Motivating High‐impact Innovation: Evidence from Managerial Compensation Contracts
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Zenu Sharma, Maya Waisman
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments,
Nr. 3,
2019
Abstract
We investigate the relationship between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation and firm innovation and find that long‐term incentives in the form of options, especially unvested options, and protection from managerial termination in the form of golden parachutes are positively related to corporate innovation, and particularly to high‐impact, exploratory (new knowledge creation) invention. Conversely, non‐equity pay has a detrimental effect on the input, output and impact of innovation. Tests using the passage of an option expensing regulation (FAS 123R) as an exogenous shock to option compensation suggest a causal interpretation for the link between long‐term pay incentives, patents and citations. Furthermore, we find that the decline in option pay following the implementation of FAS 123R has led to a significant reduction in exploratory innovation and therefore had a detrimental effect on innovation output. Overall, our findings support the idea that compensation contracts that protect from early project failure and incentivize long‐term commitment are more suitable for inducing high‐impact corporate innovation.
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Political Influence and Financial Flexibility: Evidence from China
Xian Gu, Iftekhar Hasan, Yun Zhu
Journal of Banking and Finance,
February
2019
Abstract
This paper investigates how political influence affects firms’ financial flexibility and speed of adjustment toward target leverage ratios. We find that at the macro level, firms in environments with high political advantages, proxied by provincial affiliations with heads of state as well as political status and party rank of provincial leaders, adjust faster. At the micro level, firms that are state-owned, have CPC members as executives, or bear low exposure to changes in political uncertainty adjust faster. When interacted, the micro-level political factors have more significant impact.
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Effectiveness and (In)Efficiencies of Compensation Regulation: Evidence from the EU Banker Bonus Cap
Stefano Colonnello, Michael Koetter, Konstantin Wagner
Abstract
We investigate the (unintended) effects of bank executive compensation regulation. Capping the share of variable compensation spurred average turnover rates driven by CEOs at poorly performing banks. Other than that, banks‘ responses to raise fixed compensation sufficed to retain the vast majority of non-CEO executives and those at well performing banks. We fail to find evidence that banks with executives that are more affected by the bonus cap became less risky. In fact, numerous results indicate an increase of risk, even in its systemic dimension according to selected measures. The return component of bank performance appears to be unaffected by the bonus cap. Risk hikes are consistent with an insurance effect associated with raised the increase in fixed compensation of executives. The ability of the policy to enhance financial stability is therefore doubtful.
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Urban Agglomeration and CEO Compensation
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Kose John, Maya Waisman
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
Nr. 6,
2016
Abstract
We examine the relation between the agglomeration of firms around big cities and chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. We find a positive relation among the metropolitan size of a firm’s headquarters, the total and equity portion of its CEO’s pay, and the quality of CEO educational attainment. We also find that CEOs gradually increase their human capital in major metropolitan areas and are rewarded for this upon relocation to smaller cities. Taken together, the results suggest that urban agglomeration reflects local network spillovers and faster learning of skilled individuals, for which firms are willing to pay a premium and which are therefore important factors in CEO compensation.
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Relative Peer Quality and Firm Performance
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Sureshbabu Mani, Pengfei Ye
Journal of Financial Economics,
Nr. 1,
2016
Abstract
We examine the performance impact of the relative quality of a Chief Executive Officer (CEO)’s compensation peers (peers to determine a CEO's overall compensation) and bonus peers (peers to determine a CEO's relative-performance-based bonus). We use the fraction of peers with greater managerial ability scores (Demerjian, Lev, and McVay, 2012) than the reporting firm to measure this CEO's relative peer quality (RPQ). We find that firms with higher RPQ earn higher stock returns and experience higher profitability growth than firms with lower RPQ. Learning among peers and the increased incentive to work harder induced by the peer-based tournament contribute to RPQ's performance effect.
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Executive Compensation Structure and Credit Spreads
Stefano Colonnello, Giuliano Curatola, Ngoc Giang Hoang
Abstract
We develop a model of managerial compensation structure and asset risk choice. The model provides predictions about how inside debt features affect the relation between credit spreads and compensation components. First, inside debt reduces credit spreads only if it is unsecured. Second, inside debt exerts important indirect effects on the role of equity incentives: When inside debt is large and unsecured, equity incentives increase credit spreads; When inside debt is small or secured, this effect is weakened or reversed. We test our model on a sample of U.S. public firms with traded CDS contracts, finding evidence supportive of our predictions. To alleviate endogeneity concerns, we also show that our results are robust to using an instrumental variable approach.
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An Empirical Analysis of Legal Insider Trading in The Netherlands
Frank de Jong, Jérémie Lefebvre, Hans Degryse
De Economist,
Nr. 1,
2014
Abstract
In this paper, we employ a registry of legal insider trading for Dutch listed firms to investigate the information content of trades by corporate insiders. Using a standard event-study methodology, we examine short-term stock price behavior around trades. We find that purchases are followed by economically large abnormal returns. This result is strongest for purchases by top executives and for small market capitalization firms, which is consistent with the hypothesis that legal insider trading is an important channel through which information flows to the market. We analyze also the impact of the implementation of the Market Abuse Directive (European Union Directive 2003/6/EC), which strengthens the existing regulation in the Netherlands. We show that the new regulation reduced the information content of sales by top executives.
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Does It Pay to Have Friends? Social Ties and Executive Appointments in Banking
Allen N. Berger, Thomas Kick, Michael Koetter, Klaus Schaeck
Journal of Banking and Finance,
Nr. 6,
2013
Abstract
We exploit a unique sample to analyze how homophily (affinity for similar others) and social ties affect career outcomes in banking. We test if these factors increase the probability that the appointee to an executive board is an outsider without previous employment at the bank compared to being an insider. Homophily based on age and gender increase the chances of the outsider appointments. Similar educational backgrounds, in contrast, reduce the chance that the appointee is an outsider. Greater social ties also increase the probability of an outside appointment. Results from a duration model show that larger age differences shorten tenure significantly, whereas gender similarities barely affect tenure. Differences in educational backgrounds affect tenure differently across the banking sectors. Maintaining more contacts to the executive board reduces tenure. We also find weak evidence that social ties are associated with reduced profitability, consistent with cronyism in banking.
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New Growth and Poverty Alleviation Strategies for Africa – Institutional and Local Perspectives. African Development Perspectives Yearbook, Vol. 14
Tobias Knedlik, Karl Wohlmuth, Philippe Burger, Achim Gutowski, Mareike Meyn, T. (eds) Urban, Afeikhena Jerome
,
2009
Abstract
The Volume XIV analyses the “New Growth and Poverty Alleviation Strategies for Africa“. Institutional issues and perspectives in designing new growth and poverty alleviation strategies are considered in various case studies (Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Botswana and Tanzania). Other studies deal with institutional problems of resource-rich countries after conflict (Sudan) and with the institutions to enhance environmental protection parallel to economic growth and poverty reduction (Niger). Further studies deal with institutions to bridge the gap between formal and informal entrepreneurial sectors in Kenya and Tanzania. Local issues and perspectives for designing new growth and poverty alleviation strategies are considered in case studies on rural-urban development gaps in Tanzania and on microfinance as an instrument for new growth and poverty alleviation strategies (Tanzania and Eritrea). A study on small farmers in Ghana provides information on the role they can play in value chains. Two studies on Nigeria highlight the local and the sub-regional health and poverty alleviation programmes and the relation to growth. Book reviews and book notes on the theme are part of the volume. This volume builds the foundation for a comprehensive strategy of policy reforms in Africa so as to integrate new growth and poverty alleviation strategies. Complementary to Volume XIV is Volume XIII on “New Growth and Poverty Alleviation Strategies for Africa - Interational and Regional Perspectives“. Both volumes are of importance for all those who work in African countries as officials, executives, managers, researchers, and policy-makers, but also for all those who actively support Africa's development concerns at the international, regional, country, local, and project levels. They will experience this Volume XIV and also the complementary Volume XIII as indispensable sources of insight, reference, and inspiration.
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