The Corona Recession and Bank Stress in Germany
Reint E. Gropp, Michael Koetter, William McShane
IWH Online,
Nr. 4,
2020
Abstract
We conduct stress tests for a large sample of German banks across different recoveries from the Corona recession. We find that, depending on how quickly the economy recovers, between 6% to 28% of banks could become distressed from defaulting corporate borrowers alone. Many of these banks are likely to require regulatory intervention or may even fail. Even in our most optimistic scenario, bank capital ratios decline by nearly 24%. The sum of total loans held by distressed banks could plausibly range from 127 to 624 billion Euros and it may take years before the full extent of this stress is observable. Hence, the current recession could result in an acute contraction in lending to the real economy, thereby worsening the current recession , decelerating the recovery, or perhaps even causing a “double dip” recession. Additionally, we show that the corporate portfolio of savings and cooperative banks is more than five times as exposed to small firms as that of commercial banks and Landesbanken. The preliminary evidence indicates small firms are particularly exposed to the current crisis, which implies that cooperative and savings banks are at especially high risk of becoming distressed. Given that the financial difficulties may seriously impair the recovery from the Covid-19 crisis, the pressure to bail out large parts of the banking system will be strong. Recent research suggests that the long run benefits of largely resisting these pressures may be high and could result in a more efficient economy.
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Corona Shutdown and Bankruptcy Risk
Oliver Holtemöller, Yaz Gulnur Muradoglu
IWH Online,
Nr. 3,
2020
Abstract
This paper investigates the consequences of shutdowns during the Corona crisis on the risk of bankruptcy for firms in Germany and United Kingdom. We use financial statements from the period 2014 to 2018 to predict how pervasive risk of bankruptcy becomes for micro, small, medium, and large firms due to shutdown measures. We estimate distress for firms using their capacity to service their debt. Our results indicate that under three months of shutdown almost all firms in shutdown industries face high risk of bankruptcy. In Germany, about 99% of firms in shutdown industries and in the UK about 98% of firms in shutdown industries are predicted to be under distress. The furlough schemes reduce the risk of bankruptcy only marginally to 97% of firms in shutdown industries in Germany and 95% of firms in shutdown industries in the United Kingdom in case of a three-month shutdown. In sectors that are not shutdown under conservative estimates of contagion of sales losses, our results indicate considerable risk of widespread bankruptcies ranging from 76% of firms in Germany to 69% of firms in the United Kingdom. These early findings suggest that the impact of corona crisis on corporate sector via shutdowns can be severe and subsequent policy should be designed accordingly.
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Phillips Curve and Output Expectations: New Perspectives from the Euro Zone
Giuliana Passamani, Alessandro Sardone, Roberto Tamborini
DEM Working Papers,
Nr. 6,
2020
publiziert in: Empirica
Abstract
When referring to the inflation trends over the last decade, economists speak of "puzzles": a “missing disinflation” puzzle in the aftermath of the Great Recession, and a ”missing inflation” one in the years of recovery to nowadays. To this, a specific "excess deflation" puzzle may be added during the post-crisis depression in the Euro Zone. The standard Phillips Curve model, in this context, has failed as the basic tool to produce reliable forecasts of future price developments, leading many scholars to consider this instrument to be no more adequate. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to this literature through the development of a newly specified Phillips Curve model, in which the inflation-expectation component is rationally related to the business cycle. The model is tested with the Euro Zone data 1999-2019 showing that inflation turns out to be consistently determined by output gaps and and experts' survey-based forecast errors, and that the puzzles can be explained by the interplay between these two variables.
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Firm Productivity Report
Johannes Amlung, Tommaso Bighelli, Roman Blyzniuk, Marco Christophori, Jonathan Deist, Filippo di Mauro, Annalisa Ferrando, Mirja Hälbig, Peter Haug, Sergio Inferrera, Tibor Lalinsky, Phillip Meinen, Marc Melitz, Matthias Mertens, Ottavia Papagalli, Verena Plümpe, Roberta Serafini
CompNet - The Competitive Research Network,
2020
Abstract
As we enter a second phase of the COVID-pandemic, in which we attempt to reopen economies and foster growth, investigating the efficiency and productivity of firms becomes essential if we wish to design the appropriate policies. The 2020 Flagship Firm Productivity report provides a comprehensive account of how productivity is changing –and what is driving those changes –in Europe, drawing from granular firm-level information.Although it was written before the crisis erupted, this report can therefore offer critical insights to current policymaking andprovides grounds for future research.
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The Dilemma of International Diversification: Evidence from the European Sovereign Debt Crisis
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Gergana L. Kostova, Sami Ben Naceur
Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies,
Nr. 2,
2020
Abstract
This paper tests how capital markets value the international diversification of banks in good and in bad economic times by investigating changes in domestic and foreign sovereign debt ratings before and during the European sovereign debt crisis. Tracing 320 European banks in 29 countries and 226 credit rating announcements for European sovereigns between 1 January 2001 and 15 August 2012, we show that the market values banks with access to foreign funds. Despite occasional adverse effects immediately following negative news regarding sovereign credit rating changes, international diversification was found to be beneficial to European banks, especially during periods of distress.
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Banks’ Equity Performance and the Term Structure of Interest Rates
Elyas Elyasiani, Iftekhar Hasan, Elena Kalotychou, Panos K. Pouliasis, Sotiris Staikouras
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments,
Nr. 2,
2020
Abstract
Using an extensive global sample, this paper investigates the impact of the term structure of interest rates on bank equity returns. Decomposing the yield curve to its three constituents (level, slope and curvature), the paper evaluates the time-varying sensitivity of the bank’s equity returns to these constituents by using a diagonal dynamic conditional correlation multivariate GARCH framework. Evidence reveals that the empirical proxies for the three factors explain the variations in equity returns above and beyond the market-wide effect. More specifically, shocks to the long-term (level) and short-term (slope) factors have a statistically significant impact on equity returns, while those on the medium-term (curvature) factor are less clear-cut. Bank size plays an important role in the sense that exposures are higher for SIFIs and large banks compared to medium and small banks. Moreover, banks exhibit greater sensitivities to all risk factors during the crisis and postcrisis periods compared to the pre-crisis period; though these sensitivities do not differ for market-oriented and bank-oriented financial systems.
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Asymmetric Investment Responses to Firm-specific Forecast Errors
Julian Berner, Manuel Buchholz, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
This paper analyses how firm-specific forecast errors derived from survey data of German manufacturing firms over 2007–2011 affect firms’ investment propensity. Understanding how forecast errors affect firm investment behaviour is key to mitigate economic downturns during and after crisis periods in which forecast errors tend to increase. Our findings reveal a negative impact of absolute forecast errors on investment. Strikingly, asymmetries arise depending on the size and direction of the forecast error. The investment propensity declines if the realised situation is worse than expected. However, firms do not adjust investment if the realised situation is better than expected suggesting that the uncertainty component of the forecast error counteracts positive effects of unexpectedly favorable business conditions. Given that the fraction of firms making positive forecast errors is higher after the peak of the recent financial crisis, this mechanism can be one explanation behind staggered economic growth and slow recovery following crises.
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Stress Tests and Small Business Lending
Kristle R. Cortés, Yuliya Demyanyk, Lei Li, Elena Loutskina, Philip E. Strahan
Journal of Financial Economics,
Nr. 1,
2020
Abstract
Post-crisis stress tests have altered banks’ credit supply to small business. Banks most affected by stress tests reallocate credit away from riskier markets and toward safer ones. They also raise interest rates on small loans. Quantities fall most in high-risk markets where stress-tested banks own no branches, and prices rise mainly where they do. The results suggest that banks price the stress-test induced increase in capital requirements where they have local knowledge, and exit where they do not. Stress tests do not, however, reduce aggregate credit. Small banks seem to increase their share in geographies formerly reliant on stress-tested lenders.
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Cross-border Transmission of Emergency Liquidity
Thomas Kick, Michael Koetter, Manuela Storz
Journal of Banking and Finance,
April
2020
Abstract
We show that emergency liquidity provision by the Federal Reserve transmitted to non-U.S. banking markets. Based on manually collected holding company structures, we identify banks in Germany with access to U.S. facilities. Using detailed interest rate data reported to the German central bank, we compare lending and borrowing rates of banks with and without such access. U.S. liquidity shocks cause a significant decrease in the short-term funding costs of the average German bank with access. This reduction is mitigated for banks with more vulnerable balance sheets prior to the inception of emergency liquidity. We also find a significant pass-through in terms of lower corporate credit rates charged for banks with the lowest pre-crisis leverage, US-dollar funding needs, and liquidity buffers. Spillover effects from U.S. emergency liquidity provision are generally confined to short-term rates.
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Does Machine Learning Help us Predict Banking Crises?
Johannes Beutel, Sophia List, Gregor von Schweinitz
Journal of Financial Stability,
December
2019
Abstract
This paper compares the out-of-sample predictive performance of different early warning models for systemic banking crises using a sample of advanced economies covering the past 45 years. We compare a benchmark logit approach to several machine learning approaches recently proposed in the literature. We find that while machine learning methods often attain a very high in-sample fit, they are outperformed by the logit approach in recursive out-of-sample evaluations. This result is robust to the choice of performance metric, crisis definition, preference parameter, and sample length, as well as to using different sets of variables and data transformations. Thus, our paper suggests that further enhancements to machine learning early warning models are needed before they are able to offer a substantial value-added for predicting systemic banking crises. Conventional logit models appear to use the available information already fairly efficiently, and would for instance have been able to predict the 2007/2008 financial crisis out-of-sample for many countries. In line with economic intuition, these models identify credit expansions, asset price booms and external imbalances as key predictors of systemic banking crises.
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