Regulation and Taxation: A Complementarity
Benjamin Schoefer
Journal of Comparative Economics,
Nr. 4,
2010
Abstract
I show how quantity regulation can lower elasticities and thereby increase optimal tax rates. Such regulation imposes regulatory incentives for particular choice quantities. Their strength varies between zero (laissez faire) and infinite (command economy). In the latter case, regulation effectively eliminates any intensive behavioral responses to taxes; a previously distortionary tax becomes a lump sum. For intermediate regulation (where some deviation is feasible), intensive behavioral responses are still weaker than under zero regulation, and so quantity regulation reduces elasticities, thereby facilitating subsequent taxation. I apply this mechanism to labor supply and present correlational evidence for this complementarity: hours worked in high-regulation countries are compressed, and these countries tax labor at higher rates.
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Finance and Growth in a Bank-Based Economy: Is It Quantity or Quality that Matters?
Michael Koetter, Michael Wedow
Journal of International Money and Finance,
Nr. 8,
2010
Abstract
Most finance–growth studies approximate the size of financial systems rather than the quality of intermediation to explain economic growth differentials. Furthermore, the neglect of systematic differences in cross-country studies could drive the result that finance matters. We suggest a measure of bank’s intermediation quality using bank-specific efficiency estimates and focus on the regions of one economy only: Germany. This quality measure has a significantly positive effect on growth. This result is robust to the exclusion of banks operating in multiple regions, controlling for the proximity of financial markets, when distinguishing different banking sectors active in Germany, and when excluding the structurally weaker East from the sample.
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State Aid in the Enlarged European Union. An Overview
Jens Hölscher, Nicole Nulsch, Johannes Stephan
Abstract
In the early phase of transition that started with the 1990s, Central and Eastern European Countries pursued economic restructuring of the enterprise sector that involved massive injections of state support. Also foreign investment from the West and facilitation of the development of a market economy involved massive injections of state support. With their accession to the European Union (EU), levels and forms of state aid came under critical review by the European Commission. This inquiry investigates whether the integration of the new member states operates on a level playing field with respect to state aid. Quantitative and qualitative analysis is relied upon to answer this key, as well as other, related questions. Findings suggest that in recent years a level playing field across the EU has indeed emerged. State aid in the new EU member countries is rather handled more strictly than laxer compared to the ‘old’ EU countries.
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Governmental Learning as a Determinant of Economic Growth
Marina Grusevaja
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 23,
2010
Abstract
Systemic economic transition is a process of determined radical institutional change, a process of building new institutions required by a market economy. Nowadays, the experience of transition countries with the implementation of new institutions could be reviewed as a method of economic development that despite similar singular steps has different effects on the domestic economic performance. The process of institutional change towards a market economy is determined by political will, thus the government plays an important role in carrying out the economic reforms. Among the variety of outcomes and effects the attention is drawn especially to economic growth that diverges significantly in different post-transition countries. The paper attempts to shed light upon the problem on the basis of institutional economics, of economics of innovation and partially of political economy of growth using an evolutionary, process-oriented perspective. In this context the issue central to the promotion of economic growth is the successful implementation of new institutions through governmental activities. The paper shows that under the conditions of bounded rationality and radical uncertainty economic growth is determined, inter alia, by the capacity for governmental learning.
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Human Capital Investment, New Firm Creation and Venture Capital
Merih Sevilir
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
Nr. 4,
2010
Abstract
This paper studies the relation between firm investment in general human capital, new firm creation and financial development for new firm financing, such as the existence of a venture capital industry. On one hand, firm investment in general human capital leads employees to generate new innovative ideas for starting their own firm. Since employees need a venture capitalist to start their new firm, firm investment in general human capital encourages the creation of venture capitalists by increasing the need for their services, such as providing advice and monitoring. On the other hand, as new firm financing becomes available, firms' willingness to invest in general human capital increases, and as a by-product, the creation of employee-founded and venture capital-backed new firms increases in the economy. Hence, our model provides a rational explanation for the emergence of new firms created by employees of established firms, which represents one of the most common type of new firms in many industries.
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Investor Rationality and House Price Bubbles: The Case of Berlin and the German Reunification
Oliver Holtemöller, R. Schulz
German Economic Review,
2010
Abstract
We analyze the behavior of investors in the Berlin rental apartment house market over the years 1980–2004. Using constant-quality multipliers (price–rent ratios), we reject the hypothesis that multipliers in the market were set in a rational manner. Supported by narrative evidence, we conjecture that investors misjudged the economic effects of the German reunification. To examine this, we employ a stylized structural economic model and analyze the effects of shocks on rational multipliers. It seems that investors confused the reunification with a permanent supply side shock to the economy. By basing their investment decisions on this misjudgement, investors behaved irrationally, but in a very uncertain and unprecedented environment.
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Veblen, Myrdal, and the Convergence Hypothesis: Toward an Institutionalist Critique
John B. Hall, Udo Ludwig
Journal of Economic Issues,
2010
Abstract
An Institutionalist critique that draws from selected contributions of Veblen and Myrdal initiates a convergence debate. Challenged is a Neoclassical interpretation of economic processes expected to lead toward a catching up with respect to per capita output of Germany's poorer eastern region with the richer western region. Economic method is considered, and the Institutionalist School of Thought rooted in contributions of Veblen as well as Myrdal is touted for offering higher levels of explanatory power than the Neoclassical School. We challenge the usefulness of laws in Economic Science, and especially their applicability to the empirical economy. Instead of automatic forces driving a meliorative trend, we seek to establish that human agency and policy play determining roles in affecting economic and societal outcomes in Germany's eastern region.
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