Schätzunsicherheit oder Korrelation, Welche Risikokomponente sollten Unternehmen bei der Bewertung von Kreditportfoliorisiken wann berücksichtigen?
Henry Dannenberg
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 5,
2007
Abstract
Die Bewertung der Ausfallwahrscheinlichkeiten von Ratingklassen, basierend auf historischen Daten, ist mit Schätzunsicherheit verbunden. Zur Bewertung dieser Unsicherheit werden in der Literatur Konfidenzintervalle diskutiert. Diesen liegen allerdings Annahmen bezüglich der Abhängigkeiten zwischen einzelnen Forderungen zugrunde, die im Widerspruch zu den Annahmen der gängigen Kreditportfoliomodelle stehen. Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird anhand von Simulationsstudien gezeigt, dass eine Berücksichtigung von Schätzunsicherheit in kleinen Portfolios gerechtfertigt sein kann, auch wenn dafür Abhängigkeiten vernachlässigt werden müssen. Die Modellierung der Schätzunsicherheit beruht hier auf der Idee der Konfidenzintervalle und der ihnen zugrundeliegenden Verteilungen. Die Ergebnisse der Arbeit sind vor allem für die Modellierung von Forderungsportfolios in Unternehmen von Interesse.
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Bank Lending, Bank Capital Regulation and Efficiency of Corporate Foreign Investment
Diemo Dietrich, Achim Hauck
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 4,
2007
Abstract
In this paper we study interdependencies between corporate foreign investment and the capital structure of banks. By committing to invest predominantly at home, firms can reduce the credit default risk of their lending banks. Therefore, banks can refinance loans to a larger extent through deposits thereby reducing firms’ effective financing costs. Firms thus have an incentive to allocate resources inefficiently as they then save on financing costs. We argue that imposing minimum capital adequacy for banks can eliminate this incentive by putting a lower bound on financing costs. However, the Basel II framework is shown to miss this potential.
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Cross-border Bank Contagion in Europe
Reint E. Gropp, M. Lo Duca, Jukka M. Vesala
ECB Working Paper, No. 662,
Nr. 662,
2006
Abstract
This paper analyses cross-border contagion in a sample of European banks from January 1994 to January 2003. We use a multinomial logit model to estimate the number of banks in a given country that experience a large shock on the same day (“coexceedances“) as a function of variables measuring common shocks and lagged coexceedances in other countries. Large shocks are measured by the bottom 95th percentile of the distribution of the daily percentage change in the distance to default of the bank. We find evidence in favour of significant cross-border contagion. We also find some evidence that since the introduction of the euro cross-border contagion may have increased. The results seem to be very robust to changes in the specification.
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Network Investment and the Threat of Regulation – Preventing Monopoly Exploitation or Infrastructure Construction?
Ulrich Blum, Christian Growitsch, Niels Krap
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 7,
2006
Abstract
In summer 2005, the German telecommunication incumbent Deutsche Telekom announced its plans to build a new broadband fibre optics network. Deutsche Telekom decided as precondition for this new network not to be regulated with respect to pricing and third party access. To develop a regulator's strategy that allows investments and prevents monopolistic prices at the same time, we model an incumbent's decision problem under a threat of regulation in a game-theoretical context. The decision whether to invest or not depends on the probability of regulation and its assumed impact on investment returns. Depending on the incumbent's expectation on these parameters, he will decide if the investment is favourable, and which price to best set. This price is below a non-regulated profit maximising price, since the incumbent tries to circumvent regulation. Thus, we show that the mere threat of a regulator's intervention might prevent supernormal profits without actual price regulation. The regulator, on the other hand, can influence both investment decision and the incumbent's price via his signals on regulation probability and price. These signals an be considered optimal, if they simultaneously allow investment and minimize the incumbent's price.
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Equity and Bond Market Signals as Leading Indicators of Bank Fragility
Reint E. Gropp, Jukka M. Vesala, Giuseppe Vulpes
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
Nr. 2,
2006
Abstract
We analyse the ability of the distance to default and subordinated bond spreads to signal bank fragility in a sample of EU banks. We find leading properties for both indicators. The distance to default exhibits lead times of 6-18 months. Spreads have signal value close to problems only. We also find that implicit safety nets weaken the predictive power of spreads. Further, the results suggest complementarity between both indicators. We also examine the interaction of the indicators with other information and find that their additional information content may be small but not insignificant. The results suggest that market indicators reduce type II errors relative to predictions based on accounting information only.
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Industry Level Technology Gaps and Complementary Knowledge Stocks as Determinants of Intra-MNC Knowledge Flows
Björn Jindra, Johannes Stephan
East-West Journal of Economics and Business,
1 & 2
2005
Abstract
Pursuing a subsidiary level analysis, we this paper tests the ‘technology gap’ hypothesis in the context of intra-MNC knowledge flows. Furthermore, it introduces complementary knowledge stocks into the concept of absorptive capacity. A set of hypotheses is tested in sample 434 foreign subsidiaries based in Central and East Europe. We find partial support for the ‘technology gap’ hypothesis applied at industry level. Furthermore, subsidiaries’ complementary knowledge stocks increase the probability for corresponding knowledge inflows from the foreign parent.
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Factors accounting for the enactment of a competition law – an empirical analysis
Franz Kronthaler, Johannes Stephan
Einzelveröffentlichungen,
Nr. 6,
2005
Abstract
The paper is concerned with the factors that account for decisions to enact a national competition law. In a first step, the paper updates and enlarges the existing data bases of countries that have enacted a competition law. The paper then identifies and discusses possible factors that influence the decision to enact a competition law. In a third step, the method of panel-data logit analysis is employed to test a set of hypothesis pertaining to the factors across the time dimension and across countries. The results of this analysis are interpreted in terms of significance and in terms of the sign of their influence on the probability of a country to enact. Given generality of the analysis, the results can shed light on the probability of individual countries, and in particular developing countries, to actually take the step of enactment.
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Measurement of Contagion in Banks' Equity Prices
Reint E. Gropp, G. Moerman
Journal of International Money and Finance,
Nr. 3,
2004
Abstract
This paper uses the co-incidence of extreme shocks to banks’ risk to examine within-country and across country contagion among large EU banks. Banks’ risk is measured by the first difference of weekly distances to default and abnormal returns. Using Monte Carlo simulations, the paper examines whether the observed frequency of large shocks experienced by two or more banks simultaneously is consistent with the assumption of a multivariate normal or a student t distribution. Further, the paper proposes a simple metric, which is used to identify contagion from one bank to another and identify “systemically important” banks in the EU.
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Price Competition between an Expert and a Non-Expert
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Nr. 6,
2000
Abstract
This paper characterizes price competition between an expert and a non-expert. In contrast with the expert, the non-expert's repair technology is not always successful. Consumers visit the expert after experiencing an unsuccessful match at the non-expert. This re-entry affects the behavior of both sellers. For low enough probability of successful repair at the non-expert, all consumers first visit the non-expert, and a 'timid-pricing' equilibrium results. If the non-expert's repair technology performs well enough, it pays for some consumers to disregard the non-expert a visit. They directly go to the expert's shop, and an 'aggressive-pricing' equilibrium pops up. For intermediate values of the non-expert's successful repair a 'mixed-pricing' equilibrium emerges where the expert randomizes over the monopoly price and some lower price.
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