Evaluating communication strategies for public agencies: transparency, opacity, and secrecy
Axel Lindner
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 8,
2008
Abstract
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects stemming
from different communication strategies of public agencies if strategies of agents are complementary to each other: communication can either be fully transparent, or the agency opaquely publishes only its overall assessment of the economy, or it keeps information completely secret. It is shown that private agents put more weight to their private information in the transparent case than in case of opacity. Thus, in many cases, the appropriate measure against overreliance on public information is giving more details to the public instead of denying access to public information.
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Does too much Transparency of Central Banks Prevent Agents from Using their Private Information Efficiently?
Axel Lindner
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 16,
2007
Abstract
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects of different communication strategies of a central bank: it can either publish no more than its overall assessment of the economy or be more transparent, giving detailed reasons for this assessment. The latter strategy is shown to be superior because it enables agents to use private information and to be less dependent on common knowledge. This result holds true even if the strategies of agents are strategic complements, for which case it has been argued that too much transparency might induce agents to neglect their private knowledge.
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Investment, Financial Markets, New Economy Dynamics and Growth in Transition Countries
Albrecht Kauffmann, P. J. J. Welfens
Economic Opening Up and Growth in Russia: Finance, Trade, Market Institutions, and Energy,
2004
Abstract
The transition to a market economy in the former CMEA area is more than a decade old and one can clearly distinguish a group of relatively fast growing countries — including Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia — and a majority of slowly growing economies, including Russia and the Ukraine. Initial problems of transition were natural in the sense that systemic transition to a market economy has effectively destroyed part of the existing capital stock that was no longer profitable under the new relative prices imported from world markets; and there was a transitory inflationary push as low state-administered prices were replaced by higher market equilibrium prices. Indeed, systemic transformation in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have brought serious transitory inflation problems and a massive transition recession; negative growth rates have continued over many years in some countries, including Russia and the Ukraine, where output growth was negative throughout the 1990s (except for Russia, which recorded slight growth in 1997). For political and economic reasons the economic performance of Russia is of particular relevance for the success of the overall transition process. If Russia would face stagnation and instability, this would undermine political and economic stability in the whole of Europe and prospects for integrating Russia into the world economy.
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