Regulierung internationaler Finanzmärkte und Banken
Diese Forschungsgruppe analysiert Ursachen und Konsequenzen von internationalen Aktivitäten von Banken sowie den regulatorischen Rahmen, innerhalb dessen globale Banken operieren.
International aktive Banken können eine effiziente internationale Kapitalallokation vereinfachen und zur internationalen Risikoteilung beitragen. Allerdings können sie auch Instabilitäten generieren und zu einer Übertragung von Schocks über nationale Grenzen hinaus beitragen. Dies ist einer der Gründe für die aktuelle Re-Regulierung des internationalen Bankensystems.
Die Forschungsgruppe trägt auf drei verschiedenen Wegen zur Literatur bei. Erstens analysiert die Gruppe empirisch, warum internationale Banken global aktiv sind und wie Schocks im Finanzsystem übertragen werden. Zweitens untersucht die Gruppe das Entstehen von systemischen Risiken und Ungleichgewichten im integrierten Bankenmarkt und die sich daraus ergebenden Konsequenzen für die Realwirtschaft. Drittens werden die Auswirkungen von Änderungen bezüglich der Bankenaufsicht und Bankenregulierung analysiert, mit einem besonderen Fokus auf dem europäischen Integrationsprozess
IWH-Datenprojekt: International Banking Library
ForschungsclusterFinanzstabilität und Regulierung
07.2017 ‐ 12.2022
Die politische Ökonomie der europäischen Bankenunion
Europäischer Sozialfonds (ESF)
Ursachen für nationale Unterschiede in der Umsetzung der Bankenunion und daraus resultierende Auswirkungen auf die Finanzstabilität.
01.2015 ‐ 12.2017
Dynamic Interactions between Banks and the Real Economy
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG)
National Culture and Risk-taking: Evidence from the Insurance Industry
in: Journal of Business Research, April 2019
The gravity of insurance within the financial sector is constantly increasing. Reasonably, after the events of the recent financial turmoil, the domain of research that examines the factors driving the risk-taking of this industry has been signified. The purpose of the present study is to investigate the interplay between national culture and risk of insurance firms. We quantify the cultural overtones, measuring national culture considering the dimensions outlined by the Hofstede model and risk-taking using the ‘Z-score’. In a sample consisting of 801 life and non-life insurance firms operating across 42 countries over the period 2007–2016, we find a strong and significant relationship among insurance firms' risk-taking and cultural characteristics, such as individualism, uncertainty avoidance and power distance. Results remain robust to a variety of firm and country-specific controls, alternative measures of risk, sample specifications and tests designed to alleviate endogeneity.
Elevated Uncertainty during the Financial Crisis: Do Effects on Subjective Well-being Differ across European Countries?
in: B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Nr. 2, 2019
This paper focuses on the effect of uncertainty as reflected by financial market variables on subjective well-being. The analysis is based on Eurobarometer surveys, covering 18 countries over the period 2000–2013. Individuals report lower levels of life satisfaction in times of higher uncertainty approximated by stock market volatility. This effect is heterogeneous across respondents: the probability of being unsatisfied is higher for respondents who are older, unemployed, less educated, and live in one of the GIIPS countries of the Euro area. Furthermore, higher uncertainty in combination with a financial crisis increases the probability of reporting low values of life satisfaction.
Drivers of Systemic Risk: Do National and European Perspectives Differ?
in: Journal of International Money and Finance, March 2019
With the establishment of the Banking Union, the European Central Bank has been granted the power to impose stricter regulations than the national regulator if systemic risks are not adequately addressed at the national level. We ask whether there is a cross-border externality in the sense that a bank’s systemic risk differs when applying a national versus a European perspective. On average, banks’ contribution to systemic risk is similar at the two regional levels, and so is the ranking of banks. Generally, larger banks and banks with a lower share of loans are more systemically important. The effects of these variables are qualitatively but not quantitatively similar at the national versus the European level.
Political Influence and Financial Flexibility: Evidence from China
in: Journal of Banking & Finance, February 2019
This paper investigates how political influence affects firms’ financial flexibility and speed of adjustment toward target leverage ratios. We find that at the macro level, firms in environments with high political advantages, proxied by provincial affiliations with heads of state as well as political status and party rank of provincial leaders, adjust faster. At the micro level, firms that are state-owned, have CPC members as executives, or bear low exposure to changes in political uncertainty adjust faster. When interacted, the micro-level political factors have more significant impact.
Bank Response to Higher Capital Requirements: Evidence from a Quasi-natural Experiment
in: Review of Financial Studies, Nr. 1, 2019
We study the impact of higher capital requirements on banks’ balance sheets and their transmission to the real economy. The 2011 EBA capital exercise is an almost ideal quasi-natural experiment to identify this impact with a difference-in-differences matching estimator. We find that treated banks increase their capital ratios by reducing their risk-weighted assets, not by raising their levels of equity, consistent with debt overhang. Banks reduce lending to corporate and retail customers, resulting in lower asset, investment, and sales growth for firms obtaining a larger share of their bank credit from the treated banks.
The Cleansing Effect of Banking Crises
in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 12, 2020
We assess the cleansing effects of the recent banking crisis. In U.S. regions with higher levels of supervisory forbearance on distressed banks during the crisis, there is less restructuring in the real sector and the banking sector remains less healthy for several years after the crisis. Regions with less supervisory forbearance experience higher productivity growth after the crisis with more firm entries, job creation, and employment, wages, patents, and output growth. Supervisory forbearance is greater for state-chartered banks and in regions with weaker banking competition and more independent banks, while recapitalisation of distressed banks through TARP does not facilitate cleansing.
The Cleansing Effect of Banking Crises
in: Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Papers, 2020
We assess the cleansing effects of the recent banking crisis. In U.S. regions with higher levels of supervisory forbearance on distressed banks during the crisis, there is less restructuring in the real sector and the banking sector remains less healthy for several years after the crisis. Regions with less supervisory forbearance experience higher productivity growth after the crisis with more firm entries, job creation, and employment, wages, patents, and output growth. Supervisory forbearance is greater for state-chartered banks and in regions with weaker banking competition and more independent banks, while recapitalization of distressed banks through TARP does not facilitate cleansing.
Asymmetric Investment Responses to Firm-specific Forecast Errors
in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 5, 2020
This paper analyses how firm-specific forecast errors derived from survey data of German manufacturing firms over 2007–2011 affect firms’ investment propensity. Understanding how forecast errors affect firm investment behaviour is key to mitigate economic downturns during and after crisis periods in which forecast errors tend to increase. Our findings reveal a negative impact of absolute forecast errors on investment. Strikingly, asymmetries arise depending on the size and direction of the forecast error. The investment propensity declines if the realised situation is worse than expected. However, firms do not adjust investment if the realised situation is better than expected suggesting that the uncertainty component of the forecast error counteracts positive effects of unexpectedly favorable business conditions. Given that the fraction of firms making positive forecast errors is higher after the peak of the recent financial crisis, this mechanism can be one explanation behind staggered economic growth and slow recovery following crises.
Financial Linkages and Sectoral Business Cycle Synchronisation: Evidence from Europe
in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 2, 2020
We analyse whether financial integration between countries leads to converging or diverging business cycles using a dynamic spatial model. Our model allows for contemporaneous spillovers of shocks to GDP growth between countries that are financially integrated and delivers a scalar measure of the spillover intensity at each point in time. For a financial network of ten European countries from 1996-2017, we find that the spillover effects are positive on average but much larger during periods of financial stress, pointing towards stronger business cycle synchronisation. Dismantling GDP growth into value added growth of ten major industries, we observe that some sectors are strongly affected by positive spillovers (wholesale & retail trade, industrial production), others only to a weaker degree (agriculture, construction, finance), while more nationally influenced industries show no evidence for significant spillover effects (public administration, arts & entertainment, real estate).
Inside Asset Purchase Programs: The Effects of Unconventional Policy on Banking Competition
in: ECB Working Paper Series, Nr. 2017, 2017
We test if unconventional monetary policy instruments influence the competitive conduct of banks. Between q2:2010 and q1:2012, the ECB absorbed Euro 218 billion worth of government securities from five EMU countries under the Securities Markets Programme (SMP). Using detailed security holdings data at the bank level, we show that banks exposed to this unexpected (loose) policy shock mildly gained local loan and deposit market shares. Shifts in market shares are driven by banks that increased SMP security holdings during the lifetime of the program and that hold the largest relative SMP portfolio shares. Holding other securities from periphery countries that were not part of the SMP amplifies the positive market share responses. Monopolistic rents approximated by Lerner indices are lower for SMP banks, suggesting a role of the SMP to re-distribute market power differentially, but not necessarily banking profits.