German Economy Drawn into the World Recession
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
1. Sonderausgabe
2009
Abstract
In spring 2009, the world economy is in a deep recession. The intensification of the financial crisis in autumn has caused a sharp contraction of demand. The reaction of monetary and fiscal policy was substantial, but up to now (April 2009), it has not succeeded in restoring confidence of economic agents. Although some leading indicators point to a stabilization of production in the coming quarters, the downturn will not come to an end before next winter, because the financial crisis will continue to put strain on the real economy for some time to come.
The German economy is in its deepest recession since the foundation of the Federal Republic. Germany is particularly affected, because at the core of the economy is the production of those goods for that world demand has collapsed most: capital goods and high-quality consumer durables. While exports and private investment activity will continue to shrink this year (albeit at a slower rate), private consumption will be a stabilizing factor for some time, as will public investment activity in the second half of the year. Later in 2009 and in 2010, rising unemployment will depress consumption, while in this forecast, it is assumed that exports and investment slowly recover in 2010, because the financial turmoil will calm down.
For economic policy, a recapitalization of the banking sector should have priority. The ECB should lower its key interest rate to 0.5%. Given the sharply increasing fiscal deficits, a new, third fiscal program would be counterproductive. Only if monetary policy fails to stabilize the economy, further fiscal measures, coordinated at a European level, should be considered.
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The New EU Members on the Verge of Disaster: What to Do?
Hubert Gabrisch
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 3,
2009
Abstract
The long lasting, but externally financed boom in the new EU countries has collapsed under the impacts of the global financial crisis. The countries’ fiscal and monetary authorizes do not seem to be able to effectively resist – a deep crisis is under way. The situation is particularly dramatic in the Baltic countries, where the hands of the monetary authority are institutionally tied, and an expansionary fiscal policy would trigger off speculative attacks on the exchange rate. Neither the maintaining of the currency board arrangement nor an ‘emergency access’ to the Euro zone would help. The other non-Euro members of the Union still aim to adopt the Euro in the next future and, thus, are reluctant to give up the Maastricht criteria. The Euro countries Slovakia and Slovenia might face a major deterioration of their credit rating if governments would attempt to increase fiscal deficits. All in all, two problems are to be solved: first, the external provision of liquidity to their economies and, second, an approach that anchors policies in the countries against economic nationalism, which is a beggar-thy-neighbor policy. We propose a combination of a reformed exchange rate mechanism with a stability and solidarity fund for all countries. The former would help to avoid too strong depreciations and the latter would provide liquidity to stabilize the exchange rate and the entire economy.
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Business Cycle Forecast 2009: World Financial Crisis Triggers Deep Recession in Germany
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 1,
2009
Abstract
At the beginning of 2009, the major industrialized economies are in recession. The financial turmoil has developed into a crisis of confidence to and solvency of the financial sector, raising financing costs and lowering the value of assets for firms and households. Monetary and fiscal policies have reacted strongly, but they will not succeed in ending the recession until the financial sectors in the US and in Western Europe have stabilized. This forecast is made under the assumption that stabilization will start in the second half of 2009 because the continued protection of important financial institutions by governments will restore confidence – albeit at a low level – and because at this time, the fall of US-house prices will start to fade off.
The German economy is hit particularly hard, because the financial crisis depresses worldwide investment demand and the sectors producing investment goods are at the heart of the German economy. The recession will not end before the second half of 2009, and capacity utilization will decrease throughout the year. We expect a tentative revival to begin in a recovery of exports. While private investment will shrink markedly, consumption of private households and the government as well as public investment will dampen the downturn. GDP will shrink by 1.9% in Germany and in East Germany by 1.5% because this region is less dependent on exports.
Economic policy has to help restoring confidence, and this can only be achieved if it behaves in a consistent and predictable way.
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A Lesson Learned? Pre- and Post-Crisis Entry Decisions in Turkish Banking
H. Evren Damar
Contemporary Economic Policy,
No. 1,
2009
Abstract
This study looks at the determinants of entry by Turkish banks into local markets during the periods before and after the crisis of 2000–2001. Motivated by a theoretical model of entry, results of fixed-effects logit regressions suggest that there has been a change in the geographical diversification strategies of Turkish banks. It appears that the dominance of strategic concerns, such as competing with banks of similar size, has diminished, while economic concerns, such as incumbent characteristics and cost considerations, have become more important. Overall, the postcrisis restructuring policies seem to have led to improved decision making in the sector.
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Financial Crisis Burdens Economic Activity in Poland
Martina Kämpfe
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 12,
2008
Abstract
In the first half of the year 2008, domestic demand –the main force behind growth – only marginally declined. Still extraordinarily high was the demand for the output of construction firms. Although demand from Western European countries declined since spring, the foreign trade was not much behind its level of the previous year because of high export activity to Asian and Eastern European countries. In the second half of the year, both, the finance and banking system as well as the real economy, were impacted by the consequences of global financial crisis. Indications of that are the temporary collapse of the polish stock market, the rapid fall of the Złoty and the weakening of domestic demand and exports. Against this background, expansion of economic activity in 2009 will continue at a markedly lower level.
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Crisis Contagion in Central and Eastern Europe
Hubert Gabrisch
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 12,
2008
Abstract
The global financial crisis reached the Central and Eastern European region. Fears of a recession are spreading among investors in Russia and the Ukraine due to the heavy decline of oil and steel prices and provoked a first wave of short-term capital withdrawals. The export sector of all countries in the region is affected by weakening global demand. Finally, the financial sector, which is dominated by international banks in almost all countries, appears as the contagion channel for risk adjustments of mother banks. The combined impact of all these causes and channels lead to a proliferation of restrictions in credit and money supply and an outflow of investment capital. A strong weakening of economic growth is on the way in the region, and a long-lasting recession seems possible in some countries, in first line in the Baltic countries. It becomes a superior task of governments to ease the length and depth of the approaching recession by a strong fiscal stimulus. A continuation of the present policy of fiscal consolidation or of nominal convergence toward a quick adoption of the Euro does not seem very advisable. If governments decided to support domestic demand, measures should be taken to strengthening of a genuinely domestic banking sector in order to maintain credit availability.
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Der lange Schatten des Sozialismus: Folgen für die Wirtschaftspolitik in Ostdeutschland
Ulrich Blum
List Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik,
2008
Abstract
East Germany’s economy growth was not able to close, over the last ten years, the lag against the West German economy. This paper inquires into the economic reasons, especially those that can be traced in history. It is shown that the exodus of elites from what was Central Germany started in the 1930s because of the persecution of the Jewish elites. During the period after the Second World War until the construction of the wall in 1961 especially young and qualified people left the Soviet Zone and later the G.D.R. Thus, the elites destroyed in the Third Reich and the Second World War could not be replaced exogenously. In the 1970s, an inadequate economic system destroyed the still existing industrial middle class which was an important base of productivity and helped to generate foreign income because of its export intensity to the Western countries. This generated a current account crisis which was only overcome by a loan from West Germany, the so-called “Strauß-Kredit”. In 1988, however, the fundamental problems again became visible and enforced a change of the economic system. The privatisation strategy by the Treuhand by and large did not sell or restitute enterprises but sold plants out of the fragmented combines. Today, the visible deficit in headquarter function is the most important single obstacle against growth and wealth in the New Lander. It can be expected that this will only disappear within a new technology cycle.
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Eastern German Economy: No Catching-up in 2008 and 2009
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 6,
2008
Abstract
In the New Lander, growth of production is characterized by two diverging developments. On the one hand, the manufacturing sector has expanded strongly while the public service sector as well as the retail sectors has considerably damped economic activity. On the other hand, those firms primarily bound to local markets have gained hardly any momentum, whereas others have been stimulated by external markets in Western Germany and abroad. These differences are mainly due to weak local demand in the wake of a low purchasing power and an ongoing reduction in the population. At the same time, export-oriented firms in the manufacturing sector have benefited from strong external demand, and they will further benefit from it, although somewhat less owing to the slowing world economy. However, as East German exporting firms are less exposed to those countries where the ongoing crisis in the real estate and the financial sector has unfolded its dampening effects the most, they are also less prone to it. Accordingly, gross domestic product will increase by 1,7% this year and 0,8% in 2009. This translates into further improvements on labor markets. Registered unemployment will fall below one million. In particular, manufacturing firms and the private business service sector will increase their demand for labor.
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International Financial Integration and Stability: On the Causes of the International Banking Crisis 2007/08 and Some Preliminary Lessons.
Diemo Dietrich, Achim Hauck
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 5,
2008
Abstract
Since its beginning, the recent financial market turmoil that has come to be known as the „subprime crisis“ has provoked considerable controversy among both, policymakers and scientists. The debate mainly focuses on two questions. The first is whether and how short-term measures should be taken to stabilize the global financial system. The second is which general lessons can be drawn from this crisis. Up to now, several potential causes of the crisis have been discussed in a more or less isolated manner. However, a predominant source of the crisis has not been identified yet. Accordingly, there is still a lack of knowledge regarding general consequences of the crisis for economic policy.
The purpose of this article is twofold. First, we show that to a large extent the crisis is due to the economic integration of formerly peripheral countries into the world economy that led to significant savings and investment imbalances. Thus, we argue that the crisis not only is a global phenomenon in its effects but also has global roots. Based on this argument, the second purpose of our paper is to derive implications for economic policy, where we also discuss the consequences for the future design of the global financial architecture.
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Consequences of the US-subprime Crisis Dampen Economic Growth in Germany
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
1. Sonderausgabe
2008
Abstract
The crises of the housing and the financial sector in the US and the turmoil on worldwide financial markets have clouded the prospects of the world economy for this and next year. In particular, conditions for financing consumption and investment will worsen. In addition, the price hikes for energy and food entail a redistribution of purchasing power from ordinary households to the producers of these goods. As a consequence of all this, the economy in the US will be more or less stagnating this year, and world growth will slow down. Firms in the nonfinancial sector, however, are generally in good financial condition, policy in the US takes strong measures to contain the crisis, and growth dynamics in emerging markets economies appear to be robust enough to withstand the dampening effects. In Germany, the economy is, in spite of the adverse effects from abroad and in particular the strong appreciation of the euro, still in good shape. Apparently, the economy has become more robust in the past years, partly due to increased competitiveness of German producers. Still, economic expansion will slow down, with annual growth rates of 1.8% for this year and 1.4% for 2009.
For the first time the forecast of the institutes comprises a medium term projection. For this, the potential growth rate of the German Economy is estimated to be 1.6%. As to policy recommendations, the institutes advise against the establishment of minimum wages in Germany, because they fear adverse effects for employment. In this point the IWH and its partners take a different view.
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