Monetary Policy and Financial (In)stability: An Integrated Micro–Macro Approach
Ferre De Graeve, Thomas Kick, Michael Koetter
Journal of Financial Stability,
Nr. 3,
2008
Abstract
Evidence on central banks’ twin objective, monetary and financial stability, is scarce. We suggest an integrated micro–macro approach with two core virtues. First, we measure financial stability directly at the bank level as the probability of distress. Second, we integrate a microeconomic hazard model for bank distress and a standard macroeconomic model. The advantage of this approach is to incorporate micro information, to allow for non-linearities and to permit general feedback effects between financial distress and the real economy. We base the analysis on German bank and macro data between 1995 and 2004. Our results confirm the existence of a trade-off between monetary and financial stability. An unexpected tightening of monetary policy increases the probability of distress. This effect disappears when neglecting microeffects and non-linearities, underlining their importance. Distress responses are largest for small cooperative banks, weak distress events, and at times when capitalization is low. An important policy implication is that the separation of financial supervision and monetary policy requires close collaboration among members in the European System of Central Banks and national bank supervisors.
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Does too much Transparency of Central Banks Prevent Agents from Using their Private Information Efficiently?
Axel Lindner
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 16,
2007
Abstract
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects of different communication strategies of a central bank: it can either publish no more than its overall assessment of the economy or be more transparent, giving detailed reasons for this assessment. The latter strategy is shown to be superior because it enables agents to use private information and to be less dependent on common knowledge. This result holds true even if the strategies of agents are strategic complements, for which case it has been argued that too much transparency might induce agents to neglect their private knowledge.
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The relationship between unemployment and output in post-communist countries
Hubert Gabrisch, Herbert Buscher
Post-Communist Economies,
2006
Abstract
Unemployment is still disappointingly high in most Central and East European countries, and might be a reflection of the ongoing adjustment to institutional shocks resulting from systemic transition, or it may be caused by high labour market rigidity, or aggregate demand that is too weak. In this paper we have investigated the dynamics of unemployment and output in those eight post-communist countries, which entered the EU in 2004. We used a model related to Okun’s Law; i.e. the first differences in unemployment rates were regressed on GDP growth rates. We estimated country and panel regressions with instrument variables (TSLS) and applied a few tests to the data and regression results. We assume transition of labour markets to be accomplished when a robust relationship exists between unemployment rate changes and GDP growth. Moreover, the estimated coefficients contain information about labour market rigidity and unemployment thresholds of output growth. Our results suggest that the transition of labour markets can be regarded as completed since unemployment responds to output changes and not to a changing institutional environment that destroys jobs in the state sector. The regression coefficients have demonstrated that a high trend rate of productivity and a high unemployment intensity of output growth have been occurring since 1998. Therefore, we conclude that labour market rigidities do not play an important role in explaining high unemployment rates. However, GDP growth is dominated by productivity progress and the employment-relevant component of aggregate demand is too low to reduce the high level of unemployment substantially.
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Does Transparency of Central Banks produce Multiple Equilibria on Currency Markets?
Axel Lindner
Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
Nr. 1,
2006
Abstract
A recent strand of literature shows that multiple equilibria in models of markets for pegged currencies vanish if there is slightly diverse information among traders; see Morris and Shin (2001). It is known that this approach works only if the common knowledge in the market is not too precise. This has led to the conclusion that central banks should try to avoid making their information common knowledge. We develop a model in which more transparency of the central bank implies better private information, because each trader utilises public information according to her own private information. Thus, transparency makes multiple equilibria less likely.
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Does Transparency of Central Banks Produce Multiple Equilibria on Currency Markets?
Axel Lindner
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 178,
2003
Abstract
A recent strand of literature (see Morris and Shin 2001) shows that multiple equilibria in models of markets for pegged currencies vanish if there is slightly diverse information between traders. It is known that this approach works only if there is not too precise common knowledge in the market. This has led to the conclusion that central banks should try to avoid making their information common knowledge. We present a model in which more transparency of the central bank means better private information, because each trader utilizes public information according to her own private information. Thus, transparency makes multiple equilibria less likely.
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