Mutual Perception of Science and Industry in Innovation Networks – Evidence from East Germany
Jutta Günther, Cornelia Lang
D. Dyker (ed.), Network Dynamics in Emerging Regions of Europe, Imperial College Press,
2010
Abstract
The paper examines how science and industry perceive each other. Cooperation in the field of innovation and research and development has increased in recent years. But comprehensive empirical research on the mutual perception of science and industry is lacking so far. The article presents the results of explorative research based on a number of qualitative interviews with representatives from science and industry on that topic. The interviews were carried out in the Central German Region which is a centre of manufacturing industry especially of chemicals. So the two selected industries are chemical industry (high-tech based) and food processing (low-tech based). The paper provides remarks on the German innovation system. The empirical section summarizes the interview reports. We found only little evidence of conflict of interests between market-oriented industry and science organisations. Cooperation exists and works. The key issue is trust.
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Quality of Service, Efficiency, and Scale in Network Industries: An Analysis of European Electricity Distribution. EPRG Working Paper 05/04
Christian Growitsch, Tooraj Jamasb, Michael Pollitt
Externe Publikationen,
2005
Abstract
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Network Investment and the Threat of Regulation – Preventing Monopoly Exploitation or Infrastructure Construction?
Ulrich Blum, Christian Growitsch, Niels Krap
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 7,
2006
Abstract
In summer 2005, the German telecommunication incumbent Deutsche Telekom announced its plans to build a new broadband fibre optics network. Deutsche Telekom decided as precondition for this new network not to be regulated with respect to pricing and third party access. To develop a regulator's strategy that allows investments and prevents monopolistic prices at the same time, we model an incumbent's decision problem under a threat of regulation in a game-theoretical context. The decision whether to invest or not depends on the probability of regulation and its assumed impact on investment returns. Depending on the incumbent's expectation on these parameters, he will decide if the investment is favourable, and which price to best set. This price is below a non-regulated profit maximising price, since the incumbent tries to circumvent regulation. Thus, we show that the mere threat of a regulator's intervention might prevent supernormal profits without actual price regulation. The regulator, on the other hand, can influence both investment decision and the incumbent's price via his signals on regulation probability and price. These signals an be considered optimal, if they simultaneously allow investment and minimize the incumbent's price.
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Economies of Scope in European Railways: An Efficiency Analysis
Christian Growitsch, Heike Wetzel
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 5,
2006
Abstract
In the course of railway reforms in the end of the last century, national European governments, as well the EU Commission, decided to open markets and to separate railway networks from train operations. Vertically integrated railway companies – companies owning a network and providing transport services – argue that such a separation of infrastructure and operations would diminish the advantages of vertical integration and would therefore not be suitable to raise economic welfare. In this paper, we conduct a pan-European analysis to investigate the performance of European railways with a particular focus on economies of vertical integration. We test the hypothesis that integrated railways realise economies of joint production and, thus, produce railway services on a higher level of efficiency. To determine whether joint or separate production is more efficient we apply a Data Envelopment Analysis super-efficiency bootstrapping model which relates the efficiency for integrated production to a virtual reference set consisting of the separated production technology. Our findings are that in a majority of European Railway companies exist economies of scope.
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Essays on Network Regulation – Theoretical and Empirical Evidence from the Electricity Supply Industry
Christian Growitsch
Schriften des IWH,
Nr. 21,
2005
Abstract
Mit dem Etablieren des gemeinsamen Europäischen Binnenmarktes im Laufe der 80er und 90er Jahre des vergangenen Jahrhunderts und dem damit verbundenen Wegfall von Handelsbarrieren und anderen Wettbewerbshemmnissen rückte die Liberalisierung sogenannter Netzindustrien in den Fokus der Europäischen Politik. Die Deregulierung solcher Sektoren mit physischer Netzinfrastruktur, insbesondere der Märkte für Strom, Gas, Telekommunikation und Schienenverkehr wurde zu einem wesentlichen Aspekt des Ziels der Förderung von Wettbewerb in der Europäischen Ökonomie. Die Einführung wettbewerblicher Strukturen in die ehemalig monopolistischen Netzindustrien bedingte die Notwendigkeit wettbewerbspolitischer Reformen auf nationaler und Europäischer Ebene. Insbesondere die Sicherstellung gleicher Wettbewerbsbedingungen und der Schutz der Verbraucher vor Marktmachtmißbrauch durch die etablierten Anbieter rückte in den Fokus der Wirtschaftspolitik und führte zum Aufbau sektorspezifischer Regulierungsregime. Diese unterscheiden sich deutlich sowohl sektoral wie im Hinblick auf nationale Ordnungsrahmen hinsichtlich ihrer Rahmenbedingungen, ihrer Methoden, ihrer Struktur und ihrer ökonomischen Wirkung. Der Austausch und die Übertragung von Erkenntnissen und Erfahrungen und die kontinuierliche Verbesserung bestehender institutioneller Arrangements sollte daher ein bedeutender Aspekt ökonomischer Forschung und staatlicher Wirtschaftspolitik sein. Die hier vorliegende Sammlung energieökonomischer Aufsätze zielt auf eben jenen Erkenntnistransfer ab. Dazu wird in den ersten beiden Artikeln ein spezifisches Regulierungsregime, der sogenannte verhandelte Netzzugang, und die damit verbundenen Erfahrungen aus dem deutschen Elektrizitätsmarkt vorgestellt. Ein dritter Aufsatz beschäftigt sich mit der Versorgungsqualität in Netzsektoren am Beispiel lokaler Stromverteilnetzbetreiber in einem europäischen Vergleich.
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Quality of Service, Efficiency, and Scale in Network Industries: An Analysis of European Electricity Distribution
Christian Growitsch, Tooraj Jamasb, Michael Pollitt
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 3,
2005
Abstract
Quality of service is of major economic significance in natural monopoly infrastructure industries and is increasingly addressed in regulatory schemes. However, this important aspect is generally not reflected in efficiency analysis of these industries. In this paper we present an efficiency analysis of electricity distribution networks using a sample of about 500 electricity distribution utilities from seven European countries. We apply the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) method on multi-output translog input distance function models to estimate cost and scale efficiency with and without incorporating quality of service. We show that introducing the quality dimension into the analysis affects estimated efficiency significantly. In contrast to previous research, smaller utilities seem to indicate lower technical efficiency when incorporating quality. We also show that incorporating quality of service does not alter scale economy measures. Our results emphasise that quality of service should be an integrated part of efficiency analysis and incentive regulation regimes, as well as in the economic review of market concentration in regulated natural monopolies.
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Negotiated Third Party Access - an Industrial Organisation Perspective
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
European Journal of Law and Economics,
2005
Abstract
In the course of the liberalization of European energy markets, the German government opted – diverging from all other European countries – for Negotiated Third-Party Access. In this article we analyze if, theoretically, this institutional regime can be superior to regulation. We review empirically whether certain aspects of the actual implementation, in particular publication of the network access charges for each network supplier, facilitated or inhibited competition. In the first place we reconsider previous research, showing that NTPA can – under certain conditions – be economically effective. Our empirical analysis shows that the duty of publishing access charges supported market transparency and imposed a regulatory threat, particularly to suppliers with significantly above-average charges. On the other hand observable price adjustments over time serve as an indicator of tacit collusion. Although the expensive suppliers cut their prices, the cheaper ones raised theirs.
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Network Access Charges, Vertical Integration, and Property Rights Structure
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Energy Economics,
Nr. 2,
2005
Abstract
After the deregulation of the German electricity markets in 1998, the German government opted for a regulatory regime called negotiated third party access, which would be subject to ex post control by the federal cartel office. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers. As the electricity networks are incontestable natural monopolies, the local and regional network operators are able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, limited only by their concerns over possible interference by the federal cartel office (Bundeskartellamt). In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for varying charging behaviour depending on a supplier`s economic independence (structure of property rights) or its level of vertical integration. For this purpose we hypothesise that incorporated and vertically integrated suppliers set different charges than independent utility companies. Multivariate estimations show a relation between network access charges and the network operator’s economic independence as well as level of vertical integration. On the low voltage level, for an estimated annual consumption of 1700 kW/h, vertically integrated firms set – as predicted by our hypothesis - significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers. There is insufficient evidence available to confirm these results for other consumptions or voltage levels.
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The Contestable Markets Theory - Efficient Advice for Economic Policy
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Externe Publikationen,
2004
Abstract
During the nineties of the last century several formerly monopolistic markets (telecommunication, electricity, gas, and railway) have been deregulated in Germany based on European directives and theoretically inspired by the theory of contestable markets. The original contestable market theory implied three assumptions necessary to be satisfied to establish potential competition: Free market entry, market exit possible without any costs, and the price adjustment lag exceeding the entry lag. Our analysis shows that if the incumbent reduces its prices slowly (high adjustment lag) and the market entry can be performed quickly (low entry lag), a new competitor will be able to earn back sunk costs. Therefore it is not necessary that all three conditions be complied with for potential competition to exist. Applying this „revised“ contestable market theory to the deregulated sectors in Germany, natural monopolies can be identified in telecommunication sections local loops and local/regional connection networks, in the national electricity grid and the regional/local electricity distribution networks, in the national and regional/local gas transmission/distribution sections, and in the railroad network. These sections are not contestable due to sunk costs, expected high entry lags and a probably short price adjustment lag. They are identified as bottlenecks, which should be regulated. The function of system operators in energy and railroad are closely related to the non-contestable monopolistic networks.
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The influence of Vertical Integration and Property Rights on Network Access Charges in the German Electricity Markets
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Externe Publikationen,
Nr. 6,
2004
Abstract
German Electricity markets were deregulated in the late nineties of the last century. In contrast to other European countries, the German government enacted negotiated third party access instead of installing a regulation authority. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers, which specify the calculation schemes for access charges. Local and regional suppliers are nevertheless able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, restricted only by the possibility of interference competition authorities. While some of those suppliers have been acquired by one of the four Transmission System Operators and become vertically integrated, the majority is still independent public utility companies. In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for different charging behaviour depending on the supplier’s economic independence or its level of vertical integration. Controlling for other coefficients as the so called structural features and related cost differences as well as the influence of competition law suits, multivariate estimations show significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers for at least one typical case.
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