Moritz Stieglitz

Moritz Stieglitz
Aktuelle Position

seit 2/17

Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter der Abteilung Finanzmärkte

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

Forschungsschwerpunkte

  • Finanzmarktstabilität und Bankenregulierung
  • reale Auswirkungen auf Geldpolitik und Wirtschaftspolitik
  • Banken- und Staatsschuldenkrisen

Moritz Stieglitz ist seit Februar 2017 Doktorand in der Abteilung Finanzmärkte. Seine Forschungsinteressen liegen in den Bereichen Finanzstabilität, unkonventionelle Geldpolitik und makroprudenzielle Regulierung.

Moritz Stieglitz studierte an der Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf und an der Goethe-Universität Frankfurt.

Ihr Kontakt

Moritz Stieglitz
Moritz Stieglitz
Mitglied - Abteilung Finanzmärkte
Nachricht senden +49 345 7753-840

Publikationen

Arbeitspapiere

cover_DP_2019-15.jpg

Firm-level Employment, Labour Market Reforms, and Bank Distress

Ralph Setzer Moritz Stieglitz

in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 15, 2019

Abstract

We explore the interaction between labour market reforms and financial frictions. Our study combines a new cross-country reform database on labour market reforms with matched firm-bank data for nine euro area countries over the period 1999 to 2013. While we find that labour market reforms are overall effective in increasing employment, restricted access to bank credit can undo up to half of long-term employment gains at the firm-level. Entrepreneurs without sufficient access to credit cannot reap the full benefits of more flexible employment regulation.

Publikation lesen

cover_DP_2019-03.jpg

Benign Neglect of Covenant Violations: Blissful Banking or Ignorant Monitoring?

Stefano Colonnello Michael Koetter Moritz Stieglitz

in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 3, 2019

Abstract

Theoretically, bank‘s loan monitoring activity hinges critically on its capitalisation. To proxy for monitoring intensity, we use changes in borrowers‘ investment following loan covenant violations, when creditors can intervene in the governance of the firm. Exploiting granular bank-firm relationships observed in the syndicated loan market, we document substantial heterogeneity in monitoring across banks and through time. Better capitalised banks are more lenient monitors that intervene less with covenant violators. Importantly, this hands-off approach is associated with improved borrowers‘ performance. Beyond enhancing financial resilience, regulation that requires banks to hold more capital may thus also mitigate the tightening of credit terms when firms experience shocks.

Publikation lesen
Mitglied der Leibniz-Gemeinschaft LogoTotal-Equality-LogoWeltoffen Logo