Relationship Lending within a Bank-Based System: Evidence from European Small Business Data
Hans Degryse, Patrick Van Cayseele
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
Nr. 1,
2000
Abstract
We investigate relationship lending using detailed contract information from nearly 18,000 bank loans to small Belgian firms operating within the continental European bank-based system. Specifically, we investigate the impact of different measures of relationship strength on price and nonprice terms of the loan contract. We test for the possibility of rent shifting by banks. The evidence shows two opposing effects. On the one hand, the loan rate increases with the duration of a bank–firm relationship. On the other hand, the scope of a relationship, defined as the purchase of other information-sensitive products from a bank, decreases the loan's interest rate substantially. Relationship duration and scope thus have opposite effects on loan rates, with the latter being more important. We also find that the collateral requirement is decreasing in the duration of the relationship and increasing in its scope.
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Der Ordnungsbezug der Informationsökonomik
Uwe Vollmer, Diemo Dietrich
Ordnungstheorie und Ordnungspolitik, Schriften zu Ordnungsfragen der Wirtschaft, Band 64,
2000
Abstract
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IWH-Industrieumfrage im September 1999: Ostdeutsche Industrie wieder etwas zuversichtlicher
Doris Gladisch
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Nr. 13,
1999
Abstract
Im September hat sich das Geschäftsklima in der ostdeutschen Industrie wieder etwas gebessert. Wohl auch ein Jahr-2000-Effekt. Zwar erwarten die Unternehmen zum Jahreswechsel keine Einschränkung ihrer Geschäftstätigkeit, weil sie ihre Informationstechnologien erneuerten, dennoch werden Materialbestände für eventuelle Lieferausfälle vorsorglich aufgestockt und Vorräte für etwaige Nachfragespitzen produziert.
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The Total Cost of Trading Belgian Shares: Brussels versus London
Hans Degryse
Journal of Banking and Finance,
Nr. 9,
1999
Abstract
Since 1990, London’s SEAQ International (SEAQ-I) has attracted considerable trading volume in Belgian equities. This paper investigates competition between the Brussels CATS market and London’s SEAQ-I. Toward this end, we gathered extensive limit order book data as well as transactions and quotation information. With regard to liquidity (indirect costs), measured by the quoted and effective bid–ask spread, the paper concludes that CATS outperforms SEAQ International for both measures. The effective spread is of course substantially smaller than the quoted spread, with the CATS effective spread showing a U-shaped form. This paper, unique in employing an extensive data set that includes all hidden orders and the whole limit order book, produces results in line with the different market microstructure models. Total trading costs on CATS are lower (higher) for small (large) trade sizes.
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The Two Germanies: Information Technology and Economic Divergence, 1949-1989
Ulrich Blum, Leonard Dudley
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE,
1999
Abstract
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Information, neue Technologien und ökonomische Effizienz
Ulrich Blum, E. Greipl, H. Hereth, S. Müller
Erweiterung der Markträume,
1997
Abstract
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Worker Beliefs about Outside Options
Simon Jäger, Christopher Roth, Nina Roussille, Benjamin Schoefer
Quarterly Journal of Economics,
2099
Abstract
Standard labor market models assume that workers hold accurate beliefs about the external wage distribution, and hence their outside options with other employers. We test this assumption by comparing German workers’ beliefs about outside options with objective benchmarks. First, we find that workers wrongly anchor their beliefs about outside options on their current wage: workers that would experience a 10% wage change if switching to their outside option only expect a 1% change. Second, workers in low-paying firms underestimate wages elsewhere. Third, in response to information about the wages of similar workers, respondents correct their beliefs about their outside options and change their job search and wage negotiation intentions. Finally, we analyze the consequences of anchoring in a simple equilibrium model. In the model, anchored beliefs keep overly pessimistic workers stuck in low-wage jobs, which gives rise to monopsony power and labor market segmentation.
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