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CompNet Database
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Evidenzbasierte Politikberatung (IWH-CEP)
Zentrum für evidenzbasierte Politikberatung (IWH-CEP) ...
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Arbeitspapiere
Macroeconomic Effects from Sovereign Risk vs. Knightian Uncertainty ...
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14.02.2023 • 4/2023
IWH-Studie zu Europas Top-Bankern: Riskante Geschäfte trotz Boni-Obergrenze
Vor zehn Jahren beschloss das EU-Parlament, die flexible Vergütung von Bankmanagern zu deckeln. Doch die Obergrenze für Boni verfehlt ihr Ziel: Manager systemrelevanter europäischer Banken gehen unverändert hohe Risiken ein, zeigt eine Studie des Leibniz-Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH).
Michael Koetter
Pressemitteilung lesen
What Explains International Interest Rate Co-Movement?
Annika Camehl, Gregor von Schweinitz
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 3,
2023
Abstract
We show that global supply and demand shocks are important drivers of interest rate co-movement across seven advanced economies. Beyond that, local structural shocks transmit internationally via aggregate demand channels, and central banks react predominantly to domestic macroeconomic developments: unexpected monetary policy tightening decreases most foreign interest rates, while expansionary local supply and demand shocks increase them. To disentangle determinants of international interest rate co-movement, we use a Bayesian structural panel vector autoregressive model accounting for latent global supply and demand shocks. We identify country-specific structural shocks via informative prior distributions based on a standard theoretical multi-country open economy model.
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Firm Subsidies, Financial Intermediation, and Bank Stability
Aleksandr Kazakov, Michael Koetter, Mirko Titze, Lena Tonzer
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 24,
2022
Abstract
We use granular project-level information for the largest regional economic development program in German history to study whether government subsidies to firms affect the quantity and quality of bank lending. We combine the universe of recipient firms under the Improvement of Regional Economic Structures program (GRW) with their local banks during 1998-2019. The modalities of GRW subsidies to firms are determined at the EU level. Therefore, we use it to identify bank outcomes. Banks with relationships to more subsidized firms exhibit higher lending volumes without any significant differences in bank stability. Subsidized firms, in turn, borrow more indicating that banks facilitate regional economic development policies.
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A Note of Caution on Quantifying Banks' Recapitalization Effects
Felix Noth, Kirsten Schmidt, Lena Tonzer
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
Nr. 4,
2022
Abstract
Unconventional monetary policy measures like asset purchase programs aim to reduce certain securities' yield and alter financial institutions' investment behavior. These measures increase the institutions' market value of securities and add to their equity positions. We show that the extent of this recapitalization effect crucially depends on the securities' accounting and valuation methods, country-level regulation, and maturity structure. We argue that future research needs to consider these factors when quantifying banks' recapitalization effects and consequent changes in banks' lending decisions to the real sector.
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Social Capital, Trusting, and Trustworthiness: Evidence from Peer-to-Peer Lending
Iftekhar Hasan, Qing He, Haitian Lu
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
Nr. 4,
2022
Abstract
How does social capital affect trust? Evidence from a Chinese peer-to-peer lending platform shows regional social capital affects the trustee’s trustworthiness and the trustor’s trust propensity. Ceteris paribus, borrowers from higher social capital regions receive larger bid from individual lenders, have higher funding success, larger loan size, and lower default rates, especially for low-quality borrowers. Lenders from higher social capital regions take higher risks and have higher default rates, especially for inexperienced lenders. Cross-regional transactions are most (least) likely to be realized between parties from high (low) social capital regions.
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