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Georg Neuschäffer

Georg Neuschäffer
Aktuelle Position

seit 10/21

Junior Research Affiliate

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

seit 10/16

Doktorand

Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg

Forschungsschwerpunkte
  • angewandte Ökonometrie
  • Arbeitsmarktökonomik
  • betriebliche Produktivität

Georg Neuschäffer ist seit Oktober 2021 Junior Research Affiliate am IWH. Er forscht zu den Themen Arbeitsmarktökonomik und angewandte Ökonometrie.

Georg Neuschäffer absolvierte seinen Bachelor an der Georg-August-Universität Göttingen und seinen Master an der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg. Er verbrachte ein Auslandssemster an der Università di Bologna und promoviert nun an der Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg.

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Georg Neuschäffer
Georg Neuschäffer
Mitglied - Abteilung Strukturwandel und Produktivität
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Publikationen

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Worker Participation in Decision-making, Worker Sorting, and Firm Performance

Steffen Müller Georg Neuschäffer

in: Industrial Relations, Nr. 4, 2021

Abstract

Worker participation in decision-making is often associated with high-wage and high-productivity firm strategies. Using linked employer–employee data for Germany and worker fixed effects from a two-way fixed-effects model of wages capturing observed and unobserved worker quality, we find that plants with formal worker participation via works councils indeed employ higher quality workers. We show that worker quality is already higher in plants before council introduction and further increases after the introduction. Importantly, we corroborate previous studies by showing positive productivity and profitability effects even after taking into account worker sorting.

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Arbeitspapiere

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Organised Labour, Labour Market Imperfections, and Employer Wage Premia

Sabien Dobbelaere Boris Hirsch Steffen Müller Georg Neuschäffer

in: IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 20, 2022

Abstract

This paper examines how collective bargaining through unions and workplace codetermination through works councils shape labour market imperfections and how labour market imperfections matter for employer wage premia. Based on representative German plant data for the years 1999–2016, we document that employer monopsony involving below competitive wages is far more prevalent than the contrary worker monopoly. We further find a smaller prevalence and intensity of employer monopsony when unions or works councils are present and the opposite for worker monopoly. Finally, we document a close link between labour market imperfections and employer wage premia. The presence and intensity of employer monopsony are associated with a lower level and larger dispersion of premia, whereas more intense worker monopoly is accompanied by a higher level only.

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Identifying Rent-sharing Using Firms‘ Energy Input Mix

Matthias Mertens Steffen Müller Georg Neuschäffer

in: IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 19, 2022

Abstract

We present causal evidence on the rent-sharing elasticity of German manufacturing firms. We develop a new firm-level Bartik instrument for firm rents that combines the firms‘ predetermined energy input mix with national energy carrier price changes. Reduced-form evidence shows that higher energy prices depress wages. Instrumental variable estimation yields a rent-sharing elasticity of approximately 0.20. Rent-sharing induced by energy price variation is asymmetric and driven by energy price increases, implying that workers do not benefit from energy price reductions but are harmed by price increases. The rent-sharing elasticity is substantially larger in small (0.26) than in large (0.17) firms.

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Organised Labour, Labour Market Imperfections, and Employer Wage Premia

Sabien Dobbelaer Boris Hirsch Steffen Müller Georg Neuschäffer

in: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, Nr. 81, 2020

Abstract

This paper examines how collective bargaining through unions and workplace co-determination through works councils shape labour market imperfections and how labourmarket imperfections matter for employer wage premia. Based on representative Germanplant data for the years 1999{2016, we document that labour market imperfections arethe norm rather than the exception. Wage mark-downs, that is wages below the marginalrevenue product of labour rooted in employers' monopsony power, are the most prevalentoutcome. We further nd that both types of organised labour are accompanied by asmaller prevalence and intensity of wage mark-downs whereas the opposite holds for wagemark-ups, that is wages above the marginal revenue product of labour rooted in workers'monopoly power. Finally, we document a close link between our production-based labourmarket imperfection measures and employer wage premia. The prevalence and intensityof wage mark-downs are associated with a smaller level and larger dispersion of premiawhereas wage mark-ups are only accompanied by a higher premium level.

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