Effectiveness and (In)Efficiencies of Compensation Regulation: Evidence from the EU Banker Bonus Cap
Stefano Colonnello, Michael Koetter, Konstantin Wagner
Abstract
We investigate the (unintended) effects of bank executive compensation regulation. Capping the share of variable compensation spurred average turnover rates driven by CEOs at poorly performing banks. Other than that, banks‘ responses to raise fixed compensation sufficed to retain the vast majority of non-CEO executives and those at well performing banks. We fail to find evidence that banks with executives that are more affected by the bonus cap became less risky. In fact, numerous results indicate an increase of risk, even in its systemic dimension according to selected measures. The return component of bank performance appears to be unaffected by the bonus cap. Risk hikes are consistent with an insurance effect associated with raised the increase in fixed compensation of executives. The ability of the policy to enhance financial stability is therefore doubtful.
Artikel Lesen
Flooded Through the Back Door: Firm-level Effects of Banks‘ Lending Shifts
Oliver Rehbein
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 4,
2018
Abstract
I show that natural disasters transmit to firms in non-disaster areas via their banks. This spillover of non-financial shocks through the banking system is stronger for banks with less regulatory capital. Firms connected to a disaster-exposed bank with below median capital reduce their employment by 11% and their fixed assets by 20% compared to firms in the same region without such a bank during the 2013 flooding in Germany. Relationship banking and higher firm capital also mitigate the effects of such negative cross-regional spillovers.
Artikel Lesen
Too connected to fail? Wie die Vernetzung der Banken staatliche
Rettungsmaßnahmen vorhersagen kann
Friederike Altgelt, Michael Koetter
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Nr. 4,
2017
Abstract
Seit der globalen Finanzkrise 2007/2008 liegt aufgrund ihrer Schlüsselrolle für ein funktionierendes Finanzsystem ein besonderer Fokus auf den so genannten systemrelevanten Finanzinstitutionen (systemically important financial institutions, SIFIs). Neben der Größe von Finanzinstitutionen ist auch das Ausmaß ihrer Vernetzung im internationalen Finanzsystem entscheidend für die Klassifikation als systemrelevant. Obwohl die Vernetzung von Banken untereinander in der Regel schwer zu messen ist, kann sie aus der Entwicklung von Prämien von Kreditausfallversicherungen (den so genannten Credit Default Swap (CDS) Spreads) und Aktienrenditen abgeleitet werden. Dieser Beitrag untersucht, inwieweit sich mit Hilfe der sich daraus ergebenden Co-Crash-Probability vor der Finanzkrise vorhersagen lässt, welche Finanzinstitutionen während der Krise Teil von staatlichen Rettungsprogrammen (bailout programmes) wurden.
Artikel Lesen
Delay Determinants of European Banking Union Implementation
Michael Koetter, Thomas Krause, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
To safeguard financial stability and harmonise regulation, the European Commission substantially reformed banking supervision, resolution, and deposit insurance via EU directives. But most countries delay the transposition of these directives. We ask if transposition delays result from strategic considerations of governments conditional on the state of their financial, regulatory, and political systems? Supervisors might try to protect national banking systems and local politicians maybe reluctant to surrender national sovereignty to deal with failed banks. Alternatively, intricate financial regulation might require more implementation time in large and complex financial and political systems. We therefore collect data on the transposition delays of the three Banking Union directives and investigate observed delay variation across member states. Our correlation analyses suggest that existing regulatory and institutional frameworks, rather than banking market structure or political factors, matter for transposition delays.
Artikel Lesen
The Appropriateness of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure for Central and Eastern European Countries
Martina Kämpfe, Tobias Knedlik
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 16,
2017
Abstract
The experience of Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) during the global financial crisis and in the resulting European debt crises has been largely different from that of other European countries. This paper looks at the specifics of the CEEC in recent history and focuses in particular on the appropriateness of the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure for this group of countries. In doing so, the macroeconomic situation in the CEEC is highlighted and macroeconomic problems faced by these countries are extracted. The findings are compared to the results of the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure of the European Commission. It is shown that while the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure correctly identifies some of the problems, it understates or overstates other problems. This is due to the specific construction of the broadened surveillance procedure, which largely disregarded the specifics of catching-up economies.
Artikel Lesen
Broadening the G20 Financial Inclusion Agenda to Promote Financial Stability: The Role for Regional Banking Networks
Matias Ossandon Busch
G20 Insights Policy Brief, Policy Area "Financial Resilience",
2017
Abstract
Policies that foster the expansion of regional banking services can be an effective tool to enhance financial inclusion by facilitating the access to deposit services. Financial inclusion, in turn, can expand banks’ deposit base with positive spillovers for financial stability, both at the bank and country levels. Governments’ support to unconventional branching via correspondent banking, to the proportionality of regulation, and to the harmonization of banking services can provide the conditions to stimulate banks to reach customers that remain outside the financial system, especially in emerging countries. By encouraging these conditions within its Financial Inclusion Action Plan, the G20 could effectively link its financial inclusion and financial stability objectives within a consistent policy framework.
Artikel Lesen
Drivers of Systemic Risk: Do National and European Perspectives Differ?
Claudia M. Buch, Thomas Krause, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
In Europe, the financial stability mandate generally rests at the national level. But there is an important exception. Since the establishment of the Banking Union in 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) can impose stricter regulations than the national regulator. The precondition is that the ECB identifies systemic risks which are not adequately addressed by the macroprudential regulator at the national level. In this paper, we ask whether the drivers of systemic risk differ when applying a national versus a European perspective. We use market data for 80 listed euro-area banks to measure each bank’s contribution to systemic risk (SRISK) at the national and the euro-area level. Our research delivers three main findings. First, on average, systemic risk increased during the financial crisis. The difference between systemic risk at the national and the euro-area level is not very large, but there is considerable heterogeneity across countries and banks. Second, an exploration of the drivers of systemic risk shows that a bank’s contribution to systemic risk is positively related to its size and profitability. It decreases in a bank’s share of loans to total assets. Third, the qualitative determinants of systemic risk are similar at the national and euro-area level, whereas the quantitative importance of some determinants differs.
Artikel Lesen
State Aid and Guarantees in Europe
Reint E. Gropp, Lena Tonzer
T. Beck, B. Casu (eds): The Palgrave Handbook of European Banking, London,
2016
Abstract
During the recent financial crisis, governments massively intervened in the banking sector by providing liquidity assistance and capital support to banks in distress. This helped stabilize the financial system in the short run. However, public bailouts also bear the risk of longer-term distortions, for example, by affecting bailout expectations of banks. In this chapter, the authors first provide an overview of state aid interventions during the recent crisis episode. The third section then analyzes the effects of state aid on financial stability from a theoretical view. This is followed by the description of results obtained from empirical studies. The link between the provision of state aid and politics is discussed in the section “Institutional Design and Policy Implications”. Finally, in the section “The European Banking Union” the authors describe the elements of the European Banking Union meant to resolve and restructure banks in distress and to lower the need for public intervention. Based on the preceding analysis, conclusions are drawn regarding the new design.
Artikel Lesen
Taxing Banks: An Evaluation of the German Bank Levy
Claudia M. Buch, Björn Hilberg, Lena Tonzer
Journal of Banking and Finance,
November
2016
Abstract
Bank distress can have severe negative consequences for the stability of the financial system. Regimes for the restructuring and resolution of banks, financed by bank levies, aim at reducing these costs. This paper evaluates the German bank levy, which has been implemented since 2011. Our analysis offers three main insights. First, revenues raised through the levy were lower than expected. Second, the bulk of the payments were contributed by large commercial banks and by the central institutions of savings banks and credit unions. Third, for those banks, which were affected by the levy, we find evidence for a reduction in lending and higher deposit rates.
Artikel Lesen
The Role of Complexity for Bank Risk during the Financial Crisis: Evidence from a Novel Dataset
Thomas Krause, Talina Sondershaus, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
We construct a novel dataset to measure banks’ business and geographical complexity. Using these measures of complexity, we evaluate how they relate to banks’ idiosyncratic and systemic riskiness. The sample covers stock listed banks in the euro area from 2007 to 2014. Our results show that banks have increased their total number of subsidiaries while business and geographical complexity have declined. Bank stability is significantly affected by our complexity measures, whereas the direction of the effect differs across the complexity measures: Banks with a higher degree of geographical complexity and a higher share of foreign subsidiaries seem to be less stable. In contrast, a higher share of non-bank subsidiaries significantly decreases the probability for a state aid request during the recent crisis period. This heterogeneity advises against the use of a single complexity measure when evaluating the implications of bank complexity.
Artikel Lesen