26.06.2014 • 18/2014
Kernkapitalquoten deutscher Banken seit der Finanzkrise angestiegen
Seit der Finanzkrise haben die deutschen Banken ihre Kernkapitalquote im Zeitverlauf deutlich erhöht. Dies zeigt eine Auswertung der Geschäfts- bzw. Finanzberichte ausgewählter Finanzinstitute durch das IWH. Der Aufwärtstrend setzte sich mit wenigen Ausnahmen bis zum vierten Quartal 2013 fort. Diese Entwicklung ist vermutlich auch auf die Anforderungen der EU-Stresstests zurückzuführen. Nur jene Banken hatten den Stresstest bestanden, die nach Abzug der simulierten Verluste mindestens eine harte Kernkapitalquote von 6% (im Jahr 2010) bzw. 5% (2011) aufweisen konnten. Jüngste Daten der privaten Geschäftsbanken weisen für das erste Quartal 2014 allerdings einen Rückgang der Quoten aus. Da nicht die aktuellen Zahlen, sondern die des vierten Quartals 2013 in die aktuelle Bilanzqualitätsprüfung (Asset Quality Review) der Europäischen Zentralbank und den sich anschließenden erneuten Stresstest eingehen, scheint für die Banken aktuell kein Anreiz zu bestehen, die Kernkapitalquoten auf dem hohen Niveau zu belassen.
Felix Noth
Pressemitteilung herunterladen
Hidden Gems and Borrowers with Dirty Little Secrets: Investment in Soft Information, Borrower Self-Selection and Competition
Reint E. Gropp, C. Gruendl, Andre Guettler
Abstract
This paper empirically examines the role of soft information in the competitive interaction between relationship and transaction banks. Soft information can be interpreted as a private signal about the quality of a firm that is observable to a relationship bank, but not to a transaction bank. We show that borrowers self-select to relationship banks depending on whether their privately observed soft information is positive or negative. Competition affects the investment in learning the private signal from firms by relationship banks and transaction banks asymmetrically. Relationship banks invest more; transaction banks invest less in soft information, exacerbating the selection effect. Finally, we show that firms where soft information was important in the lending decision were no more likely to default compared to firms where only financial information was used.
Artikel Lesen
Corporate Boards and Bank Loan Contracting
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Michael Koetter, Qiang Wu
Journal of Financial Research,
Nr. 4,
2012
Abstract
We investigate the role of corporate boards in bank loan contracting. We find that when corporate boards are more independent, both price and nonprice loan terms (e.g., interest rates, collateral, covenants, and performance-pricing provisions) are more favorable, and syndicated loans comprise more lenders. In addition, board size, audit committee structure, and other board characteristics influence bank loan prices. However, they do not consistently affect all nonprice loan terms except for audit committee independence. Our study provides strong evidence that banks recognize the benefits of board monitoring in mitigating information risk ex ante and controlling agency risk ex post, and they reward higher quality boards with more favorable loan contract terms.
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Stale Information, Shocks, and Volatility
Reint E. Gropp, A. Kadareja
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
Nr. 6,
2012
Abstract
We propose a new approach to measuring the effect of unobservable private information on volatility. Using intraday data, we estimate the effect of a well-identified shock on the volatility of stock returns of European banks as a function of the quality of public information available about the banks. We hypothesize that as publicly available information becomes stale, volatility effects and its persistence increase, as private information of investors becomes more important. We find strong support for this idea in the data. We further show that stock volatility is higher just before important announcements if information is stale.
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Do Government Owned Banks Trade Market Power for Slack?
Andreas Hackethal, Michael Koetter, Oliver Vins
Applied Economics,
Nr. 33,
2012
Abstract
The ‘Quiet Life Hypothesis (QLH)’ posits that banks with market power have less incentives to maximize revenues and minimize cost. Especially government owned banks with a public mandate precluding profit maximization might succumb to a quiet life. We use a unified approach that simultaneously measures market power and efficiency to test the quiet life hypothesis of German savings banks. We find that average local market power declined between 1996 and 2006. Cost and profit efficiency remained constant. Nonparametric correlations are consistent with a quiet life regarding cost efficiency but not regarding profit efficiency. The quiet life on the cost side is negatively correlated with bank size, quality of loan portfolio and local per capita income. The last result indicates that the quiet cost life is therefore potentially due to benevolent excess consumption of local input factors by public savings banks.
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Finance and Growth in a Bank-Based Economy: Is It Quantity or Quality that Matters?
Michael Koetter, Michael Wedow
Journal of International Money and Finance,
Nr. 8,
2010
Abstract
Most finance–growth studies approximate the size of financial systems rather than the quality of intermediation to explain economic growth differentials. Furthermore, the neglect of systematic differences in cross-country studies could drive the result that finance matters. We suggest a measure of bank’s intermediation quality using bank-specific efficiency estimates and focus on the regions of one economy only: Germany. This quality measure has a significantly positive effect on growth. This result is robust to the exclusion of banks operating in multiple regions, controlling for the proximity of financial markets, when distinguishing different banking sectors active in Germany, and when excluding the structurally weaker East from the sample.
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Real Estate Prices and Bank Stability
Michael Koetter, Tigran Poghosyan
Journal of Banking and Finance,
Nr. 34,
2010
Abstract
Real estate prices can deviate from their fundamental value due to rigid supply, heterogeneity in quality, and various market imperfections, which have two contrasting effects on bank stability. Higher prices increase the value of collateral and net wealth of borrowers and thus reduce the likelihood of credit defaults. In contrast, persistent deviations from fundamentals may foster the adverse selection of increasingly risky creditors by banks seeking to expand their loan portfolios, which increases bank distress probabilities. We test these hypotheses using unique data on real estate markets and banks in Germany. House price deviations contribute to bank instability, but nominal house price developments do not. This finding corroborates the importance of deviations from the fundamental value of real estate, rather than just price levels or changes alone, when assessing bank stability.
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Regional Growth and Finance in Europe: Is there a Quality Effect of Bank Efficiency?
Iftekhar Hasan, Michael Koetter, Michael Wedow
Journal of Banking and Finance,
Nr. 8,
2009
Abstract
In this study, we test whether regional growth in 11 European countries depends on financial development and suggest the use of cost- and profit-efficiency estimates as quality measures of financial institutions. Contrary to the usual quantitative proxies of financial development, the quality of financial institutions is measured in this study as the relative ability of banks to intermediate funds. An improvement in bank efficiency spurs five times more regional growth then an identical increase in credit does. More credit provided by efficient banks exerts an independent growth effect in addition to direct quantity and quality channel effects.
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Effects of Heterogeneity on Bank Efficiency Scores
J. W. B. Bos, Michael Koetter, James W. Kolari, Clemens J. M. Kool
European Journal of Operational Research,
Nr. 1,
2009
Abstract
Bank efficiency estimates often serve as a proxy of managerial skill since they quantify sub-optimal production choices. But such deviations can also be due to omitted systematic differences among banks. In this study, we examine the effects of heterogeneity on bank efficiency scores. We compare different specifications of a stochastic cost and alternative profit frontier model with a baseline specification. After conducting a specification test, we discuss heterogeneity effects on efficiency levels, ranks and the tails of the efficiency distribution. We find that heterogeneity controls influence both banks’ optimal costs and profits and their ability to be efficient. Differences in efficiency scores are important for more than only methodological reasons. First, different ways of accounting for heterogeneity result in estimates of foregone profits and additional costs that are significantly different from what we infer from our general specification. Second, banks are significantly re-ranked when their efficiency is estimated with a specification other than the preferred, general specification. Third, the general specification gives the most reliable estimates of the probability of distress, although differences to the other specifications are low.
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Accounting for Distress in Bank Mergers
Michael Koetter, J. W. B. Bos, Frank Heid, James W. Kolari, Clemens J. M. Kool, Daniel Porath
Journal of Banking and Finance,
Nr. 10,
2007
Abstract
Most bank merger studies do not control for hidden bailouts, which may lead to biased results. In this study we employ a unique data set of approximately 1000 mergers to analyze the determinants of bank mergers. We use undisclosed information on banks’ regulatory intervention history to distinguish between distressed and non-distressed mergers. Among merging banks, we find that improving financial profiles lower the likelihood of distressed mergers more than the likelihood of non-distressed mergers. The likelihood to acquire a bank is also reduced but less than the probability to be acquired. Both distressed and non-distressed mergers have worse CAMEL profiles than non-merging banks. Hence, non-distressed mergers may be motivated by the desire to forestall serious future financial distress and prevent regulatory intervention.
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