A Cost Efficient International Lender of Last Resort
Tobias Knedlik
International Research Journal of Finance and Economics,
2010
Abstract
The current reform of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) lending instruments has transformed the Fund towards an international lender of last resort (ILOLR). Current research discusses various general frameworks for installing an ILOLR. However, it remains unclear how the ILOLR should actually operate. This paper discusses six different options for the construction of an ILOLR that supports central banks during currency crises. The paper concludes that the most cost efficient version of the ILOLR would be direct intervention by the IMF using IMF resources, with the option of using additional reserves from central banks. The paper considers measures of cost efficiency, such as cost of borrowing, intervention, and sterilization and moral hazard problems.
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How Does Industry Specialization Affect the Efficiency of Regional Innovation Systems?
Michael Fritsch, Viktor Slavtchev
Annals of Regional Science,
Nr. 1,
2010
Abstract
This study analyzes the relationship between the specialization of a region in certain industries and the efficiency of the region in generating new knowledge. The efficiency measure is constructed by relating regional R&D input and output. An inversely u-shaped relationship is found between regional specialization and R&D efficiency, indicating the presence of externalities of both Marshall and Jacobs’ type. Further factors influencing efficiency are externalities resulting from high R&D intensity of the local private sector as well as knowledge from local public research institutions. The impact of both the specialization and the additional factors is, however, different for regions at different efficiency levels.
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FDI and the National Innovation System - Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe
Jutta Günther, Björn Jindra, Johannes Stephan
D. Dyker (ed.), Network Dynamics in Emerging Regions of Europe, Imperial College Press,
2010
Abstract
The paper investigates strategic motives, technological activities and determinants of foreign investment enterprises’ embeddedness in post-transition economies (Eastern Germany and selected Central East European countries). The empirical study makes use of the IWH FDI micro database. Results of the descriptive analysis of investment motives show that market access dominates over efficiency seeking and other motives. The majority of investors are technologically active in the region as a whole, but countries differ in terms of performance. The probit model estimations show that firm specific characteristics, among them innovativeness and autonomy from parent company, are important determinants of foreign investment enterprises’ embeddedness.
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Technology Clubs, R&D and Growth Patterns: Evidence from EU Manufacturing
Claire Economidou, J. W. B. Bos, Michael Koetter
European Economic Review,
Nr. 1,
2010
Abstract
This paper investigates the forces driving output change in a panel of EU manufacturing industries. A flexible modeling strategy is adopted that accounts for: (i) inefficient use of resources and (ii) differences in the production technology across industries. With our model we are able to identify technical, efficiency, and input growth for endogenously determined technology clubs. Technology club membership is modeled as a function of R&D intensity. This framework allows us to explore the components of output growth in each club, technology spillovers and catch-up issues across industries and countries.
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Do All Countries Grow Alike?
Claire Economidou, J. W. B. Bos, Michael Koetter, James W. Kolari
Journal of Development Economics,
Nr. 1,
2010
Abstract
This paper investigates the driving forces of output change in 77 countries during the period 1970–2000. A flexible modeling strategy is adopted that accounts for (i) the inefficient use of resources, and (ii) different production technologies across countries. The proposed model can identify technical, efficiency, and input change for each of three endogenously determined regimes. Membership in these regimes is estimated, rather than determined ex ante. This framework enables explorations into the determinants of output growth and convergence issues in each regime.
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Monopolistic Competition and Costs in the Health Care Sector
Ingmar Kumpmann
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 17,
2009
Abstract
Competition among health insurers is widely considered to be a means of enhancing efficiency and containing costs in the health care system. In this paper, it is argued that this could be unsuccessful since health care providers hold a strong position on the market for health care services. Physicians exert a type of monopolistic power which can be described by Chamberlin’s model of monopolistic competition. If many health insurers compete with one another, they cannot counterbalance the strong bargaining position of the physicians. Thus, health care expenditure is higher, financing either extra profits for physicians or a higher number of them. In addition, health insurers do not have an incentive to contract selectively with health care providers as long as there are no price differences between physicians. A monopolistic health insurer is able to counterbalance the strong position of physicians and to achieve lower costs.
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The Economic Optimality of Sanction Mechanisms in Interorganizational Ego Networks – A Game Theoretical Analysis –
Muhamed Kudic, Marc Banaszak
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 15,
2009
Abstract
Even though small- and medium-sized firms (SMEs) were believed not to proceed beyond exporting in their internationalization routes, we can observe new types of co-operation intensive entrepreneurial firms – so-called “micromultinational enterprises” (mMNEs) – entering the global landscape. These firms face the challenge to manage and control a portfolio of national and international alliances simultaneously (ego network). The aim of this paper is to provide game theoretically consolidated conditions in order to analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of interorganizational sanction mechanisms in an alliance portfolio setting. A game theoretical framework is developed over three stages with increasing complexity. Results show that two out of six analyzed sanction mechanisms do not fulfill the game theoretical condition for effectiveness. The efficiency analysis sensibilizes for discretionary elements in governance structures and demonstrates that not one single sanction mechanism but rather the right choice and combination of different types of sanction mechanisms leads to efficient results. We contribute to the international business, alliance, and network literature in several ways by focusing on alliance portfolios held by mMNEs. In doing so, we move beyond the dyadic level and analyze sanction mechanisms from an ego network perspective, a still widely under-emphasized topic in the literature.
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The Identification of Technology Regimes in Banking: Implications for the Market Power-Fragility Nexus
Michael Koetter, Tigran Poghosyan
Journal of Banking and Finance,
Nr. 8,
2009
Abstract
Neglecting the existence of different technologies in banking can contaminate efficiency, market power, and other performance measures. By simultaneously estimating (i) technology regimes conditional on exogenous factors, (ii) efficiency conditional on risk management, and (iii) Lerner indices of German banks, we identify three distinct technology regimes: Public & Retail, Small & Specialized, and Universal & Relationship. System estimation at the regional level reveals that greater bank market power increases bank profitability but also fosters corporate defaults. Corporate defaults, in turn, lead to higher probabilities of bank distress, which supports the market power-fragility hypothesis.
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Regional Growth and Finance in Europe: Is there a Quality Effect of Bank Efficiency?
Iftekhar Hasan, Michael Koetter, Michael Wedow
Journal of Banking and Finance,
Nr. 8,
2009
Abstract
In this study, we test whether regional growth in 11 European countries depends on financial development and suggest the use of cost- and profit-efficiency estimates as quality measures of financial institutions. Contrary to the usual quantitative proxies of financial development, the quality of financial institutions is measured in this study as the relative ability of banks to intermediate funds. An improvement in bank efficiency spurs five times more regional growth then an identical increase in credit does. More credit provided by efficient banks exerts an independent growth effect in addition to direct quantity and quality channel effects.
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Lending Technology, Bank Organization and Competition
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena, Günseli Tümer-Alkan
Journal of Financial Transformation,
2009
Abstract
This paper reviews recent theoretical and empirical studies investigating how both bank technology and organization shape bank-borrower interactions. We refer to two related concepts for bank technology. First, the technologies banks employ in loan granting decisions and second, the advances in information technology linked to the bank's lending technology. We also summarize and interpret the theoretical and empirical work on bank organization and its influence on lending technologies. We show that the choice of lending technology and bank organization depend heavily on the availability of information, the technological progress in the collection of information, as well as the banking market structure and the legal environment. We draw important policy conclusions from the literature. Competition authorities and supervisors have to remain alert to the consequences of the introduction of any new technology because: (1) advances in technology do not necessarily lead to more intense banking competition, and (2) the impact of technological and financial innovation on financial efficiency and stability depends on the incentives of the entire „loan production chain.‟
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