Sovereign Credit Risk, Banks' Government Support, and Bank Stock Returns around the World: Discussion of Correa, Lee, Sapriza, and Suarez
Reint E. Gropp
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
s1
2014
Abstract
In the years leading up to the 2008–09 financial crisis, many banks around the world greatly expanded their balance sheets to take advantage of cheap and abundantly available funding. Access to international funding markets, in particular, made it possible for banks to reach a size that in some cases was a large multiple of their home countries’ gross domestic product (GDP). In Iceland, for example, assets of the banking system reached up to 900% of GDP in 2007. Similarly, by the end of 2008, assets in UK and Swiss banks exceeded 500% of their countries’ GDPs, respectively. Banks may also have grown rapidly because they may have wanted to reach too-big-to-fail status in their country, implying even lower funding cost (Penas and Unal 2004).
The depth and severity of the 2008–09 financial crisis and the subsequent debt crisis in Europe, however, have cast doubts on the ability of governments to bail out banks when they experience severe difficulties, in particular, in financially fragile environments and faced with large budget imbalances. This has resulted in as what some observers have dubbed a “doom loop”: the combination of weak public finances and weak banks results in a vicious cycle, in which the funding cost of banks increases, as the ability of governments to bail out banks is called into question, in turn increasing the funding cost of these banks and making the likelihood that the government will actually have to step in even higher, which in turn increases funding cost to the government and so forth.
Against this background, the paper by Correa et al. (2014) explores the link between sovereign rating changes and bank stock returns. They show large negative reactions of stock returns in response to sovereign ratings downgrades for banks that are expected to receive government support in case of failure. They find the strongest effects in developed economies, where the credibility of government bail outs is higher ex ante, while the effects are smaller in developing and emerging economies. In my view, the paper makes a number of important contributions to the extant literature.
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Banks and Sovereign Risk: A Granular View
Claudia M. Buch, Michael Koetter, Jana Ohls
Abstract
In this paper, we use detailed data on the sovereign debt holdings of all German banks to analyse the determinants of sovereign debt exposures and the implications of sovereign exposures for bank risk. Our main findings are as follows. First, sovereign bond holdings are heterogeneous across banks. Larger, weakly capitalised banks and banks with a small depositor base hold more sovereign bonds. Around 31% of all German banks hold no sovereign bonds at all. Second, the sensitivity of banks to macroeconomic factors increased significantly in the post-Lehman period. Banks hold more bonds from euro area countries, from low-inflation countries, and from countries with high sovereign bond yields. Third, there has been no marked impact of sovereign bond holdings on bank risk. This result could indicate the widespread absence of marking-to-market for sovereign bond holdings at the onset of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe.
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Sovereign Credit Risk Co-movements in the Eurozone: Simple Interdependence or Contagion?
Manuel Buchholz, Lena Tonzer
UniCredit & Universities Foundation, Working Paper Series No. 47,
Nr. 47,
2013
publiziert in: International Finance
Abstract
We investigate credit risk co-movements and contagion in sovereign debt markets of 17 industrialized countries for the period 2008-2012. We use dynamic conditional correlations of sovereign CDS spreads to detect contagion. This approach allows separating the channels through which contagion occurs from the determinants of simple interdependence. The results show that, first, sovereign credit risk comoves considerably, in particular among eurozone countries and during the sovereign debt crisis. Second, contagion cannot be attributed to one moment in time but varies across time and countries. Third, similarities in economic fundamentals, cross-country linkages in banking, and common market sentiment constitute the main channels of contagion.
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Financial Crisis Risk, ECB “Non-standard“ Measures, and the External Value of the Euro
Stefan Eichler
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance,
Nr. 3,
2012
Abstract
I study the impact of banking and sovereign debt crisis risk of EMU member states on the external value of the euro. Using a regime switching model, I find that the external value of the euro has significantly responded to financial crisis risk during the period of November 2008–November 2011, while no significant effect is found for the period from February 2006 to October 2008. This suggests that the monetary expansion and interest rate cuts associated with the ECB's “non-standard” measures may have reduced the external value of the euro.
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Does the ECB Act as a Lender of Last Resort During the Subprime Lending Crisis?: Evidence from Monetary Policy Reaction Models
Stefan Eichler, K. Hielscher
Journal of International Money and Finance,
Nr. 3,
2012
Abstract
We investigate whether the ECB aligns its monetary policy with financial crisis risk in EMU member countries. We find that since the outbreak of the subprime crisis the ECB has significantly increased net lending and reduced interest rates when banking and sovereign debt crisis risk in vulnerable EMU countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) increases, while no significant effect is identified for the pre-crisis period and relatively tranquil EMU countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands). These findings suggest that the ECB acts as a Lender of Last Resort for vulnerable EMU countries.
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The Impact of Banking and Sovereign Debt Crisis Risk in the Eurozone on the Euro/US Dollar Exchange Rate
Stefan Eichler
Applied Financial Economics,
Nr. 15,
2012
Abstract
I study the impact of financial crisis risk in the eurozone on the euro/US dollar exchange rate. Using daily data from 3 July 2006 to 30 September 2010, I find that the euro depreciates against the US dollar when banking or sovereign debt crisis risk increases in the eurozone. While the external value of the euro is more sensitive to changes in sovereign debt crisis risk in vulnerable member countries than in stable member countries, the impact of banking crisis risk is similar for both country blocs. Moreover, rising default risk of medium and large eurozone banks leads to a depreciation of the euro while small banks’ default risk has no significant impact, showing the relevance of systemically important banks with regards to the exchange rate.
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What Can Currency Crisis Models Tell Us about the Risk of Withdrawal from the EMU? Evidence from ADR Data
Stefan Eichler
Journal of Common Market Studies,
Nr. 4,
2011
Abstract
We study whether ADR (American depositary receipt) investors perceive the risk that countries such as Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal or Spain could leave the eurozone to address financial problems produced by the sub-prime crisis. Using daily data, we analyse the impact of vulnerability measures related to currency crisis theories on ADR returns. We find that ADR returns fall when yield spreads of sovereign bonds or CDSs (credit default swaps) rise (i.e. when debt crisis risk increases); when banks' CDS premiums rise or stock returns fall (i.e. when banking crisis risk increases); or when the euro's overvaluation increases (i.e. when the risk of competitive devaluation increases).
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Government Interventions in Banking Crises: Effects of Alternative Schemes on Bank Lending and Risk-taking
Diemo Dietrich, Achim Hauck
Scottish Journal of Political Economy,
Nr. 2,
2012
Abstract
We analyse the effects of policy measures to stop the fall in loan supply following a banking crisis. We apply a dynamic framework in which a debt overhang induces banks to curtail lending or to choose a fragile capital structure. Government assistance conditional on new banking activities, like on new lending or on debt and equity issues, allows banks to influence the scale of the assistance and to externalise risks, implying overinvestment or excessive risk taking or both. Assistance without reference to new activities, like granting lump sum transfers or establishing bad banks, does not generate adverse incentives but may have higher fiscal costs.
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Government Interventions in Banking Crises: Assessing Alternative Schemes in a Banking Model of Debt Overhang
Diemo Dietrich, Achim Hauck
Abstract
In dieser Studie werden verschiedene Politikmaßnahmen evaluiert, die ergriffen werden können, um den Rückgang des Kreditangebots im Geiner Bankenkrise aufzuhalten. Es wird ein dynamischer Ansatz entwickelt, in dem Banken aufgrund eines bestehenden Schuldenüberhangs einen Anreiz haben, das Kreditangebot zu reduzieren oder eine fragile Kapitalstruktur zu wählen. Staatliche Unterstützungsmaßnahmen, die von neuen Bankgeschäften abhängig gemacht werden, erlauben es den Banken, das Ausmaß der Unterstützung zu beeinflussen und Risiken zu externalisieren; damit targen die Maßnahmen dazu bei, dass Banken das Kreditangebot unangemessen stark ausweiten und/oder exzessive Risiken eingehen. Unterstützungsmaßnahmen ohne Bezug auf neue Bankgeschäfte führen nicht zu diesen adversen Anreizeffekten, sind aber mit höheren fiskalischen Kosten verbunden.
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