Crossing Networks Competition and Design
Hans Degryse, Mark Van Achter, Gunther Wuyts
Competition and Regulation in Network Industries,
Nr. 4,
2006
Abstract
In the past two decades, Alternative Trading Systems (ATSs) started to compete with traditional exchanges. Our paper focuses on one such system: a Crossing Network (CN). First, we discuss the distinct institutional aspects a CN offers compared to traditional markets. Next, we present an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature analyzing their success in competing with traditional markets. Finally, we offer some prospects on the potential outcome of this competition, taking into account market design issues such as the optimal degree of transparency of CNs. We also provide a market practioner’s view on the market design of CNs.
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Distance, Lending Relationships, and Competition
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena
Journal of Finance,
Nr. 1,
2005
Abstract
We study the effect on loan conditions of geographical distance between firms, the lending bank, and all other banks in the vicinity. For our study, we employ detailed contract information from more than 15,000 bank loans to small firms comprising the entire loan portfolio of a large Belgian bank. We report the first comprehensive evidence on the occurrence of spatial price discrimination in bank lending. Loan rates decrease with the distance between the firm and the lending bank and increase with the distance between the firm and competing banks. Transportation costs cause the spatial price discrimination we observe.
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Entry and Strategic Information Display in Credit Markets
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse
Economic Journal,
Nr. 513,
2006
Abstract
In many countries, lenders voluntarily provide information about their borrowers to private credit registries. A recent World Bank survey reveals that the display of a lender's own borrower information is often not reciprocated. That is, access to these registries does not require the prior provision of proprietary data. We argue that incumbent lenders release information about a portion of their profitable borrowers for strategic reasons. The reasoning is that the pool of unreleased borrowers becomes characterised by a severe adverse selection problem. This prevents the entrants from bidding for all the incumbent's profitable borrowers and reduces their scale of entry.
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Softening Competition by Inducing Switching in Credit Markets
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse
Journal of Industrial Economics,
Nr. 1,
2004
Abstract
We show that competing banks relax overall competition by inducing borrowers to switch lenders. We illustrate our findings in a two-period model with adverse selection where banks strategically commit to disclosing borrower information. By doing this, they invite rivals to poach their first-period market. Disclosure of borrower information increases the rival's second-period profits. This dampens competition for serving the first-period market.
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Softening Competition by Inducing Switching in Credit Markets: A Correction
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse, Jorge Fernández-Ruiz, Miguel García-Cestona
Journal of Industrial Economics,
Nr. 3,
2008
Abstract
In a recent article in this journal, Bouckaert and Degryse [2004] (denoted B&D) present a model in which banks strategically commit to disclosing borrower information. In this note, we point out an error in B&D and show that, although banks' information disclosure may indeed arise in equilibrium, it only does so if adverse selection is not too harsh.
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Bertrand Competition with an Asymmetric No-discrimination Constraint
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse, Theon van Dijk
Journal of Industrial Economics,
Nr. 1,
2013
Abstract
Regulators and competition authorities often prevent firms with significant market power, or dominant firms, from practicing price discrimination. The goal of such an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint is to encourage entry and serve consumers' interests. This constraint prohibits the firm with significant market power from practicing both behaviour-based price discrimination within the competitive segment and third-degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and competitive segments. We find that this constraint hinders entry and reduces welfare when the monopolistic segment is small.
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Bank-Firm Relationships and International Banking Markets
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena
International Journal of the Economics of Business,
Nr. 3,
2002
Abstract
This paper reviews how long-term relationships between firms and banks shape the structure and integration of banking markets worldwide. Bank relationships arise to span informational asymmetries that are endemic in financial markets. Firm-bank relationships not only entail specific benefits and costs for both the engaged firms and banks, but also directly affect the structure of banking markets. In particular, the sunk cost of screening and monitoring activities and the 'informational capital' collected by the incumbent banks may act as a barrier to entry. The intensity of the existing firm-bank relationships will determine the height of this barrier and shape the structure of international banking markets. For example, in Scandinavia where firms maintain few and strong relationships, foreign banks may only be able to enter successfully through mergers and acquisitions. On the other hand, Southern European firms maintain many bank relationships. Therefore, banks may consider entering Southern European banking markets through direct investment.
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Relationship Lending within a Bank-Based System: Evidence from European Small Business Data
Hans Degryse, Patrick Van Cayseele
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
Nr. 1,
2000
Abstract
We investigate relationship lending using detailed contract information from nearly 18,000 bank loans to small Belgian firms operating within the continental European bank-based system. Specifically, we investigate the impact of different measures of relationship strength on price and nonprice terms of the loan contract. We test for the possibility of rent shifting by banks. The evidence shows two opposing effects. On the one hand, the loan rate increases with the duration of a bank–firm relationship. On the other hand, the scope of a relationship, defined as the purchase of other information-sensitive products from a bank, decreases the loan's interest rate substantially. Relationship duration and scope thus have opposite effects on loan rates, with the latter being more important. We also find that the collateral requirement is decreasing in the duration of the relationship and increasing in its scope.
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Phonebanking
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse
European Economic Review,
Nr. 2,
1995
Abstract
In a two-stage game, we study under what conditions banks offer phonebanking (first stage). In the second stage, they are competitors in the market for deposits. Offering the phone option creates two opposing effects. The first is a demand effect as depositors strictly prefer to manage some of their financial transactions by phone. The second (strategic) effect is that competition is increased as transaction costs are lowered. Universal phonebanking prevails when the demand effect dominates the strategic effect. Specialization can occur in that one bank offers the phone option while the other does not.
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Measurement Matters — Alternative Input Price Proxies for Bank Efficiency Analyses
Michael Koetter
Journal of Financial Services Research,
Nr. 2,
2006
Abstract
Most bank efficiency studies that use stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) employ each bank’s own implicit input price when estimating efficient frontiers. But at the same time, most studies are based on cost and/or profit models that assume perfect input markets. Traditional input price proxies therefore contain at least substantial measurement error. We suggest here two alternative input market definitions to approximate exogenous input prices. We have access to Bundesbank data, which allows us to cover virtually all German universal banks between 1993 and 2003. The use of alternative input price proxies leads to mean cost efficiency that is significantly five percentage points lower compared to traditional input prices. Mean profit efficiency is hardly affected. Across models, small cooperative banks located in large western states perform best while large banks and those located in eastern states rank lowest.
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