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Georg Neuschäffer

Georg Neuschäffer
Aktuelle Position

seit 10/16

Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter der Abteilung Strukturwandel und Produktivität

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

Forschungsschwerpunkte
  • angewandte Ökonometrie
  • Arbeitsmarktökonomik
  • betriebliche Produktivität

Georg Neuschäffer ist seit Oktober 2016 Doktorand in der Abteilung Strukturwandel und Produktivität. Er forscht zu den Themen Arbeitsmarktökonomik und angewandte Ökonometrie.

Georg Neuschäffer absolvierte seinen Bachelor an der Georg-August-Universität Göttingen und seinen Master an der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg. Er verbrachte ein Auslandssemster an der Università di Bologna.

Ihr Kontakt

Georg Neuschäffer
Georg Neuschäffer
Mitglied - Abteilung Strukturwandel und Produktivität
Nachricht senden +49 345 7753-869

Publikationen

Alle referierten Publikationen durchsuchen

Arbeitspapiere

Organised Labour, Labour Market Imperfections, and Employer Wage Premia

Sabien Dobbelaer Boris Hirsch Steffen Müller Georg Neuschäffer

in: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, Nr. 20, 2020

Abstract

This paper examines how collective bargaining through unions and workplace co-determination through works councils shape labour market imperfections and how labourmarket imperfections matter for employer wage premia. Based on representative Germanplant data for the years 1999{2016, we document that labour market imperfections arethe norm rather than the exception. Wage mark-downs, that is wages below the marginalrevenue product of labour rooted in employers' monopsony power, are the most prevalentoutcome. We further nd that both types of organised labour are accompanied by asmaller prevalence and intensity of wage mark-downs whereas the opposite holds for wagemark-ups, that is wages above the marginal revenue product of labour rooted in workers'monopoly power. Finally, we document a close link between our production-based labourmarket imperfection measures and employer wage premia. The prevalence and intensityof wage mark-downs are associated with a smaller level and larger dispersion of premiawhereas wage mark-ups are only accompanied by a higher premium level.

Publikation lesen
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Organised Labour, Labour Market Imperfections, and Employer Wage Premia

Sabien Dobbelaer Boris Hirsch Steffen Müller Georg Neuschäffer

in: IZA Discussion Paper, Nr. 13909, 2020

Abstract

This paper examines how collective bargaining through unions and workplace co-determination through works councils shape labour market imperfections and how labourmarket imperfections matter for employer wage premia. Based on representative Germanplant data for the years 1999{2016, we document that labour market imperfections arethe norm rather than the exception. Wage mark-downs, that is wages below the marginalrevenue product of labour rooted in employers' monopsony power, are the most prevalentoutcome. We further nd that both types of organised labour are accompanied by asmaller prevalence and intensity of wage mark-downs whereas the opposite holds for wagemark-ups, that is wages above the marginal revenue product of labour rooted in workers'monopoly power. Finally, we document a close link between our production-based labourmarket imperfection measures and employer wage premia. The prevalence and intensityof wage mark-downs are associated with a smaller level and larger dispersion of premiawhereas wage mark-ups are only accompanied by a higher premium level.

Publikation lesen
cover_DP_2020-11.jpg

Worker Participation in Decision-making, Worker Sorting, and Firm Performance

Steffen Müller Georg Neuschäffer

in: IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 11, 2020

Abstract

Worker participation in decision-making is often associated with high-wage and high-productivity firm strategies. Using linked-employer-employee data for Germany and worker fixed effects from a two-way fixed effects model of wages capturing observed and unobserved worker quality, we find that establishments with formal worker participation via works councils indeed employ higher-quality workers. We show that worker quality is already higher in plants before council introduction and further increases after the introduction. Importantly, we corroborate previous studies by showing positive productivity and profitability effects even after taking into account worker sorting.

Publikation lesen
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