Cities, Bd. 4: Profilierung von Städten - Urban Distinctiveness, Berlin (Jovis) (Edition Bauhaus, Bd. Nr. 22),
2006
Abstract
The article examines the response of the German university system to an increasingly knowledge-based economy in comparison to the US. Additionally the potential role of universities in urban development is analysed. Several indicators show that several regulations of the German university system have to be changed for adapting it to the requirements of a knowledge-based economy.
Read article