Currency Appreciation and Exports: Empirical Evidence for Germany
Götz Zeddies
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 6,
2009
Abstract
In the first decade after its introduction, the Euro didn’t just hold up well, but compared to important currencies even appreciated considerably. Of course, exchange rate risks were noticeably lowered by introducing the single currency, since the bulk of EMU Member States’ exports are conducted within the currency union. Nevertheless, a strong Euro is unfavourable especially for open economies like Germany.
The article investigates the effects of exchange rate movements on German exports over time. The analyses reveal a downward impact of nominal effective exchange rates, not only for total, but also for exports to countries outside the currency union. Although an increasing pass-through of exchange rate changes to export prices is apparently at hand, further reasons for the dwindling effect of nominal exchange rates on exports are likely to exist.
In this context, it is shown that exports are less sensitive not only with respect to nominal, but also with respect to real effective exchange rate changes, suggesting a declining price elasticity of demand. Instead, exports are increasingly determined by economic activity in trading partner countries. In consequence of its geographic proximity, Germany did particularly benefit from the economic upswing in Eastern Europe, overlaying the appreciation of the Euro. Additionally, the latter could hardly impair German export industries due to their specialization on capital and high-quality consumer goods less vulnerable to exchange rate fluctuations.
Read article
German Economy Drawn into the World Recession
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
1. Sonderausgabe
2009
Abstract
In spring 2009, the world economy is in a deep recession. The intensification of the financial crisis in autumn has caused a sharp contraction of demand. The reaction of monetary and fiscal policy was substantial, but up to now (April 2009), it has not succeeded in restoring confidence of economic agents. Although some leading indicators point to a stabilization of production in the coming quarters, the downturn will not come to an end before next winter, because the financial crisis will continue to put strain on the real economy for some time to come.
The German economy is in its deepest recession since the foundation of the Federal Republic. Germany is particularly affected, because at the core of the economy is the production of those goods for that world demand has collapsed most: capital goods and high-quality consumer durables. While exports and private investment activity will continue to shrink this year (albeit at a slower rate), private consumption will be a stabilizing factor for some time, as will public investment activity in the second half of the year. Later in 2009 and in 2010, rising unemployment will depress consumption, while in this forecast, it is assumed that exports and investment slowly recover in 2010, because the financial turmoil will calm down.
For economic policy, a recapitalization of the banking sector should have priority. The ECB should lower its key interest rate to 0.5%. Given the sharply increasing fiscal deficits, a new, third fiscal program would be counterproductive. Only if monetary policy fails to stabilize the economy, further fiscal measures, coordinated at a European level, should be considered.
Read article
A Dynamic Approach to Interest Rate Convergence in Selected Euro-candidate Countries
Hubert Gabrisch, Lucjan T. Orlowski
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 10,
2009
Abstract
We advocate a dynamic approach to monetary convergence to a common currency that is based on the analysis of financial system stability. Accordingly, we empirically test volatility dynamics of the ten-year sovereign bond yields of the 2004 EU accession countries in relation to the eurozone yields during the January 2, 2001 untill January 22, 2009 sample period. Our results show a varied degree of bond yield co-movements, the most pronounced for the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Poland, and weaker for Hungary and Slovakia. However, since the EU accession, we find some divergence of relative bond yields. We argue that a ‘static’ specification of the Maastricht criterion for long-term bond yields is not fully conducive for advancing stability of financial systems in the euro-candidate countries.
Read article
Are Public Debts of the German Federal States Influencing their Financial Scope?
Sabine Freye
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 12,
2009
Abstract
The German Federal States have little impact on their budget. Both, revenues and ex-penditures, are basically determined by federal and European law. For a long time, this situation has been causing increasing debts. Today, public debts are again a top issue. The planned federal “debt brake” includes a gradual reduction and an interdiction of structural debts as from 2020. In a short perspective, this means an additional financial limitation to the public budgets. With regard to the described situation, the main question of this paper is: Do the German states actually have financial scope to realize the implementation of the planned “debt brake”? The analyses show that the financial scope for reducing their structural debts is particularly small in the five Federal States benefitting from additional transfers as from 2010. The highest budget restrictions do show the city states Berlin and Bremen.
Read article
Interest Rate Convergence in Euro Candidate Countries: A Dynamic Analysis
Hubert Gabrisch, Lucjan T. Orlowski
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 5,
2009
Abstract
The study advocates a dynamic approach to monetary convergence to a common currency that is based on the analysis of financial system stability. Accordingly, the study tests empirically volatility dynamics of the ten-year sovereign bond yields of the 2004 EU accession countries in relation to the euro zone yields during the January 2, 2001 to January 22, 2009 sample period. Results show a varied degree of bond yield co-movements, the most pronounced for the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Poland, and weaker for Hungary and Slovakia. However, since the EU accession, the study finds some divergence of relative bond yields. One can argue that a ‘static’ specification of the Maastricht criterion for long-term bond yields is not fully conducive for advancing stability of financial systems in the euro-candidate countries.
Read article
Low Skill but High Volatility?
Claudia M. Buch
CESifo Working Paper No. 2665,
2009
Abstract
Globalization may impose a double-burden on low-skilled workers. On the one hand, the relative supply of low-skilled labor increases. This suppresses wages of low-skilled workers and/or increases their unemployment rates. On the other hand, low-skilled workers typically face more limited access to financial markets than high-skilled workers. This limits their ability to smooth shocks to income intertemporally and to share risks across borders. Using cross-country, industry-level data for the years 1970 - 2004, we document how the volatility of hours worked and of wages of workers at different skill levels has changed over time. We develop a stylized theoretical model that is consistent with the empirical evidence, and we test the predictions of the model. Our results show that greater financial globalization and development increases the volatility of employment, and this effect is strongest for low-skilled workers. A higher share of low-skilled employment has a dampening impact.
Read article
The Exchange Rate of the Euro Cannot be Explained Fundamentally even Ten Years after the Introduction of the New Currency
Tobias Knedlik
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 1,
2009
Abstract
On first of January 2009, the Euro’s tenth birthday can be celebrated. The introduction of the Euro led to diminishing importance of trade in foreign currency for the Euro-countries. However, a significant part of foreign trade of Germany and other Euro-members is still nominated in foreign currency. Therefore, the external value of the Euro plays a crucial role for the European economy. Since the early depreciation of the exchange rate just after the introduction until 2000, an almost steady increase in the external value of the Euro could be observed. The contribution elaborates on the exchange rate development and tests whether the Euro was following a path as it would be predicted by both, the interest rate parity theory and the purchasing parity theory. Both theoretical approaches are not able to explain the specific valuation figure of the Euro. For the conduct of economic forecasts, it is to conclude that modelling exchange rate developments as random processes can be legitimate. Regarding exchange rate policy, it remains to ask which alternative policy approaches might be better suitable for the European economy.
Read article
Long-term Effects of Business Incubators: What Happens to Incubated Firms after they Have Graduated from the BIs?
Michael Schwartz
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 8,
2008
Abstract
Many cities and municipalities devote considerable public resources to the establishment and operation of business incubators (BIs) to promote the survivability and the positive development of newly founded firms. In the context of incubator evaluations, survival is one of the most important performance indicators, and survival rates of incubated firms are frequently communicated to the public by local authorities to demonstrate the success of those policy initiatives. However, in most cases, these data refers to the initial incubation period. Little is known about survival or exit dynamics of incubated firms after they have graduated from the BIs. On the basis of a comprehensive research project concerned with the development of graduate firms from incubators in Dresden, Halle (Saale), Jena, Neubrandenburg and Rostock, this article not only investigates how many firms survive after leaving the incubator facilities, but also investigates if graduation causes an immediate negative effect on subsequent survivability. The results show that about one third of all graduate firms fail after leaving the incubator. Furthermore, it can be found that graduate firms from the BIs in Halle (Saale) and Neubrandenburg face a relatively high risk of business closure especially in the first years after the completion of the incubation period.
Read article
Business Cycle Forecast, Summer 2008: Price Hikes and Financial Crisis Cloud Growth Prospects
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 7,
2008
Abstract
In the summer of 2008 the turmoil on financial markets and that on the markets for energy dim the prospects for the world economy. The acceleration of the oil price hike during the first half of the year has led to an increase in expected inflation and to higher interest rates on capital markets, while stock prices are going down. At the same time, the financial crisis is far from over, and banks in the US and in Western Europe continue in their efforts to consolidate their balance sheets. Thus, the expansion of credit supply will be scarcer in the next quarters. All this means that demand will slow in the developed economies during the next quarters. However, the massive fiscal stimulus will help the US economy to stabilize, and the world economy still benefits from the high growth dynamics in the emerging markets economies. All in all, the developed economies will not reach their potential growth rate before the second half of 2009. In Germany, the upswing comes to a temporary halt during summer of this year. Slowing foreign demand and the oil price hike induce firms to postpone investments, and private consumption, the soft spot of the upswing in Germany, is still sluggish due to high inflation rates that impair purchasing power. For the end of 2008, chances are good that growth in Germany accelerates again, because German exporters are still penetrating emerging markets as competitiveness does not diminish. All in all, the German economy will grow by 2.3% in 2008 (mainly due to the very high dynamics at the beginning of the year) and by 1.3% in 2009. A main risk of this forecast is that monetary policy fails in easing the high inflationary pressures. As to fiscal policy, efforts to reach sustainable public finances should not weaken.
Read article
The Maximum Level of Fines Restricts the Effect of European Competition Law
Henry Dannenberg, Nicole Steinat
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
2008
Abstract
In 2006, the fining guidelines for competition law infringements were completely renewed. The aim of this reform was twofold: on the one hand to decrease the incentive for cartelization and on the other hand to increase the likelihood of cartel detection.
The article studies how company’s decision for or against a cartel is influenced by these guidelines. We show that due to the maximum level of fines – which refers to the worldwide group turnover - an effective deterrence level can be achieved only for those companies, which realize just a small part of their turnover in the relevant market. Their incentive to blow the whistle increases with the cartel duration. This leads to a rising instability of cartels where one member generates only a small part of its turnover in the relevant market. In contrast, the deterrence level for companies that realize a large part of their sales in the relevant market is quite low due to the maximum level of fines.
The article gives a short overview of the risk factor competition law – from a company perspective. We illustrate how the expenditures related to cartel law infringements can be calculated. Further on, the minimum profit margins that are necessary for an economically advantageous cartel are determined. We show that for certain types of cartels already small rates of return are sufficient to make cartel participation attractive.
Read article